Three Cheers for Tanha
Robert Morrison (Dharmachari Sagaramati)
---o0o---
copyright retained by the author
Robert Morrison is the author of Nietzsche
and Buddhism:
A Study in Nihilism and Ironic Affinities, Oxford University
Press, 1997.
Introduction
Anyone acquainted with either the
Pali suttas or the
Theravaada tradition as a whole, if asked for an opinion on the
spiritual status of ta.nhaa,
usually translated as 'craving', would most likely answer along
the lines that ta.nhaa
is entirely antithetical to the Buddhist spiritual quest, the brahmacariya,
and is
almost akin to the Christian notion of 'original sin', in the
sense that no one is born
without it. As the second of the Four Noble Truths tells us, ta.nhaa
is the cause
of dukkha or 'suffering and unsatisfactoriness', the first
Noble Truth, and the
cessation of ta.nhaa, the third Noble Truth, is synonymous
with nirvaa.na
itself, the very goal of Buddhist practice. Ta.nhaa is said
to be the 'seamstress'
that 'sews one just into this ever-becoming rebirth'.[1] It is
that by 'which this world
is smothered, enveloped, tangled like a ball of thread, covered as
with a blight, twisted
up like a grass-rope, so that it overpasses not sa.msaara,
the Downfall, the Way of
Woe, the Ruin'.[2] It is likened to an 'arrow … thickly smeared
with poison'.[3]
Selecting certain passages from the Paali suttas, one can
build up a view of ta.nhaa
as completely unwholesome and anti-spiritual, something that has
simply to be negated.
Notwithstanding this reprobation of ta.nhaa, in this essay I
will present a more
sympathetic view, a view that highlights the wider implications of
ta.nhaa, and
contends that without it there would be no Buddhist spiritual life
– no brahmacariya
or 'pursuit of excellence' – and therefore no Buddhas.
1.
The Term Tanhaa
Ta.nhaa is literally
'drought' or 'thirst' and, as
the Pali-English Dictionary informs us, 'is found mainly in
poetry, or in prose
passages charged with emotion. It is rarely used in the philosophy
or the psychology'.
Figuratively, it means 'craving, hunger for, excitement, the fever
of unsatisfied
longing'. Given its poetic pedigree, ta.nha can be said to
be a term that appeals
more to the imagination than reason, and this may be why it is
hardly mentioned in the
lists and abstract permutations of the later technical, not to say
arid, literature of the
Abhidhamma. To those who heard the word from the mouth of the
Buddha or one of his
disciples, ta.nhaa no doubt evoked an acute pathos which
the translation 'craving'
miserably fails to do. To understand ta.nhaa as simply one
affect among other
affects would be a mistake. For example ta.nhaa, as we
shall see, is a term that
has cosmic significance, and is a notion that is best understood
metaphorically, as a
metaphor that evokes the general condition that all unenlightened
beings find themselves
in in the world: a state of being characterized by a 'thirst' that
compels a pursuit for
appeasement, the urge to seek out some form of gratification. In
other words, ta.nhaa
is a metaphor for the existential and affective ground underlying
the whole of sa.msaaric
existence,[4] the ground out of which spring the various strivings
for satisfaction,
fulfilment, and meaning. It can therefore be understood as an
attempt to characterize, in
a single metaphor, the general condition of unenlightened
existence, as well as providing
the primary reason why sa.msaara is deemed ultimately to be
dukkha or
'unsatisfactory': as sa.msaara cannot fully quench
our 'thirst', it must
appear to one who fully understands this (i.e. an ariya) as
dukkha.[5]
2.
The Cosmological Perspective
In the Aggaa Sutta, which
is as near as Buddhism
comes to having a kind of Genesis, at the end of the 'devolution' (sa.mva.t.ta)
cycle of the cosmos,[6] most beings are said to be reborn in the
AAbhassara Brahmaa world,
where they are said to 'dwell, mind-made, feeding on delight,
self-luminous, moving
through the air, glorious'. They remain in this condition for 'a
very long time'. However,
all things being impermanent, the ordinary world begins to evolve
again, and those
self-luminous beings, as a result of their 'merit' (pua)
running out,
tumble down the Buddhist version of the 'great chain of being' and
eventually hover around
the now evolving earth. As the Buddha tells it to Vaase.t.tha:
At that
period, Vaase.t.tha, there was
just one mass of water, and all was darkness, blinding darkness.
Neither moon nor sun
appeared, no constellations or stars appeared, night and day were
not distinguished, nor
months and fortnights, nor years or seasons, and no male and
female, beings being reckoned
just as beings. And sooner or later, after a very long period,
savoury earth spread itself
over the waters where those beings were. It looked just like the
skin that forms itself
over hot milk as it cools. It was the colour of fine ghee or
butter, and it was very
sweet, like pure wild honey.
Then some
being of a greedy nature
said: 'I say, what can this be?' and tasted the savoury earth on
his finger. In so doing,
he became taken with the flavour, and ta.nhaa arose in him.
Then other beings,
taking their cue from him, also tasted the stuff with their
fingers. They too were taken
with the flavour, and ta.nhaa arose in them… And as a
result their
self-luminance disappeared … the sun and moon appeared, night and
day were
distinguished, months and fortnights appeared, and the year and
its seasons. To that
extent the world re-evolved. [D iii. 84-85][7]
The once self-luminous beings
continue their 'fall',
becoming coarser and coarser as they become more and more
entangled in the world, until
they eventually create the kind of troubled and divided world that
surrounds us today,
populated by people like us, driven by all sorts of affects. And,
as we can see, it is ta.nhaa
that replaces the infamous bite of the infamous apple[8], causing
the world to re-evolve
– a kind of Buddhist version of the 'fall' – but here the apple is
replaced by
what seems to be one of those delicious Indian sweets, and the
'fall' is only a part of a
cycle that endlessly repeats itself. We also notice that ta.nhaa
arose not in the
mind of a crude, biologically conditioned being, stuck somewhere
in the mid-reaches of the
kaama-loka, but in the mind of a deva, a divine
'self-luminous' being from
the reaches of the ruupa-loka.[9] Elsewhere, the Buddha
declares that ta.nhaa
is the 'fuel' (upaadaana) that links one life with the
next,[10] implying that ta.nhaa
is the radical condition for existing anywhere within the Buddhist
cosmos, including its
higher, more refined reaches.
The cosmic significance of ta.nhaa
is also witnessed
elsewhere. For example, in the A'nguttara Nikaaya we have:
Bhikkhus, a
first beginning of
bhava-ta.nhaa cannot be known [paaayati] before which one
could say
bhava-ta.nhaa did not exist, it has since come to be'. [A v.
116.]
Although this sutta
mentions bhava-ta.nhaa,
which, together with kaama-ta.nhaa and vibhava-ta.nhaa
is one of a group of
three ta.nhaas mentioned in the suttas,[11] and not ta.nhaa
per se, I
think it is rather obvious that bhava-ta.nhaa or the
'thirst-to-be', being the most
general and basic of the three, is, in fact, ta.nhaa per
se. For example, kaama-ta.nhaa
is 'thirsting' after specifically sensual experiences and is,
therefore, an aspect of the
more general bhava-ta.nhaa, which is 'thirsting' after any
form of being or
experience – it is simply the urge to be, or, more
correctly, to become
(bhava). If we assume that existence does not have an
inherent Freudian 'Death
Wish', then the third ta.nhaa, vibhava-ta.nhaa or
'thirst for
non-existence', is more likely to be the outcome of the continual
frustration of bhava-ta.nhaa
and kaama-ta.nhaa, and is therefore a secondary and derived
state. The fundamental ta.nhaa
is therefore bhava-ta.nhaa, which I would understand as
being synonymous with ta.nhaa
per se.
Given this, we can say that ta.nhaa
has cosmic
significance. Like the cosmos itself, its beginning is said to
unknowable,[12] and it is
presented, in this Buddhist 'Genesis',[13] as the primary and
affective condition that
sets in motion another cycle of the Buddhist cosmos, implying that
it is understood to be
the primal condition out of which all other affects can be said to
develop. Ta.nhaa,
from this perspective, can be understood as the all-pervasive and
fundamental
characteristic of the Buddhist cosmos; its raison d'tre.
3. Ta.nhaa
as a Metaphor
In the sutta before the one
just quoted, what is said
of ta.nhaa having no knowable first beginning is also said
of 'spiritual ignorance'
[avijjaa].[14] Commenting on these two suttas,
Buddhaghosa asks: 'But why
does the Bhagavant [i.e. the Buddha] give the exposition of
sa.msaara with [ta.nhaa
and avijjaa] as starting points?' He provides his own
answer: 'Because they are the
principal causes of action [kamman] that lead to happy and
unhappy destinies'.[15]
Unlike Christianity and Islam, Buddhism does not posit any
particular point in time when
the universe first came into being, let alone posit any first
cause: the cosmos has no
known first beginning. Therefore, even these two 'principal
causes' of ta.nhaa and avijjaa
are not in any manner causa sui, but said to be
'conditionally connected' [idappaccayaa],[16]
not otherwise. In other words, they have no independent,
autonomous existence. 'But', as
Buddhaghosa adds, 'there is a metaphorical [pariyaaya] way
in which [they] can be
treated as the root cause [of sa.msaara]. What way is that?
When [they are] made to
serve as a starting point in an exposition of sa.msaara'.[17]
In other words, they
are methodologically foremost in that they represent the basic and
general condition of
unenlightened, sa.msaaric existence, as well as being the last
sa.msaaric tendencies to be
eroded before attaining Arahantship or complete Buddhahood. In
this sense, in one form or
another, they characterize the whole of sa.msaaric existence, from
its most primitive and
crude depths to its most refined heights. They can, therefore, be
said to be there from
the very 'beginning' through to the final 'end' of sa.msaara.
One could even add
that, conjoined, these two are the twin pillars that support the
whole edifice of
sa.msaara. Ta.nhaa, therefore, according to this
account, is clearly not some
particular affect among other affects, but is best understood as a
metaphor – a
metaphor that attempts to capture the most pervasive affective
characteristic of
sa.msaaric existence. Moreover, if we take these two suttas
from the A'nguttara
Nikaaya at face value, it appears that ta.nhaa, as bhava-ta.nhaa,
is
even more fundamental than avijjaa or 'spiritual
ignorance'. In the sutta
dealing with ta.nhaa it is said that ta.nhaa is
'nourished' by avijjaa,
which in turn is nourished by the 'five hindrances', which are
nourished by 'the three
wrong ways of practice', and so on, whereas in the sutta
dealing with avijjaa,
it is said that avijjaa is nourished by 'the five
hindrances', which are nourished
by 'the three wrong ways of practice', and so on, making ta.nhaa
more fundamental
than even avijjaa. However, both are said to be
conditionally dependent, implying
that we can understand ta.nhaa and avijjaa as the
affective and cognitive
aspects of the one state. In other words, there is a conditional
interdependence between
affective state and perceived world which cannot be
experientially separated.[18]
To use an image from the suttas, they are like two sheaves
of reeds stacked
together, which depend upon each other for support.[19] The two
sheaves of reeds in this
case are naama-ruupa or 'mind and body' and viaa.na
or 'consciousness',
which implies that 'consciousness' or 'discernment' (viaa.na)
is conditionally
dependent upon the affects, and vice versa – taking naama
or 'mind' as
comprising vedanaa or 'feeling-sensation', saaa or
'apperception', and
the sa'nkhaaras or 'formative forces', which is where the
affects are found. This
interdependence can also be seen elsewhere in the suttas,
where the Buddha exhorts
his bhikkhus to cultivate meditative concentration (samaadhi):
'A bhikkhu
who is concentrated knows (pajaanaati) things as they
really are (yathaa-bhuuta)'.[20]
The state of samaadhi here being the necessary affective
state for 'transformative
insight' (paaa) to arise, which, notwithstanding their
interdependence, again
intimates the primacy of the affective in relation to the
cognitive.
4.
Dependent Co-Arising and Ta.nhaa
That ta.nhaa can be
understood as a general condition
rather than a specific affect can also be seen in the most common
twelve-membered nidaana
chain of pa.ticca-samuppaada or 'dependent co-arising'.
Here, it is said that in
dependence upon our 'contact' [phassa] with the world, vedanaa
or
'feeling-sensation' arises; in dependence upon vedanaa
there arises ta.nhaa;
and in dependence upon ta.nhaa arises upaadaana or
'clinging', which results
in becoming even more bound up in sa.msaaric activities. However, I
do not consider ta.nhaa
here to refer to a particular affect arising in dependence
upon
'feeling-sensation', but a term for a general condition: it
is, as Buddhaghosa puts
it, a 'metaphorical' [pariyaaya] expression for the primary
and general condition
of our being in the world, from which spring the manifold affects
that arise through our
contact with the world.[21] For example, if a heterosexual man
encounters a very
attractive woman, this will probably give rise to a pleasurable
'feeling-sensation', which
in turn can form the condition for the arising of affects such as
'lust' [raaga],
'infatuation' [pema], etc. Whereas, if we encounter someone
who tells us that we
are stupid, then the 'feeling-sensation' is more likely to be
unpleasant, which in turn
can form the condition for the arising of affects such as
'aversion' [pa.tigha] or
'hatred' [dosa], etc. The response to 'feeling-sensation'
is going to be a
particular affect, and ta.nhaa here, as I suggest, is not
so much a particular
affect, but is best understood metaphorically, as the general
condition from which there
can arise all manner of affects, including, as we shall see, what
Buddhism regards as
'skilful' (kusala) affects, the kind of affects cultivated
in an active spiritual
life.
We get an intimation that tanhaa
can give rise to
skilful affects in a version of pa.ticca-samuppaada found
in the Mahaanidaana
Sutta of the Diigha Nikaaya. Here it is said that 'ta.nhaa
conditions
searching' (pariyesanaa), which in turn conditions
'acquisition' (laabha),
and so on ending with 'the taking up of stick and sword, quarrels,
disputes, arguments,
strife, abuse, lying and other evil and unskilful states'.[22] The
sutta then goes
on to say that 'ta.nhaa is the cause, the reason, the
origin, the condition for all
searching (pariyesanaa)'. However, elsewhere, it is clear
that all searching does
not necessarily lead to 'lying and other evil and unskilful
states'. For example in the Majjhima
Nikaaya, the Ariyapariyesanaa Sutta tells us there is a
'noble search' (ariyaa
pariyesanaa) as well as an 'ignoble search' (anariyaa
pariyesanaa). The noble
search corresponds to Gotama's going forth, when, 'while still
young, a black-haired young
man endowed with the blessing of youth, in the prime of life,
though my mother and father
wished otherwise and wept with tearful faces, I shaved off my hair
and beard, put on the
yellow robe, and went forth from the home life into homelessness …
seeking the
supreme state of sublime peace'.[23] If 'ta.nhaa is the
cause, the reason, the
origin, the condition for all searching (pariyesanaa)', can
we not say that this
noble search (ariyaa pariyesanaa) also has its origin in ta.nhaa?
If ta.nhaa
is, as I have said, simply a metaphor that sums up the state we
find ourselves in in the
world, a state of seeking we know not what, what other basic
condition would this noble
search spring from?
In this sutta, the Buddha
mentions that, before his
enlightenment, he too was caught up in the ignoble search. The
switch from the ignoble to
the noble search came about as a result of his reflecting on his
experience of the
unsatisfactoriness of his former searching, i.e. the ignoble
search, which led him to set
out in search of something more spiritually worthy and meaningful,
i.e. the noble search,
by means of which he discovered the 'supreme state of sublime
peace', Nibbaana. Although
the sutta tells us that he went forth in search of 'the
unaging, unailing,
deathless, sorrowless, and undefiled supreme security from
bondage, Nibbaana', I think we
must assume that when he set out on this noble search he did not know
if there were
such a state as nirvaa.na to be attained; he did not know
if he would find
an answer. We only know this as a result of his noble search. From
this episode, we can
say that the Buddha-to-be was a human being who, because of his ta.nhaa
– his
urge for satisfaction – sought to gratify this urge through the
ignoble search,
seeking satisfaction, security, happiness, fulfillment in those
things which cannot
provide real satisfaction (in the sutta they are said to be
'Wife and children
… men and women slaves, goats and sheep … gold and silver,' etc).
The result of
searching for happiness and meaning in these areas was that his ta.nhaa
was not
appeased: he experienced dissatisfaction and frustration (dukkha),
which led him to
reflect more deeply on life. His reflections led him to try
another way of life to satisfy
his longing – to appease his ta.nhaa – by setting out on
the brahmacariya
or 'life in pursuit of excellence': he left home, became a sama.na,
studied under
various teachers, attained what they had attained, was still not
satisfied, became an
ascetic, nearly killed himself in the process, and eventually went
off on his own and
finally attained what he was searching for – nirvaa.na.
Reading the text in
this way, it is clear that although ta.nhaa is the urge
that leads to the ignoble
search, it can also be understood as the urge that leads to the
noble search as well, and
the eventual attainment of nirvaa.na. The shift from the
ignoble to the noble
search is not a matter of restraining ta.nhaa, or of
attempting to annihilate it,
but arises as a consequence of reflection: reflecting on the fact
that the life one is
leading leaves one's basic desire for fulfillment (ta.nhaa)
unsatisfied. Ta.nhaa
remains to goad one onto a new search, to look for new
possibilities[24]. Therefore, we
can say that because Gotama's ta.nhaa remained unsatisfied,
and his reflections led
him to see that the worldly life is inherently unsatisfactory,
when he saw the Fourth
Sight[25] he was able to respond to the religious ideal the
wandering mendicant
symbolized, and 'went forth from home into the homeless life' as a
sama.na, the
pursuit of which eventually led to him becoming a Buddha, an
'Awakened One'.[26] Ta.nhaa,
therefore, can be understood as the basis from which both the
ignoble and the noble search
can spring. The cause of the shift from the ignoble to the noble
search is a matter of
seeing that the life one is leading, although it may have its
pleasures and moments of
happiness and fulfillment, leaves one's basic existential state (ta.nhaa)
untouched. Only the noble search can affect that more basic
existential condition.
5.
Skilful and Unskilful Ta.nhaa
Although, as I have said, the
common and accepted
traditional view of ta.nhaa is of a state antithetical to
the Buddhist spiritual
life, there are some rarely commented-upon passages which indicate
that ta.nhaa
also has a more wholesome aspect.
In the A'nguttara Nikaaya
we have the statement: 'he
abandons ta.nhaa by means of ta.nhaa'.[27] But as to
what this statement
might imply, the sutta itself provides only a hint, and is
in need of exegesis.
Fortunately, the commentary provides some:
Based on the
present craving [ta.nhaa]
(i. e., desire for becoming an Arahant), he gives up previous
craving that was the
root-cause of (one's involvement in) the cycle of rebirth. Now (it
may be asked) whether
such present craving (for Arahantship) is wholesome [kusala]
or unwholesome [akusala]?
— It is unwholesome. — Should it be pursued or not? — It should be
pursued [sevitabbaa].
— Does it drag one into rebirth [pa.tisandhi.m aaka.d.dhati]
or not? — It
does not drag one into rebirth.[28]
As Nyanaponika adds at the end of
this quote, 'Such
permissible (sevitabbaa) craving is abandoned when its
object is attained'. In
other words, the 'desire for becoming an Arahant', which is
identified here as 'present ta.nhaa',
is abandoned only when one attains Arahantship. However, it seems
rather odd that although
this 'present ta.nhaa', which Nyanaponika understands as
the 'desire for becoming
an Arahant', 'should be pursued' and 'does not drag one into
rebirth', nevertheless it is
regarded by the commentator as unskilful (akusala). How can
the desire to become an
Arahant be 'unwholesome' (akusala)? Perhaps the commentator
has in mind a similar
theme found in the Sa.myutta Nikaaya, where chanda
or 'desire to do'
replaces ta.nhaa, and which makes the matter a little
clearer. There the brahmin
U.n.naabha asks AAnanda:
What is it,
master AAnanda, for which
the 'life of excellence' [brahmacariya] is lived under the
recluse Gotama?
For the sake
of abandoning 'desire to
do' [chanda], brahmin, the life of excellence is lived
under the Exalted One.
[S v. 271ff.] [29]
When asked whether there is any
practice for abandoning this
chanda, AAnanda replies that chanda is to be
abandoned by developing the
four iddhi-paadas or 'paths to power', the first of which
is chanda-samaadhi
or 'concentration of will'.[30] U.n.naabha retorts: 'That he
should get rid of one chanda
by means of another chanda is an impossible thing'. AAnanda
then asks U.n.naabha
whether, before setting out to visit him, he had the chanda
to visit him, and when
he arrived at the Park, whether that chanda was not now
abated? U.n.naabha agrees
that this is the case:
Very well
then, brahmin. That monk who
is [an] Arahant, in whom the aasavas are destroyed, who has
reached perfection,
done what had to be done, laid down the burden, reached the
highest good, who has outworn
the fetters of becoming and is freed by perfect knowledge [sammadaaa]
–
that chanda which he previously had to attain Arahantship,
now that Arahantship is
won, that appropriate [tajja] chanda is appeased [pa.tippassaddha].
The chanda to be
'abandoned' [pahaana], which,
interestingly, the commentator construes as ta.nhaa,[31] is
to be abandoned by
means of developing the 'appropriate' chanda, which, here,
is the chanda or
'desire' for Arahantship. And, as the text tells us, this
'appropriate' chanda is
not said to be simply negated at the attainment of Arahantship,
but is said to be
'appeased', or, we could say, satisfied and fulfilled. All that is
negated is the
possibility of chanda having aims and objects whose pursuit
would lead to
frustration and unsatisfactoriness (dukkha).[32] Using this
model, we can therefore
fill out the statement 'he abandons ta.nhaa by means of ta.nhaa':
ta.nhaa,
whose aims and objects are within sa.msaara, is to be
abandoned by developing
'appropriate' [tajja] ta.nhaa, which is a form of ta.nhaa
that can
become 'appeased' as its aim is Arahantship. But what form would
this appropriate ta.nhaa
take? Although there are no such terms in the suttas as
'thirsting after
Arahantship' (arahatta-ta.nhaa), or 'thirsting after the
Dhamma' (dhamma-ta.nhaa),[33]
the notion that ta.nhaa can have Arahantship as its aim is
found in the
post-canonical Nettippakara.na:[34]
There are
two kinds of ta.nhaa:
skilful [kusala] and unskilful [akusala]. Unskilful ta.nhaa
leads to sa.msaara,
skilful ta.nhaa is for abandoning, which leads to
diminishing [of sa.msaaric
activities]. [87][35]
As the text goes on to tell us,
quoting a passage from the Majjhima
Nikaaya, such skilful ta.nhaa is synonymous with an
'eager desire [pihaa]
to enter the peaceful sphere that the ariyas, who having
realized it by themselves,
dwell in'.[36] Thus, having 'liberation of mind' (ceto-vimutti)
due to the 'fading
away of [unskilful] desire' (raaga-viraaga) as its object,
such ta.nhaa is
skilful,[37] and, in the manner of chanda, can therefore be
said to be eventually
'appeased'.
The Paali commentator,
Buddhaghosa, also understands ta.nhaa
as having a wholesome aspect:
just as …
[a] cow, through her ta.nhaa
for cold water, starts drinking cold water, which gives her
satisfaction and allays
her torment, so the worldly man in the grip of bhava-ta.nhaa
performs actions of
various kinds beginning with abstention from killing living
beings. This leads to happy
destinies and gives satisfaction because it is free from the
burning defilements and, by
bringing him to a happy destiny, allays the torment of suffering
[that would be
experienced] in those unhappy destinies.[38]
Buddhaghosa points out that the
spiritually ignorant person
is like a thirsty cow who tries to slake her thirst by drinking
hot water, 'which gives no
satisfaction', and represents unskilful action leading to
continual frustration and sorrow
(dukkha). Given these examples, we can therefore say that
'getting rid of ta.nhaa
by means of ta.nhaa' implies that ta.nhaa can only
be 'appeased' by becoming
skilful, by 'thirsting' after those things that, from the
Buddhist point of view,
can actually bring real satisfaction. In other words, ta.nhaa,
as the general
condition of unenlightened existence, can only be 'appeased' by
taking up the Buddhist brahmacariya
or 'pursuit of excellence', whose goal is nirvaa.na.
It is also interesting to note
that two affects closely
related to ta.nhaa – raaga and kaama – also
have this
twofold aspect.[39] For example, we have the terms dhamma-raaga
or 'desire for the
Dhamma',[40] and dhamma-kaama or 'love of the Dhamma',[41]
both of which are
understood as kusala affects to be developed. Yet raaga
is listed as one of
the three akusala-muulas or 'roots of unskilfulness' from
which other secondary
unskilful affects are said to develop, and is, as far as I am
aware – at least in the
Theravaada tradition – always considered an akusala affect,
as is kaama.
Raaga and kaama, therefore, like ta.nhaa and chanda,
can also
be said to have their kusala and akusala aspects,
their ariya and anariya
aspects, and, when their objects are 'appropriate', can be said to
form part of the
affective aspect of the Buddhist path, and eventually find
satisfaction. However, if, as I
have argued, ta.nhaa is not simply an affect among other
affects, but is best
understood as the affective ground out of which all the affects
can be said to spring,
then these kusala forms of chanda, raaga, and kaama
can be said to be
the affective expressions of kusalaa ta.nhaa.
Another interesting distinction
made in the suttas,
which also has relevance here, is that between the aamisa
or 'carnal' affects and
the dhamma or 'spiritual' affects.[42] For example, there
is both a 'carnal' or
'unregenerate' and a 'spiritual' or 'regenerate' form of 'longing'
(esanaa),
'searching' (pariyesanaa), 'enjoyment' (bhoga),
'compassion' (anukampaa),
'generosity' (caaga), 'prosperity' (vu.d.dhi),
'favour' (anuggaha),
'sharing' (sa.mvibhaaga), 'worship' (puujaa),
'power' (iddhi), etc.
Although no examples are given to illustrate this distinction, I
would conjecture that,
for example in the case of 'longing' (esanaa), as we have
already have the
distinction between the 'ignoble search' (anariyaa pariyesanaa)
and the 'spiritual
search' (ariyaa pariyesanaa), 'longing' in its aamisa
form would be for
material objects and pleasures, whereas 'longing' in its dhamma
form would have
spiritual objects in mind. Therefore, as we have a whole list of
affects having a kusala,
or ariya, or dhamma form, as well as an akusala,
or anariya,
or aamisa form, it can be said that neither ta.nhaa,
raaga, kaama,
pihaa, esanaa, pariyesanaa nor chanda
are intrinsically
unskilful, ignoble, or unregenerate, but it is the objects sought
after that determine
whether they are either skilful or unskilful, noble or ignoble,
generate or unregenerate.
Given this, we could say that there are four conditions of ta.nhaa:
(1) as the
affective ground of existence, or simply ta.nhaa per se,
which is ethically
neutral, but which, as the methodological starting point, can give
rise both to skilful
and to unskilful affects; (2) unskilful ta.nhaa, when it is
the general condition
for the arising of unskilful affects; (3) skilful ta.nhaa,
when it is the general
condition for the arising of skilful affects; (4) the
'appeasement' of ta.nhaa, or,
we could say, the 'quenching' or even 'satiation' of ta.nhaa,
which is nirvaa.na.[43]
Ta.nhaa per se is simply the general condition out of which
all kinds of affects,
both skilful and unskilful, can arise. When those affects are
skilful, we can say that the
general condition out of which they arise is skilful; when
unskilful, the general
condition is unskilful. Given that Buddhist doctrine teaches that
all things come to be
only in dependence upon conditions, and that, as I see it, ta.nhaa
per se has no
ethical apriority, this raises the interesting question as to the
conditions under which ta.nhaa
can be said to become either skilful or unskilful.
In the section on 'Ta.nhaa
as metaphor', we saw that
besides ta.nhaa, avijjaa or 'spiritual ignorance'
also had no knowable or
perceptible 'first beginning'. Further, according to Buddhaghosa, ta.nhaa
and avijjaa,
'being the principle causes of action [kamman]', 'can be
treated as the root cause
[of sa.msaara]', and, methodologically, can therefore be
'made to serve as the
starting point in an exposition of sa.msaara' – which, like
ta.nhaa and
avijjaa, has no knowable beginning. As ta.nhaa and avijjaa
are so
fundamental and are so inextricably linked – one cannot have one
without the other
– within the individual they can be understood as the basic
affective and cognitive
aspects that inform experience, which implies that how one sees
and understands one's self
and the world is influenced by one's affective state, and one's
affective state is in turn
influenced by the way one sees and understands one's self and the
world. As we saw above,
according to Buddhaghosa, they are 'conditionally connected' [idappaccayaa].
Yet if
ta.nhaa can be skilful as well as unskilful, and skilful
activity is spiritual
activity, then 'spiritual ignorance' (avijjaa) cannot be
the cognitive counterpart
of skilful ta.nhaa, whose object is nirvaa.na. The
cognitive counterpart of
skilful ta.nhaa must be something like 'right-view' (sammaa-di.t.thi),
the
first member of the Noble Eightfold Path. Further, if ta.nhaa
per se has no
knowable beginning, and is simply the general condition that all
beings find themselves in
in the world, it would be rather absurd to hold them all culpable
for being in a condition
of ta.nhaa. And, as 'spiritual ignorance' (avijjaa)
is ta.nhaa's
beginningless cognitive counterpart, then beings cannot be held
ultimately responsible for
being born in the condition of 'spiritual ignorance' either,
implying that 'spiritual
ignorance' is also an ethically neutral state. To do otherwise
would be to hold all beings
culpable for not being born fully fledged Buddhas from that
'unknowable beginning', which
is clearly ridiculous. Given this, we can draw up a correspondence
between the various
forms of ta.nhaa and their cognitive counterparts:
ta.nhaa per
se...........................................avijjaa or
'spiritual ignorance'
unskilful ta.nhaa.....................................micchaa-di.t.thi
or 'wrong-view'
skilful ta.nhaa.........................................sammaa-di.t.thi
or 'right-view'
ta.nhaa
'appeased'.................................vijjaa or
'wisdom' (i.e. nirvaa.na).
The question as to how ta.nhaa
can become either
skilful or unskilful can therefore be linked to the question as to
how 'wrong-views' and
'right-views' arise. However, as this list of correspondences is
not found as such in the
Paali tradition, I will put this question into a simplified
evolutionary setting so as to
provide an alternative perspective.
6. Ta.nhaa
in an Evolutionary Setting
As ta.nhaa per se is the
general existential
condition we find ourselves in, it is the source from which spring
the various means of
seeking some form of gratification and purpose in life. Using
Buddhist traditional terms,
we can see this search for gratification as expressive of the two
'root' affects of raaga
or 'desire' in general, and dosa or 'aversion', the
former being the basic
response to that which appears attractive, the latter to what
appears threatening.
Together with their cognitive aspect, moha or
'bewilderment', these form the three akusala-muulas
or 'unskilful-roots' of existence. Although Buddhism is concerned
solely with the
spiritual life, and these unskilful-roots are always regarded
ethically as hindrances to
the individual's spiritual development, in their cruder forms they
are also regarded as
hindrances to civilized society itself. Notwithstanding this, for
the purposes of this
illustration, I will transfer them from their traditional
conception and view them from
the perspective of a non-moral evolutionary setting, as the most
general and basic natural
forces that were necessary for the evolution and survival
of early man: raaga
as the urge to acquire the necessities for survival; dosa
as the aggressive drive
needed when one is acquiring those necessities in a contest with
others, as well as to
defend one's possessions and family/tribe against aggressors. As moha
is the
dimness of the bewildered mind in relation to the truth of the
spiritual life, it is
simply the general state of mind that the other affects inhabit.
In early man it would be
a state of mind with very limited horizons: eating, copulating,
hunting, basic
co-operation with other members of the tribe and, in moments of
quiet consciousness,
perhaps the first glimmerings of 'why?' The view that simply
satisfying basic needs will
ever quench ta.nhaa would be in Buddhist terms a micchaa-di.t.thi
or
'wrong-view'. But because ta.nhaa cannot be fully satisfied
with such basic needs,
some will eventually experience this state of affairs as
unsatisfactory (dukkha),
and will therefore seek out more satisfying ways of living – other
views on life
– which can lead, eventually, at least in some instances, to the
emergence of more
developed and civilized societies. As life in such a society, at
least for some, is not so
dominated by the ends of pure survival and satisfying basic needs,
there will arise the
necessary freedom for more co-operative and cultivated social
interaction to arise,
providing the necessary conditions for a wider range of more
purely human and cultivated
responses and affects to emerge. Such a progression is compatible
with the general
Buddhist doctrine of pa.ticca-samuppaada: affects arise in
dependence upon
conditions. Therefore, within such conditions, more developed and
civilized affects can
emerge – including those which Buddhism would regard as being to
some degree kusala
– as well as their interrelated cognitive counterparts expressed
in such cultural
forms as literature, philosophy, art, religion, etc. Some of these
forms would embody, to
some degree, what Buddhism would recognize as 'mundane' (lokiya)
sammaa-di.t.thi
or 'right-view', in that they would 'understand that it is good to
be generous, make
offerings and sacrifices; that both good and evil actions will
bear fruit and have
consequences; that there is this world and the other world',
etc.,[44] views that are
found in most civilized cultures. Such a state of affairs can
arise out of the fact that
man is driven by his 'thirst' for satisfaction and meaning in
life, and that, as long as
he has not seen the way to satisfy his deeper longings, in other
words, as long as
'right-view' has not arisen, he will continually experience
dissatisfaction (dukkha),
which, in turn, is the primary condition for the search to
continue.
All this, however, is contingent.
Buddhism has no notion of
any divinely ordained and necessary progress up through the 'Great
Chain of Being', or any
of its modern secular counterparts (there are no fatherly Buddhas
looking after us). Apart
from natural forces, the main factors in the nexus of conditions
within which human
development and progress can be said to happen are the
all-too-fickle human desires and
aspirations. Thus the greater freedom offered by more civilized
societies also gives the
opportunity for base unskilful affects to arise, which create
various unwholesome
ideologies such as fascism, racialism, despotism, and express
themselves in religious
bigotry and intolerance, etc. Therefore at times and for various
reasons, the crude and
atavistic urges – primitive raaga and dosa – erupt
under
conditions such as war and social strife, and, in the process,
being framed in
rationalized ideologies, become much more destructive and inhuman
than the raaga
and dosa counterparts found among the 'beasts'. As long as moha
or
'bewilderment' is still present, all kinds of 'wrong-views' can
emerge, and where there
are 'wrong-views' there is the possibility of falling victim to
these atavistic urges.
Nevertheless, all things being contingent, the more civilized
affects can be seen as
arising in dependence upon the more primitive urges: the fact that
the more basic urges
cannot fully satisfy ta.nhaa will inevitably result in the
arising of dukkha,
and as long as there is dukkha there is the possibility
that man will keep
searching for something more. As long as some keep searching,
there is the possibility
that one will find something. And, of course, there is also the
possibility that some who
start the search will give up and decide that it is all just human
vanity, and settle into
some materialistic or nihilistic creed, as did some contemporaries
of the Buddha. The
greater freedom offered by civilized society offers a greater
range of objects to respond
to and, therefore, a correspondingly greater potential for the
development of more
peculiarly human and even spiritual affects and institutions to
emerge. As no form of
existence short of nirvaa.na can quench our 'thirst', some
will find even the most
civilized and cultured forms of life, including the accepted
religious forms, to be dukkha,
and will therefore venture out on the Ariyan Quest (ariyaa
pariyesnaa) and search
for that which, according to Buddhism, will finally quench our
'thirst': nirvaa.na.
Yet without the initial attempts of primitive raaga and dosa
to find
security and satisfaction, civilization as we know it would not
have arisen, and the very
conditions necessary for spiritual development in the Buddhist
sense would not have
arisen. After all, without ta.nhaa there would be no
existential Angst (dukkha),
and without existential Angst there would be no search for
an answer to the human
predicament, and without such a search there would be no Buddhas.
7.
The Teleology of Ta.nhaa
As we have seen, Buddhism
envisages the universe as
characterized by the metaphor of ta.nhaa, the thirst or
urge to find happiness,
well-being, satisfaction, meaning, or whatever else one wants to
call it. As the Buddhist
universe is always a universe of beings – there being no time when
there are no
beings of some form around – ta.nhaa is simply a term that
symbolizes the
condition we find ourselves in in the world, a general state of
wanting we know not what.
And as there is no such notion as original sin in Buddhism, we are
not to blame for being
in this condition (at least not 'originally'): the general
condition of ta.nhaa is
just the way things are, and no one can be said to have created it
as such. This universe
of beings, characterized by ta.nhaa, is what we might call
the subjective aspect of
existence. But Buddhism also posits a universal law, which is
understood to exist
independently of beings, including Buddhas.[45] This is the law of
pa.ticca-samuppaada,
or 'conditioned co-arising'. All the Buddhas do is simply reveal
what is there, and make
it known.[46] The most concise expression of this law of
conditioned co-arising states
that whatever comes into being does so only in dependence upon
conditions, conditions
which themselves only exist by way of other conditions, etc. and
when the conditions
change, whatever came to be ceases to exist. Therefore we can say
that this universal law
of conditioned co-arising represents the universe in its objective
aspect, in the sense
that it is how the universe is independent of how we might feel
about it, or want it to
be.
Seeing ta.nhaa and the law
of conditioned co-arising
as the subjective and objective aspects of existence, we can say
it is the coming together
of these two aspects that creates human existence as we know and
see it. However, such a
universe cannot be said to manifest any kind of teleology: there
is no preordained end for
which it can be said to exist, towards which we must inevitably
roll. There is no
providential force that ultimately guarantees our future welfare.
Nevertheless, it could
be argued that although this is the case, this universe is
structured in such a way that
it can be said to favour spiritual evolution, even though it
cannot guarantee that it will
happen. This comes about because, from the Buddhist perspective,
human beings will only
find real satisfaction, fulfilment and meaning in their lives by
venturing upon something
like the Buddhist spiritual path. The reason for this is simply
that such fulfilment and
meaning only come to be in dependence upon certain conditions,
those conditions being what
the Buddhist spiritual path is. The Buddhist spiritual path is
nothing other than the
application of the universal law of conditioned co-arising as a
guide to the kind of
actions that will lead to fulfilment and meaning. Therefore our ta.nhaa
will only
be fully appeased by following some such path of skilful action.
If we act with
self-centred greed, ill-will, seek no more than sensual
satisfaction, then, according to
the nature of the way things are, although we might find a certain
amount of satisfaction,
we will eventually run into continual frustration (dukkha).
This is just the way
things are. The universe, therefore, although it manifests no
providence, can,
nevertheless, be said to 'favour' the spiritual life in the sense
that it is only
by leading such a life that one will eventually become a fulfilled
human being, or,
further, what Buddhism calls an Awakened human being, a Buddha,
even though there is no
power or force in the universe that can guarantee that such will
happen. Notwithstanding
this, given the vast incalculable vistas of time that Buddhist
cosmology presents to us,
and that beings grounded in ta.nhaa will continually ferret
for ultimate
satisfaction and meaning within a universe whose nature is best
described as 'conditioned
co-arising', then it becomes a statistical probability that some
being will find nirvaa.na,
that some being will become a Buddha, and reveal the way to the
rest of us. Yet for such
to come about, all we need posit are these two aspects: the
subjective aspect of ta.nhaa
per se inherent in all beings, and a universe whose objective
aspect is revealed in the
doctrine of 'conditioned co-arising'.
Robert Morrison
(Dharmachari Sagaramati)
Abbreviations
A |
A'nguttara-Nikaaya
|
PED |
Pali-English
Dictionary |
D |
Diigha-Nikaaya
|
S |
Sa.myutta-Nikaaya
|
M |
Majjhima-Nikaaya
|
Vsm. |
Visuddhimagga
|
Netti. |
Nettippakara.na
|
|
|
Bibliography
Diigha-Nikaaya: ed.
T.W.Rhys Davids and
J.E.Carpenter, 3 vols. (London, 1889-1910);
Dialogues of
the Buddha, 3 vols.,
trans. T.W. and C.A.F.Rhys Davids
(London,
1889-1921); Thus have I Heard,
trans. M.Walshe (London, 1987).
Majjhima-Nikaaya: ed. V.
Trenckner and R. Chalmers, 3
vols. (London, 1888-1902);
Middle Length Sayings, 3
vols., trans. I. B. Horner
(London, 1954-9); The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha,
trans. Bhikkhu
aa.namoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi (Boston, 1995).
Sa.myutta-Nikaaya: ed. L.
Feer, 5 vols. (London,
1884-98); The Book of Kindred Sayings, 5 vols. trans. C. A
.F. Rhys Davids and F.
L. Woodword (London, 1917-30).
A'nguttara-Nikaaya: ed. R.
Morris and E. Hardy, 5
vols. (London, 1885-1900);
The Book of
Gradual Sayings, 5
vols., trans. F. L. Woodword and E. M. Hare (London, 1932-6).
Nettippakara.na: ed. E.
Hardy (London, 1902); The
Guide, trans. Ven. aa.namoli (London, 1962).
Visuddhimagga of
Buddhaghosa: ed. C. A. F. Rhys
Davids, 2 vols. (London, 1920-1); The Path of Purification,
trans. Bhikkhu
yaa.namoli, 2 vols. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976).
Collins, S.
(1993) The Discourse on
what is Primary (Aggaa-Sutta), Journal of Indian
Philosophy 21, 301-93.
Gombrich, R.
(1992) The Buddha's Book
of Genesis, Indo-Iranian Journal 35, 159-78.
Matilal, B. K.
(1985) Logic, Language
and Reality, Delhi.
Nyanaponika Thera, (1970) trans., Anguttara
Nikaaya: An
Anthology (Kandy).
Pruden, L.M. (1988-90), Abhidharmako'sabhaa.syam
of
Vasubandhu, translated in 4 volumes, being a translation of
Poussin's French translation
with reference to the Sanskrit text and with additional notes
(Berkeley, California).
Notes
- A iii.
399-400. Note that I have re-translated some of the sutta
material referred to in this
paper.
- A ii.
209-10.
- M
ii. 259-60.
- I
use the word 'ground' here in the sense of a 'primary
condition', or 'fundamental
principle' that attempts to characterize life in general. If
one takes one of Flew's
definitions of metaphysics, as 'an attempt to characterize
existence or reality as a whole
(A Dictionary of Philosophy, London, 1979), then we
could say that ta.nhaa
is a metaphysical notion in this sense – a metaphysical
metaphor.
- In
the sense of sa'nkhaara-dukkhataa, or 'existential
unsatisfactoriness'.
- In
Buddhist cosmology, the universe continually cycles through
immense aeons (kappas)
of 'devolution' (sa.mva.t.ta) and 'evolution' (viva.t.ta).
- An
almost identical account of this sutta is found outside
the Paali tradition in the Mahaavastu
(iii. 339).
- What
kind of fruit the fruit of the 'Tree of Knowledge' actually is
is not mentioned in
Genesis. Tradition has taken it to be an apple, but some
scholars believe it more likely
to be a fig.
- Sa.msaara
is divided into three levels: 1) kaama-loka, or 'realm
of sensual desire', which is
sub-divided into various realms. At the bottom are the hell
realms, then, rising up
through the kaama-loka, the realms of the pettas
or 'hungry ghosts',
animals, humans, and at the top the six deva realms.
Here, although there are male devas
and female deviis, only in the lower two realms does
copulation take place. In the
higher four gratification is achieved simply through acts such
as smiling or looking at
each other; 2) ruupa-loka or 'realm of form', which is
sub-divided into seventeen
levels, the beings in each being progressively more refined.
Here there is no sexual
distinction; 3) aruupa-loka, or 'realm of no form', a
rather mysterious realm
sub-divided into the four planes of the aruupa-jhaanas,
i.e. the realms of
'infinite-space', 'infinite-consciousness', 'no-thingness',
and
'neither-perception-nor-non-perception'.
- S iv.
400.
- See
D iii. 216.
- See
S iii. 149, where it is said: 'Inconceivable, bhikkhus,
is the beginning of sa.msaara. For beings hindered by
spiritual ignorance (avijjaa) and fettered by ta.nhaa,
who go the
round of births, the beginning [of sa.msaara] cannot be
known'.
- Some
Buddhist scholars would say that this account should not be
taken seriously as Buddhist
cosmology, it being no more than a Buddhist tongue-in-cheek
satire of certain Braahmanical beliefs (e.g.
see Gombrich (1992) and Collins (1993). However that may be,
from what is said we can take
it that the Buddhists understand ta.nhaa as having
cosmic significance:
- A v.
113ff.
- Vsm.
525. Note that ta.nhaa here is said to lead to 'happy
destinies' as well as unhappy
ones.
- A v.
116.
- Vsm.
525.
- Although
avijjaa does literally mean 'lack of knowledge' (vijjaa)
in the sense of
knowledge about the true nature of things, following Matilal, I
would understand avijjaa
to imply the holding of 'views' (di.t.this). As Matilal
says, "the Sanskrit
term avidyaa (Paali: avijjaa),
although grammatically negative … does not [necessarily] mean
negation (or absence or
lack) of anything. For it is well known in Sanskrit grammar
that the negative particle in
a Sanskrit compound does not always express simple negation or
absence" [Matilal
(1985), pp.321-22]. Using Patajali's discussion of the
semantic problem of the negative
compound a-braahma.na ('not-a-braahma.na'),
he goes on to
suggest that as 'vidyaa means knowledge of reality, or
ultimate knowledge, or
simply, knowledge, avidyaa [may be best understood as]
something that is liable to
be mistaken as such'. In other words, avidyaa is not
simply a lack of knowledge,
but thinking one has knowledge when one has not. Avijjaa therefore
implies having
views and opinions about things which are not in accordance
with the true nature of
things. In his Abhidharmako'sabhaa.syam, Vasubandhu
says that 'Avidyaa is a
separate dhamma' and is 'not a mere negation'. For
example, '.Rta or satya
is truth; non-truth (an.rta) is speech contrary to true
speech' [Pruden (1988-90),
pp.419-20].
- S ii.
114.
- S iii.
13; v. 414.
- Buddhaghosa's
commentary on this sutta does indeed make a distinction
here between va.t.ta-muulabhuutaa
purima-ta.nhaa or 'primary ta.nhaa which is the
root of sa.msaara', and samudaacaara-ta.nhaa
or 'ta.nhaa in action' [see footnote in Rhys Davids'
translation]. However, my
point is that it is always a particular affect such as 'lust'
or 'aversion' that arises at
this point, not ta.nhaa, even in the form of 'ta.nhaa in
action'. One could
say that 'lust' is a particular form of 'ta.nhaa in
action', but this is
just saying that 'ta.nhaa
in action' is always some particular affect, that all the
affects are expressions of ta.nhaa
per se.
- D ii.
58f.
- M i.
163. Although one cannot take these more or less stock phrases
too seriously as actual,
literal happenings, nevertheless it is interesting to note
here that: 1) a 'black-haired
young man endowed with the blessing of youth' is not how I
would describe a married
twenty-nine year old; 2) there is no mention of the Buddha's
wife and child; 3) he refers
to his 'mother' [maataa] and not his step-mother (Mahaapajaapati, who
later became a bhikkhunii):
according to other accounts, his mother (Maayaa)
died shortly after
giving birth to the Buddha-to-be.
- It
could, and sometimes does, also lead some who despair at
finding any meaning in life, to
commit suicide in the hope of becoming totally extinct. This
is the third kind of ta.nhaa:
the 'desire for annihilation' (vibhava-taa.nha).
- The
account of the Four Sights is found at D ii, 21-30. The first
Three Sights are
of an old man, a sick man, a dead man, and represent dukkha.
The Fourth Sight is of
a 'religious mendicant' (paribbaajika), symbolizing the
spiritual life, the way to
the cessation of dukkha.
- Notwithstanding
what the first Noble Truth tells us, i.e. that the cause of dukkha
or 'suffering
and unsatisfactoriness' is ta.nhaa, I would say that it
is not ta.nhaa per
se that is the primary cause of this dukkha, but
the way one is
attempting to satisfy one's ta.nhaa. In other words, as
the noble search represents
the forth Noble Truth, the way leading to the cessation of dukkha,
then the primary
cause of dukkha is the leading of the ignoble life,
which is not simply ta.nhaa,
but the expression of ta.nhaa conjoined with
'wrong-views' (micchaa-di.t.this).
If, as I have argued, ta.nhaa is also the affective
ground out of which the noble
search springs, which we could say would be ta.nhaa conjoined
with 'right-views' (sammaa-di.t.this),
then ta.nhaa per se is not the cause of dukkha,
but only ta.nhaa
conjoined with 'wrong-views'.
- A ii.
146: ta.nha.m nissaaya ta.nha.m pajahati.
- Nyanaponika
(1970), fn. 64.
- Mrs.
Rhys Davids draws attention to this passage as an important
example of the way in which
the notion of 'extinction of desire' needs qualifying [1920,
p.222f.]. Chanda means
'impulse, excitement; intention, resolution, will; desire for,
wish for, delight in'
[PED], and, as Mrs. Rhys Davids also points out, is often a
synonym of ta.nhaa.
- See
also, M i. 480 and ii. 173 for chanda as the
necessary 'will' to strive
and attain paaa. As the PED says of iddhi:
'there is no single word in
English for Iddhi, as the idea is unknown in Europe. The main
sense seems to be
"potency"'.
- See
footnote 4 in Woodword's translation, and also Rhys Davids'
note on chanda in Aung,
(1910), p.244.
- A
similar example with 'action' (kamman) is found at A i.
236. There the Buddha
says that there are three causes for the arising of action:
non-greed, non-hatred, and
non-confusion. Such action is said to be skilful (kusala)
and results in happiness
(sukha), but it is also said to bring about the
'cessation of action' (kamma-nirodha).
To understand what this 'cessation of action' means, one has
to look elsewhere. For
example, the Mahaacattaariisaka Sutta also informs us
that there are three kinds of
action, but here the three kinds form an ethical hierarchy: at
the bottom there is 'wrong
action' (micchaa-kammanta) followed by two
levels of 'right action'
(sammaa-kammanta). There is 'right action'
which is 'affected
by the biases' (sa-aasava), 'involved in
[creating] merit' (puaa-bhaagiya),
and 'ripens in future rebecoming' (upadhi-vepakka);
and there is 'right
action' that is 'noble' (ariya), 'without
the biases'
(anaasava), and 'beyond the mundane world'
(lokuttara)
[M iii. 74]. This latter kind of action is not karmic, and
will therefore not produce
effects that will ripen within sa.msaara. As the Buddha
is said to be in full 'possession
of all skilful states' [M ii. 116], we can assume that
the cessation of action
implies only the cessation of unskilful actions, as well as
those skilful actions
'involved in [creating] merit', etc., but which form
the necessary basis for the
arising of the third kind of skilful action, upon which such
karmic skilful action ceases.
- At
D ii. 58, we do find the term dhamma-ta.nhaa, but here
it means 'thirsting
after mental states' as it is in a list of six ta.nhaas,
each connected with the
objects of the six senses. It is also listed in this latter
sense in the first book of the
Abhidhamma Pi.taka, the Dhammasa'nganii,
among the akusala-dhammas [1059].
- The
'Guide-treatise', translated from the Paali by aa.namoli as The
Guide.
It is not so much a
commentary on the suttas, but a 'guide' for commentators
on how to interpret the suttas. It was
probably written around
the second or first centuries BCE.
- As
the A'nguttara Nikaaya explains, the compound term
'leads to diminishing' [apacayagaamin]
stands for the practice of the ten precepts of skilful action,
e.g. abstention from
harming living beings, sexual misconduct, lying, slanderous
speech, bitter speech, idle
babbling, coveting, ill-will, and the only 'positive' precept,
cultivating 'right-view' (sammaa-di.t.thi)
[v. 276-7].
- M iii.
218. See also M i. 303-4, which adds that one then sets up an
eager desire (pihaa)
for 'unsurpassed emancipation' (anuttara vimokha).
- Netti.
87.
- Vsm.
525. The 'happy destinies' [sugatis] refer to future
lives in some deva-lokas
or 'heavenly worlds'.
- Raaga
means 'love, affection, vehement desire for, interest in,
desire for', etc; kaama
means 'desire for, longing after, love (especially sexual love
or sensuality), affection'
etc.
- A iv.
423; v. 345.
- A v.
24, 27, 90, 201; Sn 92.
- See
A i. 93ff. and Itv. 98. AAmisa means: '1.
originally raw meat; hence
prevailing notion of 'raw, unprepared, uncultivated'.… 2.
'fleshy, of the flesh' (as
opposed to mind or spirit), hence material, physical;
generally in opposition to dhamma'
[PED] – dhamma, in this context, being concerned with
the spiritual life.
- Nirvaa.na
can also mean 'quenched'. See PED under nibbuta.
- M iii.
72. This is 'right-view with biases [aasavas]', which
does not seem to have nirvaa.na
as its goal, but is instead a means of creating the necessary
'merit' (pua), or
one could say 'conditions', for a better and happier life in
the future to arise, whether
in this life or the next. As 'right-view with taints' also
includes the acknowledgement
that there are 'good and virtuous recluses and brahmans in the
world who have realized for
themselves by direct knowledge and declare this world and the
other world', a view that
obviously includes non-Buddhist recluses, one could see this
as the Buddhist view of the
ideal society, which upholds the doctrine of kamman and
the importance of the
spiritual life. These would be the ideal conditions for those
who seek out 'right-view
without biases', which is 'transcendental' (lokuttara)
and Ariyan,
and has nirvaa.na
as its goal.
- 'Bhikkhus,
whether there be an appearance or non-appearance of a Tathaagata,
this determination
of nature (dhamma.t.thitataa), this orderliness of
nature [dhamma-niyaamataa]
prevails: the relatedness of this to that" [idappaccayataa]'. [S ii.
25].
- As
the Dhammapada has it 'The Tathaagatas only declare the Way;
you yourselves must
strive" [276]. Ultimately, one cannot rely upon tradition,
sacred or otherwise, but
only one's own efforts.
Source:
www.buddhismtoday.com