The Establishment of the Theory of the Two
Truths
Venerable Dr. Chang Qing
The
Mahaprajna Buddhist Society
Singapore
Summary
This paper is one of the seven chapters in my PhD thesis. There are three
sections. In the first section, I expound the early Chinese interpretations of
the two truths, according to chronological order. In the second section, I
explain the reasons why Chi-tsang establishes the theory of the two truths.
Besides that, I also give an account of the relationship between the two truths
and the Sanlun school. Finally, I go one step further to illustrate the
significance and benefits of the two truths from Chi-tsang’s point of view. One
can summarise the discussion of this paper as follows:
1. There are those who had interpreted the two
truths before Chi-tsang’s time, such as Seng-chao, Prince Chao-ming, Fa-yün,
Hui-yüan, Harivarman etc.. Nevertheless, their usage of the terms “existence”
(yu) and “non-existence” (wu) to explain the two truths appeared
rather vague and ambiguous.
2. Chi-tsang’s reason in establishing the two
truths is to abandon the two extreme views of annihilationism and enternalism.
His idea in establishing the two truths was influenced by his predecessors such
as Nagarjuna and
Fa-lang.
3. There is a close relationship between the
two truths and Sanlun school in which the two truths play an important
role.
4. The two truths are significant for one to
obtain wisdom. Chi-tsang explains the benefits of the two truths from both the
mundane and the supramundane standpoints. Nonetheless, his approach places more
emphasis on the supramundane than the mundane perspective. Nevertheless,
Chi-tsang also attempts to include the mundane view as well in order to
highlight the significance and benefit of the two truths.
Key words: 1. two
truths 2. existence and
non-existence 3. realm 4. wisdom
5. principle 6. destruction and eternality
1.
Early Chinese Interpretations of the Two Truths
The discussion of the two truths in the Ta-chih-tu-lun (Mahaprajña-paramita-çastra),
translated by Kumarajīva
(344~413)[1] is found in its presentation of the four
siddhantas.[2] The word siddhanta
refers to method, teaching, principle, or objective. The
four siddhantas
are as follows:
The worldly principle (shih-chieh-hsi-t’an, laukika siddhanta)
The individual principle (ke-ke-wei-jen-hsi-t’an, pratipaurußika siddhanta)
The therapeutic point of view (tui-chih-hsi-t’an, pratipakßika siddhanta)
The supreme point of view (ti-i-i-hsi-t’an, paramarthika siddhanta)[3]
First, the worldly principle (shih-chieh-hsi-t’an) refers to
the Buddha in accordance with sentient beings’ desire. He therefore taught the
worldly dharmas in order to enable them to accept his teachings. The Ta-chih-tu-lun writes:
If people do not truly exist, then why does the
Buddha say, “With my divine eye I see sentient begins?” Hence, we should
conclude that people exist but only from the worldly principle, not from the
supreme point of view.[4]
In this passage, the Buddha uses his divine eye
to see sentient beings. The Buddha’s perception of the existence of sentient
beings is from the worldly principle point of view. In the mundane world,
sentient beings view things as truly existing. Nonetheless, from the supreme
point of view, all things are provisionally existent. It is because all things
lack inherent existence, that they only conditionally exist. Hence, all things
are provisionally existent in the mundane world rather than really existent.
That is the reason why the Buddha views sentient beings as truly existing only
from the worldly principle point of view.
Secondly, the individual principle (ke-ke-wei-jen-hsi-t’an) refers to
the Buddha preaching the Dharma in accordance with the sharp and dull faculties
of the individual among sentient beings.
Thirdly, the therapeutic principle (tui-chih-hsi-t’an) refers to the teaching
of the Buddha as a remedy for the maladies which afflict sentient beings such as
the use of compassion to remedy greed and the contemplation of conditionality to
remedy ignorance. Regarding the Buddha’s adoption of the contemplation of
conditionality to deal with sentient beings who are ignorant, the Ta-chih-tu-lun writes:
Question: Why are you now saying that people
who are ignorant should contemplate the conditionality?
Answer: For people who are ignorant, it is not
because they are like a cow, or a sheep etc.. Ignorance comes about as a result
of people wanting to attain the real path. Nonetheless, they have the wrong mind
for contemplation, so they therefore generate false views. Hence, these people
should contemplate the conditionality and this is called wisely dealing with the
individual principle.[5]
As pointed out above, the ignorant people
referred to are those who have the wrong mind for contemplation and thus
generate false views. Hence, the contemplation of conditionality is used to deal
with this faculty of people.
Fourthly, the supreme point of view (ti-i-i-hsi-t’an) refers to the Buddha
teaching the real reality of dharmas to enable sentient beings to become truly
enlightened.
Swanson says: “There are many scattered references to the Two Truths in
the Ta-chih-tu-lun which can be categorised into four uses
in the following pattern. There are two ways of viewing one reality, or (1)
there are two truths, but (2) they are not contradictory. (3) There are
conventional differences between the two truths, but (4) they are mutually
dependent, that is, they are identical or ultimately one.”[6] He subsequently cites a couple of quotations
from the Ta-chih-tu-lun to explain these four categories of the two
truths. Here, it is not a paradox for the Ta-chih-tu-lun to claim that the two truths are mutually
dependent and yet are identical. Swanson, for example, quotes the Ta-chih-tu-lun ’s proposition of the two
truths as mutually dependent:
If there are no names and words, causes and
conditions, or coming together [of aggregates], then all mundane things,
language, and phenomena perish. If there is no worldly truth, then neither is
there a supreme truth. If there is no “two truths”, then all reality [sarvadharma] is an illusion.[7]
This is evidence to show that the two truths
are mutually dependent.
Regarding the two truths as
identical, Swanson quotes the Ta-chih-tu-lun and says:
“Bhagavan, are the worldly and supreme truths
different?”
“Subhuti, the worldly truth and the supreme
truth are not different. Why? Because the thusness of the worldly truth is
identical to the thusness of the supreme truth. Because sentient beings do not
know nor see this thusness, Bodhisattva-mahasattvas
utilise the worldly truth to signify [that dharmas are] both existent and
non-existent.”[8]
In this passage, it is important to note that
there is no difference of “thusness” (ju) between the worldly truth and the
supreme truth. Here, the term “thusness” is referring to real reality of
dharmas. That is to say, in terms of “thusness” of the two truths, they are
identical. This is because the thusness of the worldly truth refers to real
reality, that is emptiness. Likewise, the thusness of the supreme truth is
undoubtedly referring to real reality-emptiness as well. The two truths as
mutually dependent is merely concerning the two truths by themselves. On the
other hand, the two truths being identical is referring to both having the same
“thusness”. The main difference between these two issues is the “thusness”.
Therefore, the Ta-chih-tu-lun suggests that the two truths are mutually
dependent and identical.
In conclusion, from the exposition of the four categories of the two
truths by the Ta-chih-tu-lun, we
realise that the Ta-chih-tu-lun was
influenced by Madhyamika
philosophy. As Swanson writes:
Its teachings can thus be considered “orthodox”
Madhyamikan philosophy with a more positive
slant than the M•lamadhyamakakarika, and its
positive approach had a great influence on the development of Madhyamikan philosophy in China.[9]
In the Emptiness of the
Unreal (Pu-chen-k’ung-lun),
Seng-chao (374-414) deals with the views of three of them, known as “mental
non-existence” (hsin-wu), “identical
with form” (chi-se) and “original
non-existence” (pen-wu). Nonetheless,
Seng-chao merely gives a brief description of each view, followed by a short
criticism of the view’s position. For example, Seng-chao writes about the view
of “mental non-existence” as follows:
(Description:) [There is the view of] hsin-wu
[which maintains that] one should not have a [deliberate] mind towards
myriad things. Myriad things are, however, not inexistent.
(Criticism:) What this [view] realises is [the
importance of] calming the spirit; what it misses is [the nature of] voidness of
things.[10]
In this passage, Seng-chao criticises this
school which has the view of “mental non-existence” (hsin-wu) and refutes it as realising
only the importance of calming the spirit. Seng-chao’s intention is to deal with
the views of “mental non-existence” and existence of myriad things. Hence,
Seng-chao points out that calming the spirit has to be realised. It seems that
the expression of “emptiness of things” refers to the nature of things as
lacking inherent existence. Things are impermanent and therefore the names of
things are considered as provisional names. In this regard, Seng-chao also
writes:
The Mahayana çastra says:
“Dharma neither have the characteristics of existence nor those of
non-existence.” The Chung-lun says: “Dharma are neither existent nor
non-existent.”[11]
The Chung-kuan[-lun][12] says: “Things exist by conditionality. Hence,
they are considered as non-existent. Because things arise through
dependent-origination, thus they are not non-existent.[13]
A sūtra says: “Is there any difference between
the real truth and the mundane truth? Answer: “No difference.” This sūtra says that the real truth explains “not
existence” (fei-yu) and the mundane
truth explains “not non-existence” (fei-wu).[14]
It is justifiable for us to claim that
Seng-chao was influenced by Madhyamaka philosophy in this
context.[15]
As Swanson pointed out, it is inappropriate for Seng-chao to use the
terms “neither existence nor non-existence” (fei-yu-fei-wu) in explaining the two
truths. Swanson writes:
The Chinese terms yu
(existence) and wu (non-existence) are used with two different
meanings depending on whether they are affirmed or denied....Therefore,
“non-existence” (fei-yu) is affirmed
in the sense that though phenomena have conventional existence, they have no
substantive Being. “Not inexistent” (fei-wu) is affirmed in the sense that
though phenomena have no substantive Being, they are not complete
nothingness....Seng-chao explains that the supreme truth means non-Being (fei-yu) and the conventional truth means
not non-existent (fei-wu),
“non-Being” and “not non-existent” ultimately, having the same meaning (T.45,
152b17). The argument is taken one step further by pointing out that one cannot
accept the position that things are non-existent nothingness, because this is
the extreme view of annihilationism (ucchedadṛṣṭi) and one cannot accept the
position that things have substantial Being, because this is the extreme view of
eternalism (nityadṛṣṭi) (T45, 152b26-28). Since
things are not complete nothingness, annihilationism is wrong. Since things do
not have substantial Being, eternalism is wrong.[16]
Swanson’s account cited above suggests that the
interpretations of the notion of the two truths in terms of the formula ‘neither
existence nor non-existence’ is problematic. It seems that Seng-chao might have
overlooked the fact that “not existence” (fei-yu) and “not non-existence” (fei-wu) are inappropriate terms to
explain the two truths. All in all, it is legitimate to say that Seng-chao’s use
of the terms “not existence” and “not non-existence” to explain the two truths
was influenced by Madhyamaka thought, and that he uses them to
refute the three traditions of “mental non-existence”, “identical with form” and
“original non-existence”.
Swanson says: “In the Kuang
Hung-ming-chi of Tao-hsüan
(596~667), there is a collection of two hundred and ninety six documents on
Buddhism. One of the documents, On the
Meaning of the Two Truths (T.52,
247b-250b) records a discussion of the two truths introduced and presided over
by Prince Chao-ming of the Liang dynasty (502~557).”[17] According to Prince Chao-ming, the two truths
are derived from “[objective] realm” (chin) and “[subjective] wisdom” (chih).[18] He
writes:
There is, indeed, not one single way to
appreciate the Tao. Essentially (there are two ways): one can approach it either
by way of the [objective] realm (chin) or by way of [subjective] wisdom
(chih). At times, one can understand
the meaning by way of the realm [aspect]. At times, one lets the actions
manifest by way of the wisdom [aspect]. Concerning the theory of the Two Truths,
it is the tool to understand the meaning by way of the realm [aspect]. If this
point is missed [by the reader], then the person would be lost forever in
[wrongly] thinking that there are Three Truths. However, if he sees the point,
the myriad problems will disappear.[19]
As pointed out above, Prince Chao-ming asserts
that the meaning of the two truths comes from the “[objective] realm” (chin) and the act to understand the two
truths is performed in “[subjective] wisdom” (chih). In order to support his
proposition of the meaning of the two truths as “[objective] realm”, Prince
Chao-ming subsequently attempts to explain it. As Swanson claims, this is a
rather vague statement although he tries to clarify his assertion
somewhat.[20]
Indeed, there is a dialogue between the Prince and Fa-yün
(467-529)[21] on the issue of the distinction between
“[subjective] wisdom” and “[objective] realm”.
Question: The objective realm known by the sage
is called the real truth. Is the wisdom of the knower called the real truth or
is this the mundane truth?
Answer: Knowing (jen-chih) is called wisdom. That which
can be known (so-chih) is called the
objective realm. When wisdom is gained, the objective realm is obscured [it is
seen for what it truly is?], and thus it can be called the real.
Question: Are people who have wisdom the real
truth or the mundane truth?
Answer: As long as one speaks of a person who
has wisdom, this is the mundane truth.[22]
In this passage, Prince Chao-ming points out
the distinction between the “[objective] realm” and “[subjective] wisdom”. As
far as Prince Chao-ming is concerned, the real truth refers to the [subjective]
wisdom that is gained beyond the [objective] realm of the mundane world and also
that which is known by [subjective] wisdom. The mundane truth is referring to
the [objective] realm of concepts and words. Prince Chao-ming depends on the
“[objective] realm” to explain the two truths. There is also another example to
show that Prince Chao-ming is using the theory of “[objective] realm” to define
the two truths. Prince Chao-ming writes:
The Mahaparinirvaṇa sūtra says: “That which can be known by the
supramundane people is called the truth of supreme meaning (ti-i-i-ti). That which can be known by
the mundane people is called the worldly truth (shih-ti).”[23]
Since Prince Chao-ming defined the two truths
as belonging to the “[objective] realm”, it is justifiable to say that he viewed
them as two realities. As Lai writes:
The Prince had digested an admirable amount of
the Mādhyamika
logic. He was not totally free from an ontological understanding of the two
truths, but he had recognised the perspectival nature of the two
realities.[24]
The Prince did solve the paradox of the two
truths-realities by suggesting that there is ultimately one reality with two
perspectives. However, his solution was not always perfect and in the questions
and answers collected after the essay (the prince solicited these responses),
the problem emerged of how the two “substances” of the two “realms” can be
related to one another.[25]
Swanson also comments: “The Prince’s essay is
unsatisfactory in many ways. He affirms the unity of the two truths but is not
clear concerning their relationship.”[26] Hence, it is legitimate to say that Prince
Chao-ming’s suggestion of the two truths pertaining to the “[objective] realm”
is rather ambiguous.
In the final summary of this document, Prince Chao-ming uses the
ambiguous terms “existence” (yu) and
“non-existence” (wu) to define the
content of the two truths. He writes:
The real truth is beyond existence and
non-existence. The mundane truth is being as existence and non-existence. Being
as existence and non-existence constitutes the provisional name. Beyond
existence and non-existence is the Middle-Path. The real [truth] is the
Middle-Path, and it is based on non-arising as “substance” (t’i). The mundane [truth] is the
provisional name and it is based on arising dharmas as substance.[27]
Again, Prince Chao-ming uses the terms yu
(existence) and wu (non-existence) to define neither existence
nor non-existence as the real truth, and the mundane truth as existence and
non-existence. This is exactly the same as Seng-chao using these two terms to
define the content of the two truths. As was mentioned earlier, this is a rather
vague and imprecise use of yu and wu , which was pointed out by
Swanson.
According to Liu, Hui-yüan (523~592), one of the leading Ti-lun (Daçabhūmika) figures of Chi-tsang’s time, is
typical. In the Erh-ti-i section of
his monumental work, the Ta-cheng I-chang
(A Compendium of the Themes of the Mahāyāna), Hui-yüan
devoted an entire section to elaborate on the two truths.[28] Besides declaring the worldly truth (shih-ti) and the truth of supreme
meaning (ti-i-i-ti), he also
introduced the idea of the “truth of plurality” (teng-ti) which is considered as another
name for the worldly truth. Hui-yüan writes:
When speaking of the “truth of plurality” (teng-ti), the meaning of “plurality” is
equality and mutuality. [Nonetheless,] the worldly dharmas are not one. [Hence,]
we cannot say that [the worldly dharmas are equal.] Rather, “plurality” is the
mutuality of all dharmas. For this reason, we speak of the “truth of
plurality”.[29]
As pointed out above, Hui-yüan defines the
“truth of plurality” as mutuality of all dharmas. Hence, he treats the “truth of
plurality” as another name for the worldly truth. Although Hui-yüan suggests
that there are two categories of the two truths,[30] nonetheless, he makes the point that
establishing the names of the two truths does not mean that the names can be
contrasted with one another.[31]
As far as Hui-yüan is concerned, although there are seven ways to
distinguish the two truths,[32] they rely on the “phenomena” (shih) and “principle” (li) of the two truths as the fundamental
theory.[33] For this reason, Hui-yüan writes:
“Phenomena” (shih) and “principle” (li) are mutually contrasted. [Hence,]
“phenomena” are referred to as the worldly truth (shih-ti) and “principle” as the real
truth (chen-ti).[34]
In this passage, Hui-yüan relies on the
“phenomena” and “principle” to define the two truths as the worldly truth and
the real truth. Since Hui-yüan claims that the phenomenal dharmas are the
worldly truth, the mundane truth and the truth of plurality, and that the
“principle”, referring to all dharmas being empty, is the truth of supreme
meaning and the real truth, it seems that he is in favour of the worldly truth
and the real truth.[35]
Despite the fact that Hui-yüan adopts different aspects to explain the
two truths, he actually relies on “phenomena” and “principle” to define the two
truths. For example, he uses the terms “substance” (t’i) and “function” (yung) to define the two truths. He
writes:
The real nature of own “substance” is to be
called the real truth and the dependent-origination of “function” is called the
worldly truth.[36]
This is rather a vague statement. It is because
Hui-yüan simply constructs a terse sentence to define the two truths. He did not
elaborate further on the relationship between the “substance” and “function” of
the two truths. In this regard, Hui-yüan applies the theory of “phenomena” and
“principle” by using “substance” and “function” to define the two truths
although he did not mention this in this passage. It seems that
dependent-origination of function as the worldly truth pertains to “phenomena”.
This is because dependent-origination of function is to deal with the phenomenal
world which is impermanent. Likewise, the real nature of own substance pertains
to “principle”. As far as Hui-yüan is concerned, the real nature of own
substance is the principle to enable sentient beings to realise the true
reality.
Again, Hui-yüan also uses the terms “existence” (yu) and “non-existence” (wu) to define the two truths. He
writes:
Conditionality of the provisional existence is
called the worldly truth and emptiness-
no nature is called the real truth.[37]
In this passage, although Hui-yüan avoids the
simple identification of “existence” (yu) with the worldly truth and
“non-existence” (wu) with the real
truth, his definition of the two truths is vague. Hui-yüan did not mention the
relationship between “existence” and “non-existence” among the two truths.
Furthermore, Hui-yüan suggests that “existence” and “non-existence” can be
applied to the two truths.[38] Nonetheless, there
are some problems with his suggestion. As Swanson says: “Thus for Hui-yüan both
saµvṛtisatya
and paramārthasatya include correct and incorrect
aspects of yu and wu, of existence and non-existence,
depending on the level of understanding or school which is interpreting the
terms.”[39]
Since Hui-yüan is one of the leading Ti-lun
figures, his exposition of the two truths must be somewhat influenced by
the Ti-lun school. Hui-yüan also examines the
relationship between the worldly truth and the real truth from the two aspects
of “dependence” (i-chih) and
“origination” (yüan-ch’i). These two
aspects deal with the concept of true consciousness, also known as the
tathāgatagarbha.[40] Liu writes:
The aspect “origination” indicates that the
false phenomenal order originates from the true consciousness; the aspect
“dependence” indicates that the false phenomenal order is sustained by the true
consciousness. All in all, in the Ta-cheng I-chang, the concept of two
truths has been assimilated into the Ti-lun
metaphysical framework, and has become a part of the teaching of
ideation-only espoused by the Yogācāra
tradition.[41]
Despite the fact that Liu claims that the
concept of two truths in the Ta-cheng
I-chang (A Compendium of the Themes of the Mahāyāna)
has been assimilated into the Ti-lun (Daśabhūmikasūtra-śūstra) metaphysical framework, it actually still
pertains to the fundamental guide of “phenomena” (shih) and “principle” (li). Regarding the two aspects of
“dependence” and “origination”, Hui-yüan writes:
When the two [truths] are explained from [the
perspective of] “dependence”, the false phenomena are taken as the dependent
[objects] and the true [consciousness] is [taken as the subject] being depended
on. The false phenomena which are dependent are said to be the “mundane truth”;
the true [consciousness] which is being depended on is classified as the
“supreme truth”. When the two [truths] are explained from [the perspective of]
“origination”, the pure dharmadhātu [, i.e.] the tathāgatagarbha
[, engages in the activities of] origination and gives birth to [the realms of]
saµsāra and
nirvāṇa. The true nature [of the tathāgatagarbha]
itself is said to be the “supreme truth”; the function of origination is
classified as the “mundane truth”.[42]
As pointed out in this passage, the aspect of
“dependence” is to deal with the false phenomena. Hence, it belongs to
“phenomena” (shih) as one of the
fundamental guides. The aspect of “origination” is to deal with the theory of
tathāgatagarbha
which engages in the activities of origination and gives birth to the realms of
saµsåra and nirvāṇa. Hence, it belongs to the “principle” (li) of the fundamental
guides.
The Ch’eng-shih-lun (Satyasiddhi-śāstra) was
written by Harivarman (250~350) around the fourth century.[43] In the Ch’eng-shih-lun, Harivarman
writes:
All the Buddhas and sages wish to lead sentient
beings to be free from attachment to conventional names, therefore they utilise
the worldly truth to teach.[44]
Next, the worldly truth is the fundamental
teaching method of all Buddhas such as giving, precepts etc.. We use this method
to adjust and quieten our mind in order that we might become more receptive.
After this, we then speak of the truth of supreme meaning. This may be likened
to the Dharma which is not very profound at the beginning, or the sea which
gradually gets deeper. Hence, we speak of the worldly truth.[45]
In the first quotation, Harivarman demonstrates
that all the Buddhas and sages teach the worldly truth in order to enable
sentient beings to be free from the concepts of attachment to provisional names.
He is trying to show the importance of the worldly truth. As for the second
quotation, Harivarman also highlights that the worldly truth is the fundamental
teaching of all Buddhas. He subsequently mentions that our mind can be taught by
using the method of the worldly truth. It seems that the worldly truth has to be
known first, and then the truth of supreme meaning may be understood. He even
quotes the examples of Dharma and the sea to signify the essential function of
the worldly truth. In my opinion, Harivarman focuses more on the worldly truth
rather than on the truth of supreme meaning.[46] The Ch’eng-shih-lun ’s definition on the two
truths seems rather vague. It interpreted the two truths as separate realities.
In this context, it does not show the relationship between the two
truths.
In the Ch’eng-shih-lun,
Harivarman also uses the terms “existence” (yu) and “non-existence” (wu) to define the two truths. Harivarman
writes:
Question: When we advance the idea of no-self,
we might be guilty of expressing a heretic view. Why?
Answer: There are two truths. If we speak of
the truth of supreme meaning, [we regard] the existence of [a true] self as “the
illusion of being a self” (shen-chien)[47]. If we speak of the
worldly truth, [we consider] no-self as a heterodox view. If we speak of the
worldly truth, it therefore refers to self-existence and speaking of the truth
of supreme meaning is referring to no-self. This is called the right view. Next,
if we speak of the truth of supreme meaning as “non-existence” (wu) and the worldly truth as “existence”
(yu), both do not fall into these
views. [Hence,] it is justifiable to say that such is “existence” and
“non-existence”.[48]
In this passage, Harivarman suggests that it is
the right view for one to claim the worldly truth as “existence” (yu) and the truth of supreme meaning as
“non-existence” (wu). According to
Harivarman, it is incorrect for us to define the worldly truth as
“non-existence” and the truth of supreme meaning as “existence”. However,
Harivarman treats the two truths as separate realities and he does not explain
the relationship between the two truths. Subsequently, Harivarman also
writes:
Next, if we speak of the worldly truth as
existence, then it is not necessary [for us] to speak of the [truth of] supreme
meaning as non-existence.[49]
This passage furnishes us with the important
clues that the Ch’eng-shih-lun ’s use
of the terms “existence” and “non-existence” to define the two truths is
ambiguous. Also, the Ch’eng-shih-lun emphasises more on the worldly truth as
compared with the truth of supreme meaning. As was mentioned earlier, Harivarman
suggests that teaching of the worldly truth is to set one free from attachment
to the provisional names in order to attain liberation-the truth of supreme
meaning. Hence, he claims that it is not necessary to speak of the truth of
supreme meaning as non-existence if we speak of the worldly truth as existence.
That is to say, Harivarman asserts non-existence with the truth of supreme
meaning. As Priestley says: “Nāgārjuna
accordingly regards existence and non-existence as equally unreal; but
Harivarman identifies non-existence with ultimate truth.”[50]
Regarding Chi-tsang’s vehement criticism of the Ch’eng-shih-lun scholars Chih-tsang (458~522) and Seng-min
(467~527) who have their own exposition of the two truths, it will be discussed
in the following chapter.
2.
Establishment of the Two Truths and the Relationship with the Sanlun School
2.1
Establishment of the Two Truths
The most detailed and comprehensive Sanlun exposition of the Two Truths
is found in Chi-tsang’s Erh-ti-i,
where various reasons are to be found for setting forth a theory of the two
truths. Having said that, there are also some other works written by Chi-tsang
which are relevant to this discussion. In the Erh-ti-i, Chi-tsang writes:
Before my teacher [Fa-lang, 507~581] passed
away, he ascended to the high seat and instructed his followers. He said that
since he had come down from the mountain, he had relied upon the two truths as
the right path. He taught more than twenty approaches to the two truths,
particularly one method called ten-fold (shih-chung). The purpose of teaching
ten-fold, as regards the two truths, was to respond to the monk
K’ai-shan.[51]
This passage shows that Chi-tsang greatly respected his master [Fa-lang]
and truly inherited his teacher’s instructions, relying upon the two truths as
the main principle of Dharma. Particular account is taken of his teacher’s
exposition of shi-chung (ten-fold)
with regards to the two truths, in order to deal with one of the Cheng-shih-lun scholars, Chih-tsang. This discussion of the
term shih-chung is to be found in Chi-tsang’s work, Ta-cheng Hsüan-lun. This, in turn,
provides one of the arguments used by Chi-tsang to establish the two
truths.
The Buddhist Middle-Path is described as neither existence nor
non-existence. Nāgārjuna focuses on eight negations[52] at the beginning of the Chung-lun, the second pair of which
refer to “eternalism” and “annihilationism”. The eight negations are one of the
main features of Nāgārjuna’s
thought, their purpose being to extinguish all the extreme views which are based
on the ignorance of sentient beings. In the San-lun Hsüan-i (The Profound Meaning of the
Three Treatise), Chi-tsang cites the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra.
and says that there are two views arising in the minds
of sentient beings, namely “destruction” (tuan) and “eternality” (chang).[53] Sentient beings have a tendency to hold
either of these two views, which causes them to fall into saµsåra and
prevents them from being liberated. The A-p’i-ta-mo Ta-p’i-p’o-sha Lun
(Abhidharmamahāvibhāßā-çāstra) contains an extended discussion of these wrong views in a chapter
called ‘Aggregate of Views’.[54]
In the Ta-ch’eng
Hsüan-lun (A Treatise on the Profound [Teaching of
the] Mahāyāna), Chi-tsang
writes:
The Cheng-shih-lun scholars claim that due
to continuity [of the phenomena], there is “eternalism” (chang). Moment by moment there is
arising and ceasing with no self [which is]
“annihilationism” (tuan).
Because they see annihilationism and eternalism, they therefore do not believe
in the abstention from both “eternalism” and “annihilationism”. It needs to be
refuted.[55]
The annihilationism and eternalism views
represent serious maladies of sentient beings. The presentation of the two
truths is meant to remedy these two wrong views, substituting instead the
concepts of the worldly and the supreme meaning. Also, Chi-tsang
writes:
People who hear neither “existence” (yu) nor “non-existence” (wu) and think that there is no two
truths of real and mundane, generate the view of annihilationism. For this
reason, the second alternative is to speak of “existence” and “non-existence” as
the two truths in order to abandon one’s mind.[56]
In this passage, Chi-tsang demonstrates that
the reason to establish the two truths is to save people who have the view of
annihilationism of neither “existence” nor “non-existence”. The reason of
establishing the two truths is to negate the two extreme views such as
“annihilationism and eternalism” and “existence and non-existence”.
“Truths qua instruction” (chiao-ti) is the main feature of
Chi-tsang’s theory of the two truths, a theme which we will explain in more
detail in the next chapter. Chi-tsang points out that “truths qua instruction”
is like a medicine for sentient beings though when there is no illness there is
no need for any medicine.[57] The malady refers to the annihilationism view
and eternalism view. If one recovers from an illness, one no longer requires any
medicine.
Likewise, if one abandons these two wrong views, one has no need for
“truths qua instruction”. These two views of annihilationism and eternalism are
presented as two of the eight negations, as mentioned earlier. Någårjuna sets out the eight negations to extirpate these extreme views, in
order to reveal the true nature of phenomena--the Middle-Path. Chi-tsang
realised that the doctrine of two truths is a crucial and fundamental part of
Dharma and that only Dharma discoursed by Buddha can be of benefit to mankind.
Moreover, his teacher (Fa-lang) also emphasised the importance of the two
truths. Chi-tsang not only established the two truths, but also corrected what
he saw as the mistakes made about the two truths by other earlier schools, such
as the Cheng-shih-lun , thus
explaining his advocating of “truths qua instruction”, his original contribution
to Buddhist philosophy.
In the San-lun Hsüan-i,
Chi-tsang writes:
Question: For what purpose is the theory of the
two truths expounded in the s•tras?
Answer: There are two reasons. First, in order
to highlight the fact that Dharma is a Middle-Path (chung-tao) and with the idea of the
worldly truth, it is possible to explain the reason for the rejection of
annihilationism. Second, with the idea of the [truth] of supreme meaning, it is
possible to explain the reason for the rejection of eternalism. Therefore, the
[theory of the] two truths are established. Next, the two wisdoms[58] (erh-chih) are the Dharma body of the
Buddhas of the three ages (past, present, and future): Wisdom arises from the
[truth] of supreme meaning and skilful means (fang-pien) arises from the worldly
truth. [Hence,] both of them acquire wisdom concerning the real and wisdom
concerning skilful means. Thanks to the Buddhas of the ten directions and the
three ages, the [theory of the] two truths thereby are established. Next, there
is knowing that the [truth] of supreme meaning is “self benefit” (chi-li) and the worldly truth can
“benefit others” (li-ta). Hence, we
know that the two truths are as “mutual benefit” (kung-li). The two truths therefore are
established. Next, because of the two truths, hence, the Buddha’s speeches are
true. Because of the worldly truth, we therefore speak of existence as true.
Because of the [truth] of supreme meaning, we therefore speak of emptiness as
true. Next, Dharma is gradually abstruse. Hence, we first speak of the teaching
of cause and effect of the worldly truth, then we speak of the [truth] of
supreme meaning. Next, in order to help the wise one towards enlightenment, we
therefore speak of [truth] of supreme meaning and we do not speak of the worldly
truth. Next, if we do not speak of cause and effect of the worldly truth first
and merely speak of the [truth] of supreme meaning, then this will generate the
view of annihilationism. Hence, we explain the two truths.[59]
In the above quotation, Chi-tsang explains the
two reasons why the s•tras established the two truths. It seems
that these two reasons are rather crucial concepts in Buddhism. In addition,
Chi-tsang gives another four reasons by himself. These four reasons were given
through his understanding of the two truths.
In the Ching-ming
Hsüan-lun (A Treatise
on the Profound [Teaching of the] Vimalakīrti sūtra), Chi-tsang
says that according to the explanation of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, the
“right path” (chen-tao) originally
does not have “existence” (yu) and
“non-existence” (wu). In accord with sentient beings, we
therefore speak of “existence” and “non-existence”.[60] Chi-tsang knew that preaching of the two
truths was a form of skilful means, although he used the two truths to develop
further his own explanations and refutations of the wrong assertions of other
schools.
However, he definitely would not develop attachment to his doctrine,
using it instead simply as a skilful means. “Right path” (chen-tao) or the ultimate is beyond
verbalisation. In the Pai-lun Su (A
Commentary on the Twelve Topic Treatise), Chi-tsang writes:
Question: If the “mind” (shen) and “consciousness” (chüeh) are one, why does the two truths
need to be established?
Answer: The “substance” (t’i) is one but the meanings are
different. Since the substance is one, therefore “consciousness” is “mind” and
“mind” is “consciousness”. As for the meanings being different, [the body] which
we control, is “mind” and [the ability to] completely distinguish [all things]
is called “consciousness”. Some people suggest that suffering and origination
are one thing. Nonetheless, the meaning of “cause” (yin) and “effect” (kuo) is different. Hence, we speak of
the two [truths].[61]
In this passage, Chi-tsang uses the terms of
“mind” and “consciousness” to explain the concepts of “substance” (t’i) and “meaning” (i). According to Chi-tsang, “mind” and
“consciousness” have the same “substance”. Hence, Chi-tsang claims that “mind”
is identical with “consciousness” and “consciousness” is identical with “mind”.
Having said that, their meanings are different. Chi-tsang subsequently defines
the meaning of “mind” and “consciousness” to show their differences. In
addition, he gives an example to explain why the two truths are established. In
this example, Chi-tsang highlights that the meaning of “cause and effect” is
different. It seems that Chi-tsang was proposing that “mind” and “consciousness”
are one “substance”. Nonetheless, due to the difference in their meanings, the
one substance has two ‘truths’.
2.2 The
Relationship with the Sanlun School
The Chinese term Sanlun refers to the three treatises, namely the Chung-lun (Madhyamaka-çāstra), the Shih-erh-men-lun (Dvādaçamukha-çāstra), and the Pai-lun (Çata-çāstra). According
to Chi-tsang, the first two texts are aimed mainly at refuting Shuo-i-chüeh-yu-pu (Sarvāstivāda) and they are also aimed at correcting the
influence of the non-Mahāyāna schools.
The Pai-lun, however, acted as a
critique of the doctrine of others including non-Buddhist schools.
In the Ta-ch’eng Hsüan-lun (A Treatise on the Profound [Teaching of the]
Mahāyāna),
Chi-tsang writes:
Generally speaking, the Chung-lun relies on the two truths as its “central
theme” (tsung). The Pai-lun
is also like this. The Pai-lun
is using the two wisdoms (erh-chih) as “central theme” and the Chung-lun is also like this. If we say that the Chung-lun relies on the two truths as its central theme
and that with the Pai-lun this is not the case, this is [the wrong
statement.] There are two reasons for us to say that this is the wrong
statement. First, the Bodhisattva composes treatises in order to reveal
Buddhism. The Chung-lun reveals Buddhism by making the two truths as
its central theme. The Pai-lun also reveals [Buddhism] Why is it that the Pai-lun
cannot rely on the two truths as its central theme? Second,...the master
[Seng-]chao’s Preface of the Treatise
say: “Leading the path of the sage’s mind and speaking of main theory of the
real truth.” [For this reason,] why don’t the Chung-lun and Pai-lun
use the two truths as its central theme?...The end of the Pai-lun
says: “Since the Buddha speaks of the two truths, I now also follow the
Buddha to speak of the two truths.” [For this reason,] why does [the Pai-lun] not use the two truths as its
central theme? Hence, both of these treatises rely on the two truths as its
central theme.[62]
As pointed out above, Chi-tsang declares that
the Chung-lun and the Pai-lun rely on the two truths as its central theme.
He gives two reasons to support his statement. At the end of this quotation,
Chi-tsang quotes the Pai-lun to argue that not only the Chung-lun, but the Pai-lun
also relies on the two truths as its central theme. The reason for
Chi-tsang to claim that the Chung-lun
and the Pai-lun
rely on the two truths and the two wisdoms as their central theme at the
beginning of this quotation is that he treats the two truths as identical to the
two wisdoms. As for this issue, it will be discussed in the next chapter. Hence,
we realise that in the relationship between the two truths, the Chung-lun and the Pai-lun
are very close.
With regard to the texts of the Sanlun
(the Three Treatises) and
Sanlun Tsung (Three Treatises
school), the presentation of the root Sanlun texts is rather terse compared to
the commentaries of the Sanlun
Tsung written by Chi-tsang.
Chi-tsang, a founder of the Sanlun
Tsung, composed a detailed commentary for each of the Sanlun, entitled the
Chung-kuan-lun Su (A Commentary on the Middle Treatise),
the Shih-erh-men-lun Su (A Commentary on
the Twelve Topic Treatise) and the Pai-lun Su (A Commentary on the Hundred
Treatise). Sanlun Tsung refers to
Chi-tsang’s three commentaries on the Sanlun.
The main distinction between Sanlun and Sanlun Tsung is the term tsung (school) which includes the theory
of “classification of the Buddhist doctrine” (p’an-chiao). Schools are established
because the first patriarch of the school publishes his own ideas, while trying
to abandon the propositions of other schools and emphasising his own assertion.
The first patriarch classifies his own theory from the Buddhist doctrine, so he
thinks that his theory is superior to that of other schools. Schools such as Pure-Land, T’ien-T’ai, Hua-Yen, Ch’an
etc., are gradually generated
inasmuch as their own “classification of the Buddhist doctrine” is propounded by
the individual founder of the school. That is to say, those founders of their
schools adopt the theory of “classification of the Buddhist doctrine” as their
principal guide in order to establish their own school.
Koseki said that those favouring the “Indian input”, quite naturally,
point out that Chi-tsang’s theories lack fidelity. Then he quotes Robinson, who
writes: “The three treatises tradition is quite simply a restatement of
Nāgārjuna’s teaching in a new vocabulary, with a
few additional theses on matters such as
the Two Truths where Nāgārjuna was too brief and vague.”[63] Subsequently, Koseki writes:
This emphasis on scriptural fidelity also tends
to treat Chi-tsang’s thought in isolation, that is, apart from the greater Chinese Buddhist tradition. In a sense,
to conclude that San-lun is a “restatement” is perfectly all right, given
Robinson’s belief that, “It cannot be assumed that the structure of language
corresponds to the structure of thought, or that all thoughts can be represented
by symbols, or that language is the only kind of symbolic system.”...they tend
to give the impression of the mere continuity of ideas, that the significance of
Chi-tsang’s thought lies in his transmission of some acculturated form of
Mādhyamika.[64]
Koseki agrees with Robinson’s suggestion that
Sanlun is a “restatement”. With regard to language and thought, José Ignacio
Cabezón writes: “language is a means of communicating ideas, facts and emotions
in general, but from the viewpoint of the Buddhist tradition, perhaps the most
important thing that language can communicate is the doctrine that leads to
salvation, the Dharma.”[65]
But my argument is that the term “restatement” and “new vocabulary” are
very misleading. It tries to tell us that Chi-tsang’s theories are no different
from Nāgārjuna’s. If we compare Nāgārjuna and Chi-tsang’s texts, Chi-tsang’s
texts are more detailed and lengthy. Also, Chi-tsang’s presentation is different
from Nāgārjuna’s. Perhaps, one may find it easier to
read Någårjuna’s
text than Chi-tsang’s. It is true that Chi-tsang’s texts
are more complex and dense, and therefore not easy to understand. Actually,
Chi-tsang elaborates on Nāgārjuna’s thought in order to make it more
accessible for his readers who belonged to a different time from Nāgārjuna. He presented it in this manner to
benefit them.
Nevertheless, Chi-tsang basically follows Nāgārjuna’s main principles as his fundamental
guide and presents his work in a very different manner through skilful means in
order to benefit his contemporary readers. Chi-tsang then develops Nāgārjuna’s ideas further to generate his own
exposition of the three commentaries of Sanlun. Hence, Chi-tsang’s three
commentaries of Sanlun are more detailed. As we analyse Chi-tsang’s texts, we
discover most of the concepts and explanations which we cannot find in
Nāgārjuna’s Chung-lun. These concepts developed by
Chi-tsang are different to those of Nāgārjuna though he follows Nāgārjuna’s ideas as his principle. In my
opinion, Chi-tsang’s three commentaries of Sanlun are different from
Nāgārjuna’s. It is not what Robinson claims, that
the Three Treatises Tradition is a restatement of Nāgārjuna’s teaching in a new vocabulary. Hence,
it seems that the terms “restatement” and “new vocabulary” are inappropriate in
this context.
Koseki says: 'Restatement', however, is an overstatement, and is again
challenged by several problems dealt with in Hirai’s study. At least two major
areas may be isolated as illuminating: 1. the historical background and
religious dynamics involved in the Sanlun development of the two truths theory;
2. the influence of the Nirvå∆a s•tra and its doctrine of universal
enlightenment, Buddha-nature (buddhadhātu).”[66] Koseki’s points, particularly
the first one, support my argument. It seems to be more convincing and
plausible.
In the Chung-kuan-lun Su (A
Commentary on the Middle Treatise), fifteen out of the twenty seven chapters
have references to the issue of the two truths. In the Shih-erh-men-lun Su (A Commentary on the Twelve Topic
Treatise), four out of twelve chapters mention the two truths. Finally, in
the Pai-lun Su (A Commentary on the Hundred Treatise),
seven out of ten chapters mention the two truths. This indicates that the
relationship between the two truths and the three commentaries of Sanlun are
very close and the two truths play an important role in the Sanlun
school.
According to the Chinese scholar Lee Shih-Chieh, he writes:
The teaching theory of the Three Treatises school (Sanlun Tsung) can be defined by three aspects of
“refutation of falsehood and revelation of truth” (p’o-hsieh-hsien-chen), the two truths of
real and mundane, and the Middle-Path of eight negations.[67]
This indicates that the two truths is one of
the main theories at the core of the Sanlun school.
3. The
Significance and Benefits of the Two Truths
3.1 The
Significance of the Two Truths
The theory of the two truths is one of the fundamental and crucial
concepts in Buddhism. Indeed, all the Dharma discussed by Buddha can be
classified into the two truths. For example, Chi-tsang writes: “All s•tras [taught by the Buddha] are within the two truths. If [one] knows the
two truths, then all s•tras could be understood.”[68] The issue of the two truths was hotly debated
in the fifth and sixth centuries.[69] As we mentioned in
chapter two, particularly for the Ch’eng-shih-lun scholars such as
Chih-tsang (458-522), Seng-min (467-527) and Fa-yün (467-529) who suggested the
theory of the two truths was the “[objective] realm” (chin) and “principle” (li).[70] The development of this idea comes to
Chi-tsang’s time, he then criticises them and asserts that the theory of the two
truths is “instruction” (chiao) in
Buddhist thought and is not to be confused with the “[objective] realm” and
“principle”.[71] Hence, we realise that the theory of the two
truths is significant. Guy Newland says: “Consequently, comprehension of the two
truths enables one to understand the sūtras, progress on the path and attain
Buddhahood.”[72]
Nāgājuna, in his Chung-lun (Madhyamaka-çāstra)
chapter twenty-four declares that:
Verse 8: dve satye samupāçritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeçanā/
lokasaµvṛtisatyam ca satyaµ ca
paramārthataḥ//
The teaching of the dharma by the various
Buddhas is based on the two truths; namely the relative (worldly) truth and the
absolute (supreme) truth.
Verse 9: ye’nayorna vijānanti vibhāgaṃ satyayordvayoḥ/
te tattvaµ na vijānanti gambhīraṃ buddhaśāsane//
Those who do not know the distinction between
the two truths cannot understand the profound nature of the Buddha’s
teaching.[73]
The above two passages shows that the two
truths are significant in Buddhism. It is important to note that Buddhas rely on
the two truths to preach Dharma and that without knowing the difference between
the two truths, the profound nature of Buddha’s teaching could not be
understood. Chi-tsang writes:
One who speaks real speech relies on the real
truth. One who speaks true speech relies on the worldly truth. Hence, the Buddha
gives these two speeches and propagates the Dharma which relies on the two
truths. One who speaks such speech, such as all the Buddhas propagating the
Dharma, relies on the two truths.[74]
If one [speaking the Dharma] is separated from
the two truths, then this is considered as deluded speech.[75]
In the Ching-ming Hsüan-lun (A Treatise on the Profound [Teaching of the]
Vimalakīrti sūtra), Chi-tsang
says: “Because of these two truths, then the two wisdoms arise.”[76] Chi-tsang realised that one needs to
understand the two truths in order to obtain wisdom, and eventually attain the
ultimate goal. Since the two truths are fundamental to all Dharma, therefore the
real speech of the Dharma should rely on the two truths. Again, Chi-tsang
writes:
There are four kinds of “ignorance” (wu-ming): First, “ignorance which is
wrong views” (mi-li-wu-ming) which is
wrong views on the two truths. Thus a sūtra says:
“One who does not comprehend the worldly truth and the truth of supreme meaning
is called ignorant.”[77]
If one were to say there are no two truths it
would be considered as evil view.[78]
The followers of Abhidharma say: “No-self is real. Because the mundane world is a provisional
name we therefore speak of self-existence. [Similarly] the Ch’eng-shih-lun (Satyasiddhi-çāstra) is also like this. Hence, we say
that self-existence in the worldly truth and no-self in the [truth] of supreme
meaning is called the right view. [Conversely, if we speak of] no-self in the
worldly truth and self-existence in the [truth] of supreme meaning, this is
called the evil view.[79]
These citations suggest that Chi-tsang attempts
to emphasise the importance of the two truths by explaining that if one does not
understand it, such ignorance and evil views will cause one to fall into
saµsāra and not
be liberated. On the other hand, Chi-tsang was born into the traditional Chinese
culture which had a strong emphasis on filial respect to one’s ancestors and
parents. Chi-tsang used the terms “grandparent” and “parent” in order to bring
the importance of the two truths into focus. He writes:
The two truths are the grandparents of all the
Buddhas and two wisdoms are the parents of all the Buddhas.[80]
As we discussed in the foregoing, the terms yu
(existence) and wu
(non-existence) were hotly debated and a controversial issue before Chi-tsang’s
time. In order to explain how the two truths correspond to yu
and wu and the relationship between them, Chi-tsang
attempts to show that without the two truths, yu
and wu cannot be formed. In the Chung-kuan-lun Su (A Commentary on the Middle Treatise),
Chi-tsang writes:
Next, because the [truth] of supreme meaning is
emptiness, thus the worldly truth exists. If the two truths are established,
then all [dharmas] are established. If there is no emptiness, then the [truth]
of supreme meaning cannot be established and the worldly truth also cannot be
established. Hence, all [dharmas] will be destroyed. Next, all [dharmas] are
established when emptiness exists, because the [truth] of supreme meaning is
emptiness; thus prajñā is generated. Because
of prajñā which annihilates
affliction, thus the Buddhas of the three ages[81] exist. Because of the Buddhas, we therefore
speak of all the teachings of mundane and supramundane.[82]
In conclusion, Chi-tsang employs different approaches to focus on the
significance of the two truths. Chi-tsang not only used Buddhist terms
“emptiness” and “prajñā”, but also employed the
terms such as “grandparent” and “parent” to highlight the significance of the
two truths.
3.2 The
Benefits of the Two Truths
In Chi-tsang’s texts, indeed, there are not many issues raised on the
benefits of the two truths. Nevertheless, there are treatises which discuss this
issue which we can refer to. In the foregoing, we already mentioned the reasons
for the establishment and significance of the two truths. Perhaps, one may ask,
what are the benefits we can get from these? One benefit is to enable sentient
beings to be aware of the two truths, so that they can obtain perfect
understanding and eventually attain liberation. In the Erh-ti-i, Chi-tsang writes:
Question: Why do we rely on the two truths to
teach the Dharma? Are there any benefits in speaking of the two
truths?
Answer: There are two treatises which mention
this issue. First, [chapter twenty-four] of the Chung-lun says: “If one is not able to distinguish
between the two truths, one cannot understand the real meaning of the profound
Dharma. If one does not understand the two truths, one cannot understand the
real meaning of the profound Dharma. If one perfectly understands the two
truths, one will know the real meaning of the profound Dharma.” Hence, we know
that there is great benefit in speaking of the two truths. Second, [chapter
eight] of the Shih-erh-men-lun (Dvādaçamukha-çāstra) says: “If one does not know the two
truths, then one cannot obtain self benefit, benefit others and mutual benefit.
If one knows the two truths, then one will obtain these three benefits....These
two benefits [from these two treatises] encompass all the benefits. The Chung-lun explains the benefit for
knowing the profound Dharma and the Shih-erh-men-lun explains the benefit
for sentient beings. Seeking [the Dharma from the Buddha and benefiting the
sentient beings] are within these two benefits [from these two
treatises].[83]
From the Buddhist point of view, wisdom and
compassion are the key concepts. In this passage, the two benefits Chi-tsang
mentions correspond to wisdom and compassion. The first benefit mentioned about
understanding the real meaning of the profound Dharma, refers to wisdom and the
second about the benefit to sentient beings refers to compassion. Hence,
Chi-tsang’s two benefits entirely cover all the benefits, particularly when seen
from a Mahāyānist point of view. This should be considered
of great benefit for Buddhists.
These two main benefits were summarised by Chi-tsang. However, there are
other benefits of the two truths, particularly regarding the two evil views,
annihilationism and eternalism, which form one of the main reasons for
establishing the two truths. Chi-tsang further adduced the three benefits as
follows:
If one perfectly understands the two truths,
then the two wisdoms[84] exist. Having the two wisdoms, thus the
Buddhas of the ten directions and the three ages exist....Hence, we know that
there is great benefit in speaking of the two truths. Next, as for the benefit,
if one completely knows the truth of supreme meaning follows the worldly truth,
one will separate oneself from the stage of sentient beings. If one completely
knows the worldly truth follows the truth of supreme meaning, one will separate
oneself from the stages of [çrāvaka and pratyeka
Buddhas]....Hence, there is great benefit in knowing the two truths. Next,
[there is another benefit for one to separate oneself from] the two views of
annihilationism and eternalism. If one completely knows the truth of supreme
meaning comes after the worldly truth, one will separate oneself from the view
of eternalism. If one completely knows the worldly truth comes after the truth
of supreme meaning, one will separate oneself from the view of annihilationism.
When one separates oneself from the two views of annihilationism and eternalism,
it is like walking in the Middle-Path of [the Buddha] and seeing the
Buddha-nature....For this reason, there is great benefit in knowing the two
truths.[85]
If we examine the three benefits accordingly,
we can realise that, indeed, the first benefit is the reason why Chi-tsang tries
to focus on wisdom in order to know the profound doctrine. It should be
considered from the standpoint of the supramundane to explain the benefit of the
two truths. Likewise, in the second benefit, Chi-tsang attempts to explain that
the tandem of the worldly truth and truth of supreme meaning must ultimately be
understood from the standpoint of the supramundane in order to explain the
benefit of the two truths. In this regard, whether one separates oneself from
the stages of sentient beings and the two vehicles (çrāvaka and pratyeka)
depends on knowing the truth of supreme meaning comes after the worldly truth
and knowing the worldly truth follows the truth of supreme meaning. As far as
Chi-tsang is concerned, it seems that speaking of the tandem of the two truths
is to abandon attachment to the stages of sentient beings and the two vehicles.
For example, if one completely knows the worldly truth then the truth of supreme
meaning, one will separates oneself from the stages of sentient beings. The
worldly truth is the stage of sentient beings. In order to enable one to
separate oneself from the stage of sentient beings, Chi-tsang explains the truth
of supreme meaning comes after the worldly truth. His intention is to enable one
to realise the truth of supreme meaning. The main idea is the truth of supreme
meaning. Similarly, the concept in explaining the benefit of the two truths is
also applied to the third benefit. All in all, the first two benefits are from
the viewpoint of the supramundane perspective. The third benefit is from the
mundane standpoint; for it addresses the two extreme views. In fact, one of the
main reasons why Chi-tsang established the two truths was to refute the two
extreme views of annihilationism and eternalism.
[1] For the
life of Kumārajīva
see his biography in the Kao-seng-chuan (The biography of eminent
monks). T50.330a-333a. Robinson, Richard H., Early
Mādhyamika In India And China, Motilal Banarsidass: Indological Publishers and Booksellers,
Reprint: Delhi, 1976, 1978, pp.71-73. For a discussion of the dates of
Kumārajīva
see Robinson, pp.244-247, note 1.
[2] See the Ta-chih-tu-lun,
T25.59b17-61b18.
[3] Swanson, Paul L., Foundations of T’ien-T’ai
Philosophy , Berkeley, California: Asian
Humanities Press, Printed in the United State of America, 1985,
p.23.
[4] Translated by
Swanson, Foundations
-------------------------, p.24. Also, see T25.59c7-9.
[6] Swanson,
Foundations -------------------,
p.30.
[7] Swanson,
Foundations -----------------------,
p.32.
[9] Swanson,
Foundations ----------------,
p.33.
[10] Liu Ming-Wood, Madhyamaka Thought In China, Leiden: New
York; Köln: Brill (Sinica Leidensia; vol. 30), 1985,
p.54. Also, see T45.152a15-16.
[11] Translated by
Liebenthal, Walter, Chao Lun, Hong
Kong University Press, Second revised edition, 1968, p.57. Also see the Chao Lun, T45.152a28-b1. As for the Chung-lun quoted in this quotation, see
T30.36a27-28.
[12] The Chung-kuan-lun is an alternative name for the Chung-lun.
[13] The Chao Lun, T45.152b29-c1. Also, see
Liebenthal, Walter, Chao Lun, p.60
and the Chung-lun,
T30.33b11-14.
[14] T45.152b15-17.
Ibid., p.58.
[15] This view is
supported by Liu in his book, Madhyamaka Thought In China, p.37 and p.67.
[16] Swanson, Foundations ----------------,
pp.35-36.
[17] Swanson, Foundations ------------------------,
p.57.
[18] The term
“[objective] realm” is a translation of the Chinese term chin. “[Objective] realm” means the objective sphere, eg. the sphere
of mind, the sphere of form for the eye, of sound for the ear, etc.. The term
“[subjective] wisdom” is a translation of the Chinese term chih. “[Subjective] wisdom” refers to knowledge of the objective
sphere.
[19] Translated by Whalen
Lai, “Sinitic understanding of the two truths
theory in the Liang Dynasty (502~557): Ontological Gnosticism in the thoughts of
Prince Chao-ming” (Philosophy East and West 28, no. 3, July
1978), p.343. Also, see Swanson, Foundations -----------------, p.59.
There is a different translation between Lai and Swanson. In this quotation, Lai
translated the Chinese character san
(three) as the three truths. Conversely, Swanson translated it as three
ages (past, present and future).
[20] See Swanson, Foundations --------------------,
p.59.
[21] Fa-yün, one of the Ch’eng-shih-lun scholars. He excelled in the
Lotus
s•tra.
Biographical data is found in the Hsü Kao-seng-chuan (Further Biographies of Eminent
Monks), T50.463c13-465a19.
[22] Swanson, Foundations ---------------------,
p.67.
[23] The Kuang Hung-ming-chi, T52.247c16-17.
Also, see Lai, “Sinitic understanding of the two truths
theory -----------------------, p.344.
[24] Lai, “Sinitic understanding of the two truths
theory-------------------------, p.347.
[26] See Swanson, Foundations -----------------------,
p.61.
[27] The Kuang Hung-ming-chi, T52.247c22-25.
Also, see Swanson, Foundations
---------------- , p.61 and Lai, “Sinitic understanding of the two truths
theory------------------------, p.344.
[28] See Liu, Madhyamaka---------------------,
p.139.
[29] The Ta-cheng I-chang,
T44.482c22-24.
[30] Phenomenal dharmas:
the worldly truth (shih-ti), the
mundane truth (su-ti) and the truth
of plurality (teng-ti). Principle
dharmas: the truth of supreme meaning (ti-i-i-ti) and the real truth (chen-ti). See
T44.483a4-5.
[32] The seven ways are:
(1) Emotional and intellectual, (2) Provisional and real, (3) Principle and
phenomena, (4) Bondage and liberation, (5) Conditioned and unconditioned, (6)
Emptiness and existence and (7) Practice and teaching. See
T44.483c22-25.
[35] In the Ta-cheng I-chang, Hui-yüan wrote that the term “the truth of supreme meaning” may be contrasted with other terms. For
example, if “the truth of supreme meaning” is contrasted with “the mundane truth” (su-ti), then it should be called not
mundane (fei-su); and if it is
contrasted with the worldly truth, it should be called supramundane.
Nonetheless, as for the real truth, it is merely contrasted once with the
worldly truth. For example, if the worldly truth is contrasted with the real
truth, then it should be called “truth of delusion” (wan-ti). See, T44.482c29-483a3. In order
to avoid possible confusion as a result of the names of the truths contrasting
with one another, Hui-yüan therefore adopts the names of the worldly
truth and the real truth rather than the worldly truth and the truth of supreme
meaning. As far as Hui-yüan is concerned, the real truth, i.e. that
which can be contrasted by the worldly truth, should not be contrasted with
other terms.
[36] T44.483c20-21 and
T44.484c25-26.
[38] For a detailed
description, see Swanson, Foundations--------------------,
pp.79-80. Also, see the Ta-cheng
I-chang, T44.484b22-c14.
[39] Swanson, Foundations ----------------------,
pp.80-81.
[41] Liu, Madhyamaka---------------------------,
p.139.
[43] See Liu, Madhyamaka------------------------,
p.88.
[44] Translated by
Swanson, Foundations---------------------- ,
p.84. Also, see T32.327a25-26.
[45] Ibid., p.84. Also,
see T32.327b4-5.
[46] In this regard, it
is important to note that the Ch’eng-shih-lun’s statement is different from chapter
twenty-four of the Middle Stanzas:
“The Buddhas have recourse to the two truths
on preaching the Dharma for sentient beings: First, the mundane truth, second,
the supreme truth”. Translated by Liu, Madhyamaka --------------------, p.136.
Also, see the Chung-lun,
T30.32c16-17.
[47] See Lim Teong-Aik,
Fo-hsüeh-ming-tz’u-chung-ying-pa-fan-hui-chi (A Glossary of Buddhist
Terms), Taipei: Hui-Chü, First edition 1971 and seventh edition
1990, p.99.
[50] C.D.C. Priestley,
“Emptiness In The Satyasiddhi” (Journal of Indian Philosophy 1, 1970), p.36.
[51] T45.78a27-b2. The
monk Kai-shan refers to Chih-tsang (458~522) as one of the prominent scholars of
the Ch’eng-shih-lun. In
the Erh-ti-i, Chi-tsang is fond of
using the name of the temple to address the monk instead of the monk’s name. For his biography, see Hsü Kao-seng-chuan (Further Biographies of Eminent
Monks), T50.465c7-467b27.
[52] Eight negations
refers to non-origination (anutpādam),
non-extinction (anirodham), non-eternal (açāçvataµ), non-destruction (anucchedam), non-identity (anekārtham), non-differentiation (anānārtham), non-coming into being (anāgamaµ), and non-going out of being
(anirgamaµ). See Inada, Kenneth, Nāgārjuna--A Translation of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with an Introductory
Essay, Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970, p.25. Also,
see Bocking, Brian, Nāgārjuna in China -
A Translation of the Middle Treatise,
Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995,
p.14.
[56] The Ta-ch’eng Hsüan-lun,
T45.20a13-15.
[58] The two wisdoms
refer to chüan-chih (conventional wisdom) and shih-chih
(wisdom concerning the real).
[63] Koseki, Aaron Ken,
“Later Mādhyamika in
China: Some Current Perspectives on the History of Chinese Prajñāpāramitā
Thought”, in Journal of The International
Association of Buddhist Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1982, p.55.
[65] José Ignacio Cabezón, The Development of A Buddhist Philosophy of
Language and its Culmination in Tibetan Madhyamika Thought (Unpublished PhD thesis, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, 1987), p.9.
[66] Koseki, “Later Mådhyamika------------------”, p.56.
[67] Lee Shih-Chieh, San-lun-chung-chih-fa-chan-chih-ch’i-ssu-hsiang (Editor: Chan
Man-T’ao, volume 47), Taiwan: Ta-Cheng-Wen-Hua,
1955, p.215.
[68] See the Erh-ti-i, T45.78a24-25.
[69] See Swanson, Foundationa-------------------,
p.57.
[70] See section one in
Chapter Two, pp.57-70. Also see the Ta-ch’eng Hsüan-lun,
T45.15a20-24.
[71] See the Ta-ch’eng Hsüan-lun,
T45.15a16-17.
[72] Newland, Guy, The Two Truths, Ithaca, New York USA:
Snow Lion Publication, 1992, p.172.
[73] Translated by
Kanneth K, Inada, Nāgārjuna - A Translation of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with an Introductory
Essay , p.146. Also, see T30.32c16-19 and Brian
Bocking, Nāgārjuna in China,
p.342.
[74] The Chin-kang Pan-jo Su,
T33.116a18-21.
[75] The Pai-lun Su,
T42.303a20-21.
[76] T38.883b10. The two
wisdoms refer to the conventional wisdom and wisdom concerning the
real.
[77] The Fa-hua I-su,
T34.572b25-27.
[78] The Chung-kuan-lun Su,
T42.108a24.
[79] Ibid.,
T42.129b26-29.
[80] The Pai-lun Su,
T42.232c5-7.
[81] The three ages refer
to past, present and future.
[83] T45.82c17-26. Also,
see the Chung-kuan-lun Su,
T42.151a4-6 and the Shih-erh-men-lun
Su, T42.206b5-11.
[84] The two wisdoms
refer to conventional wisdom and wisdom concerning the real.
二諦理論之建立
釋長清
英國布里斯托大學哲學博士
提要
本文為我的博士論文七大章中之一小章。其共有三節。在第一節裡,我以不同年代來解釋中國早期對二諦之詮釋。在第二節中,我解釋吉藏為何要建立二諦之理由。除此之外,我也闡述了二諦與三論宗之間的關係。最後,我甚至進一步從吉藏之立場來說明二諦之重要及利益。以下為本文作了研究之後所得出之結果:
(1)早在吉藏之前,已有些人對二諦作了詮釋,如僧肇、昭明太子、法雲、慧遠、訶黎跋摩等等。雖然如此,他們皆用「有」及「無」兩種術語來解釋二諦。這顯示出作法相當粗糙及模糊。
(2)吉藏建立二諦之理由是為了要破除「斷常」極端之二見。吉藏建立二諦之概念是受到其先驅者如龍樹及法朗之影響度(法朗為吉藏之老師)
(3)二諦與三論宗之關係非常密切,尤其二諦扮演著重要的角色。
(4)若想擁有智慧,先知道二諦是非常重要的。吉藏從世間及出世間立場來解釋二諦之利益。然而,與世間相比,其多從出世間角度來強調二諦之利益。雖然如此,吉藏也嘗試站在世間立場來說明二諦之重要及利益。
關鍵詞:1.二諦 2.有與無 3.境
4.智(慧) 5.原理 6.斷與常