Abstract:
It is difficult to think of a
more urgent question for Buddhism in the late twentieth century than human
rights. Human rights issues in which Buddhism has a direct involvement, notably
in the case of Tibet,
feature regularly on the agenda in superpower diplomacy. The political, ethical
and philosophical questions surrounding human rights are debated vigourously in
political and intellectual circles throughout the world. Yet despite its
contemporary significance, the subject has merited hardly a footnote in
mainstream academic research and publication in the field of Buddhist Studies.
Why is this? One reason would seem to be the lack of a precedent within
Buddhism itself for discussing issues of this kind; scholars, by and large,
continue to follow the tradition's own agenda, an agenda which appears to some
increasingly medieval in the shadow of the twenty-first century. If Buddhism
wishes to address the issues which are of concern to today's global community,
it must begin to ask itself new questions alongside the old ones.
In the context of human
rights, which is the theme of this paper, an important preliminary question
would seem to be whether traditional Buddhism has any understanding of what is
meant by "human rights" at all. Indeed, it may be thought that since
the concept of "rights" is the product of an alien cultural tradition
it would be utterly inappropriate to speak of rights of any kind -
"human" or otherwise - in a Buddhist context. Even if it was felt
that these objections were overstated, and that the issue of human rights does
have a legitimate place on the Buddhist agenda, there would still remain the separate
and no less difficult question of how human rights were to be grounded in
Buddhist doctrine, particularly in the light of the fact that the tradition
itself provides little precedent or guidance in this area.
This article offers a
preliminary exploration of the questions raised in the paragraph above. It
concludes that it is legitimate to speak of both "rights" and
"human rights" in Buddhism, and proposes a ground for human rights in
Buddhist doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
In the autumn of 1993
the Parliament of the World's Religions met in Chicago to determine whether a consensus on
basic moral teachings could be found among the religions of the world. The
meeting was attended by representatives of the major world religions as well as
ethnic and other minority groups. Representatives of many Buddhist schools,
including Theravāda, Mahāyāna, Vajrayāna, and Zen were present and the main
closing address was given by the Dalai Lama in Grant Park on September 4th.
One of the major fruits
of this interfaith convention was a document known as the Declaration towards a
Global Ethic. [1] The Global Ethic sets out the fundamental moral principles to
which it is thought all religions subscribe. Many of these principles concern
human rights, and the Global Ethic sees the universal recognition of human
rights and dignity by the religions of the world as the cornerstone of a
"new global order."
A related aim of the
Global Ethic was to provide "the basis for an extensive process of
discussion and acceptance which we hope will be sparked off in all
religions." [2] The present paper is a contribution to this process from a
Buddhist perspective. Its aims are limited to an exploration of some of the
basic issues which must be addressed if a Buddhist philosophy of human rights
is to develop. I say "develop" because Buddhism seems to lack such a
philosophy at present. Buddhism is a latecomer to the cause of human rights,
and for most of its history has been preoccupied with other concerns. It might
be suggested, in defense of Buddhism, that concern for human rights is a
postreligious phenomenon which has more to do with secular ideologies and
power-politics than religion, and it is therefore unreasonable to accuse
Buddhism of neglect in this area. [3] I will suggest below that such an understanding
of human rights is mistaken, but leaving the specific issue of human rights to
one side there is no doubt that Buddhism lags far behind religions such as
Christianity and Islam in developing the framework for a social gospel within
which questions of this kind can be addressed. For such an intellectually
dynamic tradition Buddhism is a lightweight in moral and political philosophy.
A fig-leaf of a kind may be found in the suggestion that since much Buddhist
literature remains untranslated there may be hidden treasures in these areas
awaiting discovery. Such appeals to the unknown, however, lack credibility. For
one thing, it would be curious if only texts on these subjects had been lost to
history while literature on all manner of other topics abounds. Nor can it be a
coincidence that these subjects are absent from the traditional monastic
curricula. The absence of a discipline of philosophical ethics in Indian
culture as a whole makes it much more likely that Buddhism simply invested
little time in questions of these kinds. [4]
Political events in the course
of this century, however, have forced the issue of human rights to the top of
the agenda. [5] The Chinese invasion of Tibet,
the bitter ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka,
and the experience of military dictatorship in countries such as Burma have all
provided contemporary Buddhism with first-hand experience of the issues at
stake. Another development which has done much to focus attention on social and
political themes is the emergence of "socially engaged Buddhism," a
movement whose very name implies a critique of the more traditional (presumably
"disengaged") forms of Buddhism. Leading Asian and Western Buddhists
now routinely express their concern about social injustice in the Western
vocabulary of human rights. What I wish to consider here is how appropriate
this language is for Buddhism, and what grounds there are for supposing that
Buddhism is committed to the cause of "human rights" or has any clear
understanding of what the concept means. Given the lack of intellectual effort
down the centuries in articulating, promoting and defending rights of the kind
which the world (and especially the West) is now called upon to secure for
oppressed groups like the Tibetans, the more cynical might suggest that this
late conversion to the cause is born more of self-interest than a deep and
long-standing commitment to social justice. In calling for respect for human
rights today, then, is Buddhism simply riding on the coat-tails of the West or
is there, after all, a commitment to human rights in Buddhist teachings?
My theme in this paper
may be summed up as the conceptual and doctrinal basis for human rights in
Buddhism. I am concerned with the intellectual bridgework which must be put in
place if expressions of concern about human rights are to be linked to Buddhist
doctrine. There are many aspects to this problem, but three related issues will
be considered here: the concept of rights, the concept of human rights, and the
question of how human rights are to be grounded in Buddhist doctrine. I ask
first if the concept of "rights" is intelligible in Buddhism. To
answer this question it will be necessary to gain some understanding of the
origin of the notion in the West. Next I ask whether the Buddhist concept of
human rights (if such a thing exists) is the same as the Western understanding.
Finally I consider in what specific area of Buddhist teachings a doctrine of
human rights might be grounded. [6] Since the discussion is essentially
theoretical, detailed reference will not be made to particular Buddhist
cultures or schools, to specific human rights "abuses," or to the
human rights "record" of particular regimes. [7]
Before turning to these issues
a preliminary point must be made about Buddhism itself. In speaking of
"Buddhism" I should make clear that I am writing with reference to an
abstraction which might be termed "classical" Buddhism. This
abstraction is neither the same as nor different from Buddhism in any
historical or cultural context. It is not meant to represent the views of any
sect and is broad enough to include both Theravāda and Mahāyāna schools. The
justification for this fiction lies in the belief that whatever concept of
human rights we regard Buddhism as holding must be one which is universal in
form. The essence of any doctrine of human rights is its unrestricted scope,
and it would be as strange to have distinct "Theravāada,"
"Tibetan" and "Zen" doctrines of human rights as it would
be to have "Catholic," "Protestant" and "Eastern
Orthodox" ones. To insist on the priority of cultural and historical
circumstances would be tantamount to denying the validity of human rights as a
concept.
RIGHTS
The concept of a
"right" has a long intellectual history in the West, and the
contemporary notion of a right as an exercisable power vested in or held by an
individual has its antecedents in a more impersonal understanding of what is
objectively true or right. Etymologically, the English word "right"
is derived from the Latin rectus meaning straight. Rectus, in turn, can be
traced to the Greek orektos which means stretched out or upright. As Richard
Dagger notes, "The pattern ... is for the notion of straightness to be
extended from the physical realm to the moral - from rectus to rectitude, as it
were." [8] In other words, the property of a physical object, namely that
of being right, straight or upright, is applied metaphorically in a moral
context. Dagger suggests:
By analogy with the physical
sense, the primary moral sense of "right" was a standard or measure
for conduct. Something was right - morally straight or true - if it met the
standard of rectitude, or rightness ...
Once the idea of
"rightness" had been transferred to the moral domain, the next
development was to view it as denoting a personal entitlement of some kind.
Dagger continues:
From here the next step was to
recognize that actions taken "with right" or "by right" are
taken as a matter of right. The transition is from the belief that I may do
something because it is right, in other words, to the belief that I may do
something because I have a right to do it ... Thus the concept of rights joins
the concept of the right. [9]
The metaphorical moral usage
of terms such as "right," "straight" and
"upright" (in opposition to "crooked," "twisted"
and "bent") readily suggests itself to the mind. The rationale for
the transition from the moral use of "right" to the notion of a right
as a personal entitlement, however, is less obvious. Indeed, this development
which took place in the West during the late Middle Ages, and which has been
described as the "watershed" [10 ] in the history of
"right," may be a phenomenon which is culturally unique. The
evolution of the concept in this direction occurs sometime between Aquinas in
the thirteenth century and the jurists Suarez and Grotius in the seventeenth.
The modern usage appears clearly in Hobbes, writing in the middle of the
seventeenth century, and the idea of a right as a personal power occupies
center stage in political theory from this time on.
As part of this
evolution in the concept of a right the notion of natural rights comes to
prominence towards the end of the seventeenth century, notably in the writings
of John Locke. The belief that there are natural rights flows from the
recognition of human equality, one of the great ideals of the Age of
Revolution. Natural rights are inalienable: they are not conferred by any
judicial or political process nor can they be removed by these or other means.
These natural rights of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are the
forerunner of the contemporary notion of human rights.
Two questions might be
asked concerning the evolution of the doctrine of natural rights in the West.
First, why did it take so long for the concept of natural rights to appear? The
answer seems to lie in the fact that for much of Western history
"rights" were closely tied to social status, and were essentially a
function of position or role in society. A hierarchical social structure, such
as was predominant in Roman and medieval society, is antithetical to the notion
of natural rights. In these circumstances a person's duties and
responsibilities are determined fundamentally by the office they hold (lord,
citizen, slave), offices which are to a large extent hereditary. It was only
when the hierarchical model was challenged and replaced by an egalitarian one
that the idea of natural rights began to gain ground.
The second and more
important question for our present purposes is: Does the part played by the
unique cultural matrix of social political and intellectual developments in the
Enlightenment mean that human rights are essentially a function of the
historical process? This conclusion need not follow, for while it may be said
that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the notion of natural rights
was "an idea whose time had come," the idea itself was not entirely
new. The influence of Christian doctrine can be seen in several respects, [11]
such as the belief (ultimately derived from Judaism) of a "universal moral
law rooted in the righteousness of God." [12] Since human beings are
created in the image of God and loved by him as individuals each is worthy of
dignity and respect. Furthermore, since each is a member of the human community
under God, all other memberships (tribe, state, nation) are secondary.[13]
Apart from Christianity, ideas about the just treatment of individuals on the
basis of their common humanity are found in a secular context in Stoicism and
the writings of Cicero and Seneca. [14] The philosophical justification for a
doctrine of human rights has thus always been available, although the ground in
which this seed might flourish - a particular combination of social, political
and intellectual developments - has not.
So much for historical
background. What of contemporary theories of rights? The concept of a right has
been analyzed in a number of ways, as evidenced by the extensive
interdisciplinary literature on the subject spanning diverse fields such as
politics, law, philosophy and history. Within this discourse of rights there is
no single definition of a right which commands universal assent. For our
present purposes, however, a basic understanding of the concept will suffice.
We noted above that a right is something personal to an individual: it may be
thought of as something an individual has. [15] What the holder of a right has
is a benefit or entitlement of some kind, and at the most general level this is
an entitlement to justice. This entitlement may be analyzed into two main forms
for which there are corresponding rights: rights which take the form of a claim
(claim-rights), and rights which take the form of a liberty (liberty-
rights).[16] A claim-right is the benefit which A enjoys to impose upon B a
positive or negative requirement. A liberty-right is the benefit which A enjoys
of being immune from any such requirement being imposed by B. [17] This basic
understanding of a right may be summed up in the following working definition:
a right is a benefit which confers upon its holder either a claim or a liberty.
One important feature of any right is that it provides a particular perspective
on justice, in that the right-holder always stands in the position of
beneficiary. This subjective aspect of the entitlement, which, as we have seen,
appeared early in the history of the concept, remains crucial to the modern
understanding of a right. This is brought out in the following definition by
Finnis:
In short, the modern
vocabulary and grammar of rights is a many-faceted instrument for reporting and
asserting the requirements or other implications of a relationship of justice
from the point of view of the person(s) who benefit(s) from that relationship.
It provides a way of talking about "what is just" from a special
angle: the viewpoint of the "other(s)" to whom something (including,
inter alia, freedom of choice) is owed or due, and who would be wronged if
denied that something. [18]
The above brief review of the
Western concept of a right was required as a preliminary to an assessment of
its relevance to Buddhism. We are now in a position to ask whether the concept
of a right is found in Buddhism. If it is, then talk of human rights in
Buddhism seems legitimate.[19] If it is not, there is a danger of
anachronistically foisting onto the tradition a concept which is the product of
an alien culture. [20]
BUDDHISM AND RIGHTS
We took our cue for the
discussion of rights in the West from etymology, and perhaps we can glean
something further from this source. Above it was noted that the English word
"right" is derived from the Latin rectus meaning straight. Both
"right" and rectus themselves, however, have a more remote ancestor
in the Sanskrit rju (straight or upright). The equivalent form in Pali is uju
(or ujju) meaning "straight, direct; straightforward, honest,
upright." [21] It would therefore appear that both the objective sense
("straight") and the metaphorical moral sense ("rectitude")
of the word "right" referred to earlier occur in Buddhist as well as
Western languages. Despite a common Indo-European etymology, however, there is
no word in Sanskrit or Pali which conveys the idea of a "right" or
"rights," understood as a subjective entitlement. [22]
Does this mean that the
concept of rights is alien to Buddhist thought? Not necessarily. Alan Gewirth has
pointed out that cultures may possess the concept of rights without having a
vocabulary which expresses it. He suggests that it is "important to
distinguish between having or using a concept and the clear or explicit
recognition and elucidation of it ... Thus persons might have and use the
concept of a right without explicitly having a single word for it."[23]
Gewirth claims that the concept of rights can be found in feudal thought, Roman
law, Greek philosophy, the Old Testament, and in primitive societies. In
connection with the last Finnis points out that anthropological studies of
African tribal regimes of law have shown that "the English terms a 'right'
and 'duty' are usually covered by a single word derived from the form normally
translated as 'ought.'" He suggests that the best English translation in
these cases is "due" because "'due' looks both ways along a
juridical relationship, both to what one is due to do, and to what is due to
one." [24]
It seems, then, that the
concept of a right may exist where a word for it does not. Could this be the
case in Buddhism? In Buddhism what is due in any situation is determined by
reference to Dharma. Dharma determines what is right and just in all contexts
and from all perspectives. With respect to social justice the Rev. Vajiragnana
explains:
Each one of us has a role to
play in sustaining and promoting social justice and orderliness. The Buddha
explained very clearly these roles as reciprocal duties existing between
parents and children; teachers and pupils; husband and wife; friends, relatives
and neighbors; employer and employee; clergy and laity ... No one has been left
out. The duties explained here are reciprocal and are considered as sacred
duties, for - if observed - they can create a just, peaceful and harmonious
society. [25]
From this it would seem that
Dharma determines not just "what one is due to do" but also
"what is due to one." Thus through A's performance of his Dharmic
duty B receives that which is his "due" or, we might say, that to which
he is "entitled" in (under, through) Dharma. Since Dharma determines
the duties of husbands and the duties of wives, [26] it follows that the duties
of one correspond to the entitlements or "rights" of the other. If
the husband has a duty to support his wife, the wife has a "right" to
support from her husband. If the wife has a duty to look after her husband's
property, the husband has a "right" to the safe-keeping of his
property by his wife. If under Dharma it is the duty of a king (or political
authority) to dispense justice impartially, then subjects (citizens) may be
said to have a "right" to just and impartial treatment before the
law.
Should it be concluded,
then, that the notion of a right is present in classical Buddhism? The answer
depends on the criteria adopted for "having" a concept. Dagger sets
out the options:
If one is willing to look
primarily for the idea or the notion, however it may be expressed, then one can
confidently say that the concept of rights is virtually as old as civilization
itself.
On the other hand:
If one insists that the form
of expression is crucial ... so that a concept cannot be said to exist unless
there is a word or phrase that distinguishes it from other concepts, then one
would have to say that the concept of rights has its origin in the middle ages.
[27]
I think our conclusion should
be that the concept of rights is implicit in classical Buddhism in the
normative understanding of what is "due" among and between
individuals. Under Dharma, husbands and wives, kings and subjects, teachers and
students, all have reciprocal obligations which can be analyzed into rights and
duties. We must qualify this conclusion, however, by noting that the
requirements of Dharma are expressed in the form of duties rather than rights.
In other words, Dharma states what is due in the form "A husband should
support his wife" as opposed to "Wives have a right to be maintained
by their husbands." Until rights as personal entitlements are recognized
as a discrete but integral part of what is due under Dharma, the modern concept
of rights cannot be said to be present. In this respect, however, Buddhism is
far from unique, and a similar comment could be made about many other cultures
and civilizations. Finnis points out with respect to Roman law:
[I]t is salutary to bear in
mind that the modern emphasis on the powers of the right-holder, and the
consequent systematic bifurcation between "right" ... and
"duty", is something that sophisticated lawyers were able to do
without for the whole life of classical Roman law. [28]
He also suggests, rightly I
think, that "there is no cause to take sides as between the older and the
newer usages, as ways of expressing the implications of justice in a given
context." [29] A right is a useful concept which provides a particular
perspective on justice. Its correlative, duty, provides another. These may be
thought of as separate windows onto the common good which is justice or, in the
context of Buddhism, Dharma. It would therefore be going too far to claim that
the notion of rights is "alien" to Buddhism or that Buddhism denies
that individuals have "rights."
In sum it might be said
that in classical Buddhism the notion of rights is present in embryonic form
although not yet born into history. Whether anything like the Western concept
of rights has, or would, appear in the course of the historical evolution of
Buddhism is a question for specialists in the various Buddhist cultures to
ponder. In many respects the omens for this development were never good. Buddhism
originated in a caste society, and the Asian societies where it has flourished
have for the most part been hierarchically structured. MacIntyre, citing
Gewirth, mentions that the concept of a right lacks any means of expression in
Japanese "even as late as the mid-nineteenth century." [30] The
preconditions for the emergence of the concept of rights would seem to be
egalitarianism and democracy, neither of which have been notable features of
Asian polity before the modern era. On the other hand, a justification for the
rejection of hierarchical social structures is not hard to find in Buddhism -
one need look only at the Buddha's critique of caste. [31] Buddhism also holds,
in the doctrine of no-self, that all individuals are equal in the most profound
sense. [32] Like the Christian doctrine that all men are created equal before
God this would appear to be fertile ground for a doctrine of natural rights.
What seems to have been lacking in both faiths, but perhaps more so in
Buddhism, was the will to incarnate this theoretical vision of man in the flesh
of historical institutions.
HUMAN RIGHTS
In the preceding section
attention was focused on the concept of a right. Here we consider what it means
to characterize certain rights as human rights, [33] and pursue further the
discussion initiated in the preceding section as to whether Western notions of
human rights are compatible with Buddhism. [34]
The point has already been
made that what are today called human rights were originally spoken of as
"natural" rights, in other words, rights which flow from human
nature. In the seventeenth century philosophers and statesmen began to define
these rights and enshrine them in early constitutions such as the Fundamental
Orders of Connecticut as early as 1639. Documents of this kind inspired the
publication of other declarations, charters and manifestos in a tradition which
has continued into modern times. As an example of a modern charter of human
rights we may take The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the
General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1948. Since its promulgation
this thirty- article code has been used as a model for many subsequent human
rights charters.
What is the Buddhist
position with respect to declarations of this kind? It may be useful to begin
by asking whether Buddhism would endorse the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. The repeated calls by the Dalai Lama for respect for human rights give
some reason to think that it would. The signing of the Global Ethic by many
Buddhists also suggests that Buddhism has no reservations about subscribing to
charters or manifestos which seek to secure universal human rights. Moreover,
there seems to be nothing in any of the thirty articles to which Buddhism would
take exception. Perera's commentary on each of the thirty articles of the
Universal Declaration shows them to be in harmony with early Buddhist teachings
both in letter and in spirit. In his Foreword to the commentary Ananda Guruge’
writes:
Professor Perera demonstrates
that every single Article of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - even
the labour rights to fair wages, leisure and welfare - has been adumbrated,
cogently upheld and meaningfully incorporated in an overall view of life and
society by the Buddha. [35]
But how are these rights to be
justified with reference to Buddhist teachings? In asking this question I am
not seeking justification by reference to textual passages which seem to
support the rights claimed. There are many passages in the Pali Canon, as
Perera has ably demonstrated, which support the view that early Buddhist
teachings were in harmony with the spirit of the Declaration. The justification
required at this point has more to do with the philosophical presuppositions
underlying these passages and the overall Buddhist vision of individual and
social good.
The various declarations
on human rights themselves rarely offer a justification for the rights they
proclaim. MacIntyre observes dryly how "In the United Nations declaration
on human rights of 1949 [sic] what has since become the normal UN practice of
not giving good reasons for any assertion whatsoever is followed with great
rigor." [36] A gesture towards justification is sometimes made in recital
clauses by reference to the "inherent dignity ... of all members of the
human family" or some similar form of words. The Global Ethic, which
provides a fuller statement than most, echoes the Universal Declaration in its
call for "the full realization of the intrinsic dignity of the human
person". [37] It states: "We make a commitment to respect life and
dignity, individuality and diversity, so that every person is treated
humanely." This is amplified as follows:
This means that every human
being without distinction of age, sex, race, skin, color, physical or mental
ability, language, religion, political view, or national or social origin
possesses an inalienable and untouchable dignity. And everyone, the individual
as well as the state, is therefore obliged to honor this dignity and protect
it. [38]
Elsewhere, as part of his
dialogue with world religions, Kung makes a constructive suggestion on this
point that students of Buddhism might do well to pay heed to:
Should not Buddhist thinkers,
as they critically assess their own and alien traditions, make a more direct
effort to establish an anthropology centered around human dignity (which the
Buddha himself deeply respected)? Buddhists are fully aware that man can be
adequately understood only as conditioned in every way, as a relational being
within the totality of life and the cosmos. But should they not reflect more
earnestly, especially in an ethical vein, on the problems of the unique,
inviolable, noninterchangeable human self, with its roots in the past and its
future destiny? [39]
It is by no means apparent,
however, how human dignity is to be grounded in Buddhist doctrine. The very
words "human dignity" sound as alien in a Buddhist context as talk of
rights. One looks in vain to the The Four Noble Truths for any explicit
reference to human dignity, and doctrines such as no-self and impermanence may
even be thought to undermine it. If human dignity is the basis of human rights
Buddhism would seem to be in some difficulty when it comes to providing a
justification for them. The theistic religions, on the other hand, seem much
better equipped to provide an account of human dignity. Christians, Muslims and
Jews typically refer to the ultimate source of human dignity as divine. Article
one (paragraph 1700) of the most recent Catechism of the Catholic Church, for
instance, states: "The dignity of the human person is rooted in his
creation in the image and likeness of God." Buddhism, clearly, would not
wish to make such a claim. Kung notes how leading Buddhists at the Parliament
of the World's Religions felt called upon to protest at calls for "a unity
of religions under God," and at references to "God the Almighty"
and "God the Creator" in invocations during the proceedings. He
suggests, however, that these differences are reconcilable since the Buddhist
concepts of "Nirvana, Shunyata and Dharmakaya ... fulfil analogous
functions to the concept of God" and can be regarded by Christians as
"parallel terms for the Absolute." [40]
It may or may not be the
case that Mahāyāna schools recognize a transcendent reality which resembles the
Christian concept of God as the Absolute, and there are those better qualified
than myself to address such a question. Here I will make only three brief
points regarding the problems which arise in regarding these things as the
source of human dignity. The first is that since these concepts are understood
differently by the main Mahāyāna schools they are unlikely to provide the
common ground which is required as a foundation for human rights. The second is
that it is difficult to see how any of these things can be the source of human
dignity in the way that God can, since no school of Buddhism believes that
human beings are created by them. The third point is that even if some
metaphysical ground of the above kind can be identified in Mahāyāna Buddhism it
still leaves the problem of how human dignity is to be grounded where Theravāda
Buddhism is concerned. For the Theravāda, Nirvāṇa
is not a transcendent Absolute, nor do the concepts of "Shunyata and
Dharmakaya" have anything like the meaning or significance they attain
later. No grounding for human rights can be truly satisfactory, I would
suggest, unless it unambiguously forms part of the core teachings of classical
Buddhism as a whole.
One suggestion as to how
human rights can be grounded in Buddhist doctrine has been made by Kenneth
Inada. In a discussion of "The Buddhist Perspective on Human Rights,"
Inada suggests "there is an intimate and vital relationship of the
Buddhist norm or Dhamma with that of human rights." [41] He explains the
relationship as follows:
Human rights is indeed an
important issue, but the Buddhist position is that it is ancillary to the
larger or more basic issue of human nature. It can be asserted that the
Buddhist sees the concept of human rights as a legal extension of human nature.
It is a crystallization, indeed a formalization, of the mutual respect and
concern of all persons, stemming from human nature. Thus, human nature is the
ultimate source, the basis from which all other attributes or characteristics
are to be delineated. They all have their respective raison d'etre in it. They
are reflections and even byproducts of it. The reason for assigning human
nature the basic position is very simple. It is to give human relations a firm
grounding in the truly existential nature of things: that is, the concrete and
dynamic relational nature of persons in contact with each other, that which
[sic] avoids being caught up in rhetorical or legalistic tangles. [42]
Few would disagree with the
proposition that human rights are grounded in human nature. Towards the end of
the extract, however, Inada seems to move away from his initial suggestion that
human nature is the "ultimate source" of human rights towards the
view that the ultimate ground is the "dynamic relational nature of persons
in contact with each other." In other words, it is in the interrelatedness
of persons rather than in the persons themselves that the justification for
human rights is to be found. This is confirmed a little later:
Consequently, the Buddhist
concern is focused on the experiential process of each individual, a process
technically know as relational origination (paṭicca-samuppāda).
It is the great doctrine of Buddhism, perhaps the greatest doctrine expounded
by the historical Buddha. It means that, in any life-process, the arising of an
experiential event is a total, relational affair. [43]
How is the link between
dependent-origination and human rights to be forged? The argument reaches its
conclusion in the following passage:
Like a storm which consumes
everything in its wake, an experience in terms of relational origination
involves everything within its purview. Hence, the involvement of elements and,
in our case, human beings as entities should not be in terms of mere
relationship but rather a creative relationship which originates from the
individual locus of existence. In other words, each individual is responsible
for the actualization of an "extensive concern" for everything that
lies in his or her path of experience. So, we may say that the sum total of the
"extensive concerns" can be referred to as a mutually constituted
existential realm, and it thereby becomes a fact that there will be mutual respect
of fellow beings. It is on this basis that we can speak of the rights of
individuals. These rights are actually extensions of human qualities such as
security, liberty, and life. [44]
In simple language, the
argument seems to be as follows. Human beings, like everything else, are part
of the relational process described in the doctrine of dependent-origination;
since no-one exists independently we should look out for one another; looking
out for one another means respecting each other's rights; examples of the
rights we should respect are security, liberty and life. [45]
Although I have described this
as an "argument" it is little more than a series of assertions.
Working backwards, it is difficult to know what sense to give the concluding
sentence: "These rights are actually extensions of human qualities such as
security, liberty and life." It is unclear what is meant by "human
qualities" here. In what sense is security a "human quality"
(perhaps a "need")? Why is life described as a "quality" of
a human being? Even granted that these things are "human qualities,"
what does it mean to say that rights are extensions of "human
qualities"? In the first extract quoted above, Inada suggests that
"the Buddhist sees the concept of human rights as a legal extension of
human nature." What is left unexplained, however, is how human nature (or
"human qualities") become legal rights. Do all "human
qualities" extend into rights or only some? If so, which and why? Finally,
if "human qualities" are what give rise to rights, why invoke the
doctrine of dependent- origination?
The derivation of human
rights from the doctrine of dependent-origination is a conjuring trick. From
the premise that we live in "a mutually constituted existential
realm" (we all live together) it has "thereby become a fact"
that there will be "mutual respect of fellow beings." In the
twinkling of an eye, values have appeared from facts like a rabbit out of a
hat. However, the fact that human beings live in relationship with one another
is not a moral argument about how they ought to behave. By itself it offers no
reason why a person should not routinely abuse the rights of others. Inada's
suggestion that human rights can be grounded in the doctrine of dependent-
origination turns out to be little more than a recommendation that people
should be nice to one another on the ground that we are "all in this
together." [46]
The approach adopted by Perera
is rather different. Perera's main concern is to demonstrate that the articles
of the Universal Declaration are adumbrated in early Buddhist teachings, rather
than explore their philosophical foundations. He acknowledges that
"Buddhism credits the human personality with a dignity and moral
responsibility" [47] but does not explain fully whence this arises or how
it provides a foundation for human rights. In a number of places he suggests
certain possibilities regarding the source of human dignity, not all of which
seem to be compatible. At one point he defines "the ethical assumption on
which the Buddhist concept of human rights is founded" as the
"fundamental consideration that all life has a desire to safeguard itself
and to make itself comfortable and happy." [48] Basing rights on desires,
however, is problematic. One reason is that certain people, for example those
who seek to end their lives through suicide, seem to lack the desire in
question. Nor is difficult to conceive of a justification for human rights
abuses along the lines that the victims "no longer cared what happened to
them." If they themselves had no interest in their future, whose rights
would have been violated? A deeper problem is that the mere existence of
desires establishes nothing from a moral point of view. Desires are many and
varied and can be met in manifold ways. Moral questions arise both at the level
of whether a desire should be met and how it should be met. The identification
of a desire may be a starting point for moral reflection, but it is certainly
not its end. [49]
On the preceding page Perera
suggests an alternative foundation for human rights, one which links it to
human dignity. He writes: "Buddhism posits, as Jean Jaques Rousseau did
much later, that the essence of human dignity lies in the assumption of man's
responsibility for his own governance." [50] No Buddhist sources are cited
in support of this claim, and I believe it is unlikely that Buddhism would wish
to link human dignity quite so closely to politics. Perhaps if this suggestion
were developed a little further it would make reference to underlying human capacities
such as reason and autonomy which enable men to constitute themselves into
orderly societies, and then point to these as the underlying source of human
dignity. While political institutions may be produced through the exercise of
distinctively human capacities, however, it is unlikely that Buddhism would
locate "the essence of human dignity" in their creation. According to
the Agga~ñnasutta, the evolution of political societies is the consequence of
depravity and decline, which makes them a dubious testament to human dignity.
Where then, should the foundations for a Buddhist doctrine of human rights be
sought? The proper ground for a doctrine of human rights, I suggest, lies
elsewhere than in the doctrine of dependent-origination, as suggested by Inada,
or in either the desire for self- preservation or the acceptance of
responsibility for self-government, as proposed by Perera. Perera, in fact,
comes closest to what in my view is the true source of human rights in Buddhism
in his commentary on Article 1.[51] In discussing the first sentence of the
Article ("All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights") he comments that "Buddhahood itself is within the reach of
all human beings ... and if all could attain Buddhahood what greater equality
in dignity and rights can there be?" To focus attention upon the goal, I
believe, is more promising than any of the other approaches considered thus
far. Perera seems to grasp its significance in a remark towards the end of his
commentary on Article 1. He writes:
It is from the point of view
of its goal that Buddhism evaluates all action. Hence Buddhist thought is in
accord with this and other Articles in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights to the extent to which they facilitate the advancement of human beings
towards the Buddhist goal. [52]
I believe the above statement
provides the key to understanding human rights from a Buddhist perspective.
What is missing in Perera's commentary, however, is the explicit linkage
between the goal and human dignity, and it is this which I will now try to
establish. What I will suggest in general is that the source of human dignity
should be sought not in the analysis of the human condition provided by the
first and second noble truths (the area where Buddhist scholarship has
myopically focused its attention) but in the evaluation of human good provided
by the third and fourth. Human rights cannot be derived from any factual
non-evaluative analysis of human nature, whether in terms of its
psycho-physical constitution (the five "aggregates" which lack a
self), its biological nature (needs, urges, drives), or the deep structure of
interdependency (paṭicca-samupāda)
. Instead, the most promising approach will be one which locates human rights
and dignity within a comprehensive account of human goodness, and which sees
basic rights and freedoms as integrally related to human flourishing and
self-realization. [53] This is because the source of human dignity in Buddhism
lies nowhere else than in the literally infinite capacity of human nature for
participation in goodness. [54]
The connection between human
rights and human good can be illustrated by asking what the various
declarations on human rights see to secure. Documents which speak of human
rights commonly announce a list of specific rights and freedoms and proclaim
them to be inviolable. The rights proclaimed by the Universal Declaration
include the right to life, liberty, security of person, equality before the
law, privacy, marriage and protection of family life, social security,
participation in government, work, protection against unemployment, rest and
leisure, a minimum standard of living, and enjoyment of the arts. The exercise
of these rights is subject only to such general limitations as are necessary to
secure due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and
the requirements of morality, public order and general welfare (Article 29.2).
Otherwise, the rights are expressed in categorical forms such as "Everyone
has ..." and "No-one shall ...". For example, Article 3:
"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person." And
Article 4: "No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the
slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms." The document thus
understands the rights it proclaims as both "universal" and
exceptionless. Using the terminology introduced earlier it can be seen that
some of these rights are claim rights while others are liberty rights. Article
2 confirms this when it speaks of an entitlement to both the "rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration." [55]
What do these rights and
freedoms amount to? It might be said that they map the parameters of human
"good-in-community." In other words, these rights and freedoms are
what is required if human beings are to lead fulfilled lives in society.
Article 29.1 recognizes this when it observes "Everyone has duties to the
community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is
possible."[56] In the absence of human rights the scope for human
development and fulfillment through social interaction is drastically reduced.
The rights specified define and facilitate aspects of human fulfillment. The
right to life is clearly fundamental since it is the condition for the
enjoyment of all other rights and freedoms. The right to "liberty and
security of person" (Article 3) is also basic to any understanding of human
good. Without these minimum conditions the scope and opportunity for human
fulfillment would be intolerably restricted. The same would apply in the case
of slavery (Article 4), torture (Article 5), and the denial of rights before
the law (Article 6). It can also be seen that many of the detailed rights
identified are actually derived from more fundamental ones. Article 3, for
example, "No one shall be held in slavery," is clearly implied in
Article 2, "Everyone has the right to ... liberty." It might thus be
said that many of the thirty articles articulate the practical implications of
a relatively small number of fundamental rights and freedoms which are the
basis of the common good.
It may be noted that the
Universal Declaration itself and modern charters like it do not offer a
comprehensive vision of human good. This is not intended as a criticism, for
the purpose of such charters is to secure only what might be termed the
"minimum conditions" for human flourishing in a pluralistic milieu.
The task of articulating a comprehensive vision of what is ultimately valuable
in human life and how it is to be attained falls to the competing theories of
human good found in religions, philosophies and ideologies. Buddhism provides
one view of human nature and its fulfillment, Christianity another, secular
philosophies a third. To pursue any of these different paths, however, requires
the substructure known as "human rights," a complex of fundamental
rights and liberties which are the preconditions for the realization of the particular
opportunities made available by the competing ideologies.
If the aim of human
rights declarations is understood in the way outlined above then human rights
is fundamentally a moral issue. Where there is no right to life, liberty and
security of person, and where torture is routine, the opportunities for the
realization of human good are greatly reduced. Freedom of religion (Article
18), for example, is vital to the Buddhist vision of individual and social
good, and the consequences of the loss of these rights are all too obvious in
Tibet. Human rights is thus an area in which religions have a legitimate and
vital stake, and there is every reason why it would be proper for Buddhism both
to endorse the Universal Declaration and call upon others to respect and
implement it. [57]
If religions have a legitimate
stake in human rights, we might expect to find many of the rights and liberties
spelled out in human rights charters present in either an express or implied
form in their moral teachings. These typically include commandments or precepts
forbidding killing, stealing, adultery, and lying, as do the first four of the
Five Precepts. These evils are prohibited because it is immediately apparent
that they are antithetical to human flourishing-in-community. The rationale for
these prohibitions, I suggest, coincides to a large extent with that of the
various human rights manifestos. [58] These manifestos, indeed, may be regarded
as a translation of religious precepts into the language of rights. The process
of casuistry can be seen at work in both. Just as a limited number of moral
precepts can be expanded to meet the needs of different social situations (many
of the extensive Vinaya rules, for example, have their source in a handful of
moral precepts), [59] so the many articles in human rights charters are
extrapolated from a comparatively small number of basic rights and freedoms.
It must be admitted
there are grounds for skepticism towards the parallel which has just been
suggested since it cannot be denied that the Buddhist precepts look and sound
very different from contemporary declarations on human rights. The Buddhist
precepts make no reference to "rights" at all, and are couched
instead in the form of undertakings. [60] Let us examine what these
undertakings involve. On the basis of our earlier analysis it would seem that
"taking the precepts" in Buddhism is actually the formal
acknowledgment of a subsisting duty, a duty which arises from Dharma. The
person who takes the precepts is saying in effect "I hereby recognize my
Dharmic duty not to do x,y, and z." Since duties have their correlative in
rights, however, rights must also be implicit in the good the precepts seek to
promote. We saw earlier that rights provide a way of talking about what is just
and unjust from a special angle. We noted further that a person who has right
has a benefit, a benefit which can be described as either a claim or a liberty.
In the context of the precepts, then, the right-holder is the one who suffers
from the breach of Dharmic duty when the precepts are broken. In the case of
the first precept this would be the person who was unjustly killed. The right
the victim has may therefore be defined as a negative claim-right upon the
aggressor, namely the right not to be killed. In simple terms we might say that
the victim has a right to life which the aggressor has a duty to respect.
That the translation
between precepts and rights is accurate, and that the agreement between the two
formulations is more than superficial or accidental, is supported by the
authenticity with which the Dalai Lama was able to affirm the Global Ethic.
Kuschel comments as follows:
Something else seems decisive
to me: authenticity and humanity. The reason why the Dalai Lama's speech was so
convincing, and indeed seized people's hearts, so that it was often interrupted
by spontaneous applause, was that this man simply wanted to be an authentic
Buddhist. His plea for mutual respect, dialogue and collaboration, for
understanding between peoples and respect for creation, was not an adaptation
to Christian or Western values, but came from the depths of his own Buddhist
spirituality. [61]
Further evidence of the
linkage between the Buddhist precepts and social justice is found in the
Theravāda tradition. Writing on the theme of "Justice in Buddhism"
Vajiragnana states:
Man is responsible for
society. It is he who makes it good or bad through his own actions. Buddhism,
therefore, advocates a five-fold disciplinary code for man's training in order
to maintain justice in society ... These five ... precepts are extremely
important fundamental principles for promoting and perpetuating human welfare,
peace and justice. [62]
I suggest, then, that the
apparent differences between the moral teachings of Buddhism and human rights
charters is one of form rather than substance. Human rights can be extrapolated
from Buddhist moral teachings in the manner described above using the logic of
moral relationships to illumine what is due under Dharma. A direct translation
of the first four precepts yields a right to life, a right not to have one's
property stolen, a right to fidelity in marriage, and a right not to be lied
to. Many other human rights, such as the rights to liberty and security can
either be deduced from or are extant within the general corpus of Buddhist
moral teachings. A right not to be held in slavery, for example, is implicit in
the canonical prohibition on trade in living beings. [63] These rights are the
extrapolation of what is due under Dharma; they have not been
"imported" into Buddhism but were implicitly present.
If modern conceptions of
human rights and Buddhist moral teachings are related in the way I have
suggested, certain conclusions follow for our understanding of the Buddhist
precepts. If there are universal and exceptionless rights, as human rights
charters affirm, there must be universal and exceptionless duties. If human
rights such as a "right to life" (by which I understand a right not
to have one's life taken unjustly) are exceptionless, there must also be an
exceptionless duty to abstain from unjustly depriving a human being of life.
The First Precept in Buddhism, therefore, should be understood as an
exceptionless duty or moral absolute.
Is this reverse
translation, from absolute human rights to absolute moral duties, supported by
textual sources? There is every reason to think that it is. Such an
understanding of the precept is clearly evident in classical Buddhism, which
tirelessly reiterates the principle of the sanctity of life found in the pan-
Indian teachings on non-harming (ahiṃsā),
and which gives no reason to suppose that its moral precepts are to be
understood as anything other than exceptionless norms. If, on the other hand,
it is thought that the precepts are not to be understood as moral absolutes,
then it is difficult to see what justification there can be for Buddhists to
hold that there are universal and exceptionless human rights. It would be
inconsistent to affirm the latter but deny the former.
The above account of
human rights in Buddhism has been given entirely within the context of an
understanding of human good which has its apex in nirvana-in-this-life.
Reference to the transcendent dimension of human good and its ground has been
avoided for several reasons. The first is that no reference need be made to
transcendent realities in order to ground human rights. That this is so can be
seen from the absence of any reference to such realities in contemporary human
rights charters, and the fact that many atheists are vigorous defenders of
human rights. Where Buddhism is concerned, the vision of human good set out in
the third and fourth noble truths provides the necessary basis for a doctrine
of human rights. Human rights turn out in essence to be what justice requires
if human good is to be fulfilled. The second reason for avoiding reference to
transcendent realities is that my aim has been to suggest a basis for human
rights acceptable to classical Buddhism as a whole. Since all schools of
Buddhism affirm the third and fourth noble truths and the vision of human good
they proclaim, the required common ground for a pan-Buddhist doctrine of human
rights is present.
The above should not be
read as a denial that there can be a transcendent ground for human rights in Buddhism.
Because the transcendent dimension of human good is left obscure in Buddhist
teachings, however, the transcendent ground for human rights is also obscure.
In terms of the account given here, the transcendent ground for human rights
would be post-mortem nirvana, not in the sense of an absolute reality (as
suggested by Kung) but as the universalization of human good on a transcendent
plane. The twin axes of human good are knowledge (prajñā) and moral concern
(karuṇā) and on the
graph defined by these axes can be plotted the soteriological coordinates of
any individual. Through participation in these twin categories of good, human
nature progressively transcends its limitations and becomes saturated with
nirvanic goodness. Eventually, in post-mortem nirvāṇa, this goodness attains a magnitude which can
no longer be charted. If a transcendent ground for human rights is desired,
this is where it should be sought.
To sum up: it is
legitimate to speak of both rights and human rights in Buddhism. Modern
doctrines of human rights are in harmony with the moral values of classical
Buddhism in that they are an explication of what is "due" under
Dharma. The modern idea of human rights has a distinctive cultural origin, but
its underlying preoccupation with human good makes it at bottom a moral issue
in which Buddhism and other religions have a legitimate stake. The Global Ethic
endorses the view that the principles it sets forth on human rights are neither
new nor "Western" when it states: "We affirm that a common set
of core values is found in the teachings of the religions, and that these form
the basis of a global ethic." [64]
A final thought. Above I
have spoken only of human rights, and in the context of Buddhism this
perspective may be unduly narrow in that it seems to preclude the universe of
sentient non-human beings from any entitlement to rights. Buddhists may feel,
therefore, that it is less prejudicial in discussions of this kind to revert to
the older terminology of "natural" rights. Whether or not animals
have rights, and whether these are the same rights as human beings, is a matter
which requires separate discussion. If human rights flow from human nature, as
suggested, it may be that rights of different kinds flow from natures of
different kinds. Such would seem to be the understanding of classical Buddhism.
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NOTES
[1] The text of the
Declaration, along with commentaries and supplementary information is available
in Kung and Kuschel, (eds) (1993). Return
[2] Kung and Kuschel (eds)
(1993:8). Return
[3] For a range of cultural
and ideological perspectives on human rights see Pollis and Schwab
(1979).Return
[4] On the absence of ethics
in Hinduism see Creel (1977:20ff). Return
[5] In spite of its
contemporary importance, however, little appears to have been written on the
subject from a specifically Buddhist perspective. The only monograph on the
subject appears to be Perera (1991), and I am grateful to the Ven. Mahinda
Deegalle for bringing it to my attention. Panikkar (1982:76n) refers to a
UNESCO Symposium which took place in Bangkok in 1979 entitled Meeting of
Experts on the Place of Human Rights in Cultural and Religious Traditions,
which apparently included discussion of Buddhism. I have as yet been unable to
obtain a copy of the Final Report SS-79/CONF. 607/10 of 6 February 1980. Return
[6] On the analogous question
of whether there is an "African" doctrine of human rights see Howard
(1986). Return
[7] For information on these
empirical questions see Humana (1992), Hsiung (1985), Rupesinghe et al (1993),
de Silva (1988), also Human Rights in Developing Countries, Yearbook 1993
(Copenhagen, 1993: Nordic Human Rights Publications). Return
[8] Dagger (1989:293). I am
indebted to Dagger's excellent paper throughout this section. Return
[9] Dagger (1989:294),
original emphasis. Return
[10] Finnis (1980:206). Return
[11] Stackhouse lists five
(1984:35ff). Little (1988) shows the dependency of the modern Western secular
and liberal ideology on Christian theology by tracing the historical connection
between the Christian concept of conscience and the intellectual framework
within which the American doctrines of liberty and religious freedom emerged in
the eighteenth century in the writings of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.
He suggests that this Western framework applies relatively unproblematically to
Buddhism and Islam, and notes in general: "Thus, current human rights
formulations, along with the important notions that underlie them, are by no
means necessarily irrelevant to cultures outside the West" (1988:31). For
perspectives on human rights from the world's religions see Rouner (1988) and
Swidler (1982). Issues concerning religion and rights are discussed by Bradney
(1993). A commentary on the Universal Declaration from the perspective of
Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity and Islam may be found in Human Rights and
Religions in Sri Lanka, published by the Sri Lanka Foundation (Colombo, 1988).
The Buddhist commentary by Perera was republished separately in 1991. Return
[12] Stackhouse (1984:35)
Return
[13] Stackhouse (1984:36).
Return
[14] For a survey see Carlyle
and Carlyle (1950) Return
[15] Finnis (1980:208). Return
[16] The most influential
modern analysis of rights is that by Hohfeld (1964). Return
[17] Finnis (1980:199-205).
Return
[18] Finnis (1980:205),
original emphasis. Return
[19] Perera's discussion of
Buddhism and human rights does not address these questions, and seems to assume
that the concept of rights and human rights as understood in the Universal
Declaration are directly applicable to canonical Buddhism. Return
[20] For the view that moral
values are determined by culture, as maintained by many anthropologists, see
Ladd (ed.) (1983). The defensibility of a specific cultural custom (female
circumcision) from a human rights perspective is discussed by James (1994).
Return
[21] Pali Text Society
Pali-English Dictionary, uju and ujju. Return
[22] On the concept of rights
in Hinduism and the meaning of adhikāra, see Bilimoria (1993), also Creel
(1977:19). In Buddhist languages the notion of rights may be distributed among
a variety of terms, as perhaps, in Latin among the words auctoritas, potestas,
dominium, iurisdictio, proprietas, libertas and ius (Dagger, 1989:291). Return
[23] Quoted in Dagger
(1989:286). Return
[24] Finnis (1980:209). Return
[25] Vajiragnana (1992) Return
[26] See, for example, the
Sigālovādasutta. Return
[27] Dagger (1989:297) Return
[28] Finnis (1980:209) Return
[29] Finnis (1980:210) Return
[30] MacIntyre (1981:69). Cf.
de Bary on the Chinese neologisms which have been coined to express these
concepts (1988:183). Return
[31] The institution of caste
is criticized in numerous early discourses, notably the Soṇadaṇḍasutta. Return
[32] Carrithers (1985)
suggests that the Buddhist concept of the "self" (which he relates to
Mauss's concept of the "moi") is one which is easily transportable
across cultural frontiers. This enhances the prospects for a Buddhist doctrine
of universal human rights. Return
[33] Useful discussions of the
philosophical basis of human rights may be found in Donnelly (1985) and Nickel
(1987). Return
[34] On how far the Western
concept of human rights is relevant or applicable to other cultures see
Panikkar (1982), Teson (1985), Milne (1986), Welch et al (1990). Return
[35] Perera (1991:xi). Return
[36] MacIntyre (1981:69).
Return
[37] A Global Ethic, p.14
Return
[38] A Global Ethic, p.23
original emphasis. Return
[39] Kung (1986:383f),
original emphasis. Return
[40] A Global Ethic, p.62f
Return
[41] Inada (1982:71) Return
[42] Inada (1982:70),
paragraphs joined. Return
[43] Inada (1982:70). Return
[44] Inada (1982:70f). Return
[45] An earlier attempt to
ground Buddhist ethics in dependent- origination can be found in Macy (1979).
Macy offers the Sarvodaya Shramadana, a self-help movement in Sri Lanka, as
"A notable example of the ethics of paṭicca-samuppāda,"
but, like Inada, fails to explain how a moral imperative arises out of this
doctrine. Also drawn to the seemingly magnetic doctrines of no-self and
dependent-origination is Taitetsu Unno, whose 1988 article, supposedly about
rights, is taken up almost entirely in providing a Pure Land perspective on
these two doctrines. While these doctrines offer a congenial metaphysical
backdrop for Buddhist ethics, they cannot provide a moral ground for rights.
Harris (1994) expresses doubts that dependent-origination can provide a
satisfactory basis for Buddhist ecology. Return
[46] In a second essay on the
subject (1990) Inada gives much less emphasis to dependent-origination and
seems to want to ground human rights in compassion. However, the nature of the
argument, and in particular the concluding paragraph, are far from clear.
Return
[47] Perera (1991:28, cf.88).
Return
[48] Perera (1991:29). Return
[49] A further problem,
although I believe it is ultimately a pseudo- problem, is that Buddhism sees
desire as the cause of suffering. Desire would therefore seem an unlikely
foundation for human rights. Return
[50] Perera (1991:28). Return
[51] Article 1: "All
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of
brotherhood." Return
[52] Perera (1991:24). Return
[53] A discussion of human
nature and human good in Buddhism will be found in my forthcoming Buddhism
& Bioethics (Macmillan, 1995). Return
[54] A more familiar way of
making the same point in Buddhist terminology would be to say that all beings
are potential Buddhas or possess the "Buddha-nature." Return
[55] Emphasis added. Return
[56] Emphasis added. Return
[57] In the view of Perera: "From
the religious angle, it is possible to state that in this Declaration lie
enshrined certain values and norms emphasized by the major religions of the
world. Though not directly expressed, the basic principles of the Declaration
are supported and reinforced by these religious traditions, and among them the
contribution of the Buddhist tradition, to say the least, is quite
outstanding" (1991:xīi). Though not wishing to deny that the early teachings
support the principles of the Declaration, I do not agree that the contribution
of the Buddhist //tradition// to the cause of human rights is in any way
"outstanding." Return
[58] In certain areas (such as
the prohibition on alcohol and matters of sexual morality) the precepts go
beyond the more limited aims of human rights charters. This is because Buddhism
provides a particular vision of human good and also defines the practices
required for its fulfillment. Return
[59] Keown (1992:33). Return
[60] Sometimes a contrast is
drawn between the "voluntary" nature of the Buddhist precepts and the
"commandments" of Christianity. While the format of the Buddhist
precepts is certainly more appealing to liberal tastes, the distinction has
little real meaning. The precepts apply whether or not they are formally
"undertaken," and are commandments in all but name. Return
[61] Kung and Kuschel (eds)
(1993:104), original emphasis. Return
[62] Vajiragnana (1992).
Return
[63] A.īi.208 Return
[64] Kung and Kuschel (eds) (1993:14).
Return
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