談戒與持戒
美國密西根大學教授 格梅
茲撰；
中華佛學研究所副研究員 鄭振煌譯
中華佛學學報
第六期（1993.07）
頁351-389
©1993 中華佛學研究
所
臺北市
提要
佛教一直很強調信條和規矩，而道德或倫理則是佛
教崇高目標的前行和修行的重要基礎。佛教以其倫理思想來適應新文化情境，不是因為推論出道德神學的精細處，而是訴諸超倫理的價值：
①肯定它的超越性。
②訴諸它的比較廣泛的救世原則。
傳統佛教戒律並不能適當回應今日佛教倫理所面臨
的危機。我們如果要對戒律做有意義的重估，就必須修改佛教倫理理想的內涵與基礎，不能一味否認佛教的缺點。對我們這個時代具有意義的佛教倫理，需要具備四
個條件：
①必須根源於過去和傳統的佛教討論。
②必須考慮到社會和個人的目前時空。
③必須針對目的而談佛教倫理，並且儘量減少神秘色彩和浮誇虛飾。
④必須以人類（個體與其社會現實）為考量依據，必須是給每一個人和任何人遵守的信條。
我們有必要對古代某些神秘東西做批判性的檢驗，
有必要更新那些支持佛教倫理生活的神話和符號，但這並不表示是宗教敬畏的結束。
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由於對「戒律」的共同興趣，讓我們共聚一堂，參
加這次盛會。在我們當中，有許多人深深迷上了佛教僧戒的歷史和細節，佛教的儀式和社會涵義，但最重要的是，我們大都尊敬佛教對於人類行為所抱持的理想。換
句話說，我認為：對於戒律感興趣，隱含著對於倫理、美德、關心別人和自我修行的廣大問題感興趣。我確信，我們對於佛教倫理理想的崇高敬意，也能夠使得我們
關心它們的末來、它們的生存、它們的意義的保存和釐清。因此，我願意邀請出席本次會議的各位先進，共同思索戒律文獻所呈現的理想及其歷史意義。
在某方面來說，二千多年來，佛教僧戒已經提供了
人類美德和人類圓滿的模式。佛教僧侶的「美德」，西方人已經耳熟能詳好幾個世紀了。五百多年前，馬哥孛羅就提到了佛教徒的模範生活，雖然他把佛教看成是一種「迷信」。[1]隨著西方人對於佛教越來越了解，越來越尊敬，他們就越來越把佛教和佛教徒看成是高度倫理的宗教和宗教徒。即使是在
今天，我們還是常常聽到有人說：佛教的「美德」或「道德」非常特別，比起任何西方的道德系統要精緻得多。
1913年，凱洛琳．萊斯．大衛斯對巴利文的
「尸羅」這個詞，表達了無比的喜歡，因為她似乎對於這個詞被翻譯成英文中的「道德」表示歉意：
我很想保留美麗的巴利文「尸羅」原字，而不用英文的「道德」等詞。「美德」這個詞比較優雅，卻有點模糊。「尸羅」是道德習慣，習慣上的善，或道德的行為一
不傷害其他生命，不淫亂，誠實，言語柔和、不飲酒。
好像五戒就解決了一切問題。她加了一句：「那就
夠了」，就某種意義來說，五戒確實夠完美了。現代撰述「佛教倫理學」的作家，都很樂意把萊斯．大衛斯的這個說法擴大其定義和假設。[2]我們通常都認為在佛教典範中，「尸羅是人類行為和自我實現的中心，另一方面卻又認為道德或倫理只是佛教崇高目標的
前行。（這一點可能是最吸引現代西方人的地方）萊斯．大衛斯在上述同一資料中，也帶有分類的意味說：「此種行為只是修行的重要基礎」[3]，他又很啟示性地說：「佛陀的戒法，是對職業殺手而非比丘而說的。」
1.
從那時候起一直到現在的六百年間，情況並沒有改變太大。可能是對外國既羨慕又恐懼的同一個混合情結，感動了本世絕的卡爾．容格，把「東方的」智慧看成是深
奧的心理真實的倉庫，卻非西方人居住的地方。
2. B.
C. Law（1936/1966）在（佛教的概念）（Concepts of
Buddhism）一書中，引用萊斯．大衛斯的註腳，來綜述佛教的戒。
3.
重點放在「我所有」。這句話隱含有很多意義。這場主題演說的時間和情況，不容許我對這些意義深入介紹，但大家必須記住在亞洲和西方對於「筏喻」、阿羅漢
「超越善惡」的地位、「無相戒」等問題的長久辯論。這一切重要而頗為棘手的問題，在像本文這種長度的論文裏，僅能點到為止。萊斯．大衛斯所翻譯的偈子，是
不是針對殺手而言，我們不得而知，但故事的架構卻來自很晚期的註書。但因為文中把道德的成果說成名望、利益和天堂，所以該偈明顯指涉這個臨時或非宗教，而
建立在方便之上的道德概念。
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不過，「尸羅」不僅被認為是修行的基礎，也是佛
法的延伸。大約一百年前，湯姆斯．赫胥黎以典型的維多利亞時代的眼光，很羨慕地提到「形而上學的傑作」，使得「喬達摩」做結論：「在整個宇宙中，沒有恆常
的東西，心和物都沒有實體。」、「位格是一種形而上學的幻想；終極而言，不僅是我們，還有世間的萬事萬物，都是在無窮盡的宇宙變化之中，都只是夢幻泡
影。」
赫胥黎認為，喬達摩和他的先驅一樣，只能從他的
形而上學得出「一個行為的準則一一出離。」但，赫胥黎卻推論說，喬達摩不像他的先驅，「對於輪迴的解脫，無疑的，他有比較好的保證。當不再有實體（不管是
神我或梵我）不滅時，總之，當一個人夢想到他願意不再做夢時，輪迴就一定可以解脫了。」
赫胥黎對佛教哲學和解脫理論做過這種評價之後，
又熱心地稱揚他所理解的佛教倫理學和社會實踐：
慾念和情慾是無法單靠折磨肉體就予以消除的；反之，它們必須從根本上加以對治，也要靠持培養與之相反的心理習慣來予以克服，其他方法還有萬物一體的仁慈
心、以德報怨，……總之，完全捨棄自我肯定──宇宙過程的要素。毫無疑問的，佛教之所以如此成功，便是得力於這些倫理的品質。佛教這個系統……否認人有靈
魂；認為對於永恆不朽的信仰是一種錯誤，而希望永恆不朽是一種罪惡；否認祈禱和祭祀有任何效用；要求人們只有靠自己的力量才能得救；它的原始面貌不要求人
們發願屈服，反對偏執，從不尋求世俗力量的幫助；卻以驚
人的速度傳布到舊世界的相當多地區，即使在今天，它被加進了外國的迷信，仍然是大部分人類的主要信仰。
對我們來說，赫胥黎的讚詞，透露出他對於佛教經
典和歷史的認識有所不足，也反映他百分之百相信抽象觀念的力量。如果從一百多年來學術性宗教研究對各種宗教的認識，一百多年來的佛教研究等有利角度來看，
再看看我們自己的期望，就可以發
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現赫胥黎的評價如果不是太天真了，就是有點理想化。不過，對於
「加進了外國的迷信」之類的概念，雖然現代學者可能會發現並無多大用處，但我們必須承認赫胥黎所要解決的問題與今日並無兩樣。在《進化與倫理》一書中，赫
胥黎也面臨了下面這個問題：如果沒有我，沒有永恆的生命，沒有上帝，道德責任會變成什麼樣子？這不是一個耍嘴皮和難解的學術性辯論。如果沒有我的話，佛教
徒怎能相信業力？也不是一個為倫理建構形而上學基礎的哲學問題。它是在沒有超越的世界裡，有關於倫理的意義、功能和性質的問題。赫胥黎就像今日的我們一
樣，可能也像佛陀本人，遠在他了解「無我論」之前，他也面臨著他那個時代喪失自我的問題。但喪失自我可以有很多意義和很多結果，不只是重新建構一個人的意
義和目的領域而已。
在西方，也許在古印度也是如此，社會性的自我迷
失都引生本體性的自我迷失。不過，在西方，這種迷失通常是被看作留下一個毫無樂趣可言的虛幻。過去西方思想的主流，從否定之中似乎只能得出失望和絕望，從
無實之中只能得出虛無和空無。[4]反之，佛教傳統卻把這種自我的忘失看成是解脫的可能性，也是從這個世間解脫的理由，並非失望和哀傷的理由。對佛教
徒而言，這是一個荒涼、無家可歸的地球，我們必須出離，而出離卻會導致極樂。
赫胥黎觀察到了這個重要的差別：擊破宇宙和形而
上的安全保障，在西方會導致失望，但就佛教而言，似乎會導致快樂的離執。但吊詭的是，赫胥黎雖然毫不掩藏地稱揚佛教，卻同時也批判佛教的離執。赫胥黎把佛
教對於無我的深觀智慧，看成是類似進化論的古典理論，但他相信從這些智慧所衍生的倫理原則卻不正確。希臘人讓我們過份相信人類的完美性，一方面卻暗示堅忍
論的出離和絕望。在喬達摩身上，印度已經給了我們一個比較完美的退縮方式。但退縮只是答案的一半：在完全絕望和完全退縮的兩個極端之間，赫胥黎看到一個未
來的倫理，既可以接受人類的有限性，也可以努力去校正它。他寫道：「一個人既要拋棄年少氣盛的過度自信，也要拋棄年老力衰的暮氣沈沈。」
赫胥黎不是質樸的浪漫主義者。他的論文有時能夠
振聾啟瞶，在他預測形成我們這個世紀的自我和價值多麼不安全時，他的天才就一再浮現出來了。但無可置疑的，他對於佛教的認知，反映出維多利亞時代英國人對
於佛教和「東方」的期盼。
當西方知識分子對於他們自己的機構喪失信心之
餘，他們就轉而追求外來的模式──空無的理想。因此，我們也就不足為奇地讀到赫胥黎把佛教描寫成一種哲學，它不僅具有進佔生物論的智慧，而且「認為對於永
恒不朽的信仰是一種錯誤，而希望永恆不朽則是一種罪惡；否認祈禱和祭祀有任何效用；要求人們只有靠自已的力量才
4.
目前已經不是這回事了。請閱 Taylor, 1989。
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能得救；它的原始面貌不要求人們發願屈服，反對偏執，從不尋求世
俗力量的幫助。」我們不禁會疑惑：這種描述反映出多少成分的西方知識分子的希望。
如果佛教是什麼的話，我們可以說它一直很強調信
條和規矩，即使我們認為「屈從」可能不是最正確的詞，但我們還是不得不尋找歷史證據，來支持赫胥黎所描述的「解構的佛教」。佛教顯然曾經有過自已的政治立
場，也曾經不得不操縱政治和社會現實。在這麼做時，佛教也曾經不得不形成自己的倫理理想，其方向則遠離單純的肯定無我。
遺憾的是，赫胥黎對於出離心理學和完美社會生物
學的睿知卓見，並不太為佛教倫理學的作家們所熟知；不
過，他所倚賴的維多利亞時代英國人對佛教的印象，仍然保留至今。
今天，我們願意相信我們已經超越了維多利亞時代
的討論範圍。我們的學術研究，至少已經做了稍許的進步，我們可以安全地肯定：赫胥黎對於佛教的認識，充其量只不過是理想化的抽象概念。不過，一般人還是像
赫胥黎一樣地認為：在佛教本體論和佛教倫理學、情操之間，有一個清晰而邏輯上必須有的關係。又有一個傾向認為：被佛教當作是情操的形式，或應該是某種倫理
理論的反映。不管是當作歷史事實也好，當作辯證也好，也有很多人認為佛教已經不再有儀式主義、法統主義和政治興趣。在歷史證據的面前，所有這些訴求都飛走
了，但它們似乎在辯證上還有點成功。
這不完全是現代改變信仰的策略，不過，「解構的
宗教」是辯證學的常用策略，「我的宗教」總是對的，它是用它的理想來界定的；而別人的宗教總是人類對於現實的錯誤了解。有時候這是一種有效的辯證策略，在
上一個世紀的某些圈子裏，這種策略還滿管用的。我相信這種成功一定會曇花一現的，更糟的是，佛教作為一種正面改變的力量所能發揮的良性效益，可能會因而被
打折扣了，尤其在我們透過人類理想而非強迫手段來共同追求社會共識時，佛教作為這種推動力量的功能將大受影響。如果把佛教當成是理想的解構實體，而不考慮
到形成它的制度歷史的具體行動規範和儀式傳統，則必然會傷害到真理（或者說誠實？），也有損於佛教作為人類智慧的寶藏。
把佛教當成最高智慧和解脫的解構理論，而非行為
模式的體系，這種趨勢是怎麼形成的呢？歐洲、印度和中國的社會史差異極大，毫無疑問的，這是最重要的因素之一。只要對婆羅門教和佛教的互動情形做深入研
究，就可以發現佛教倫理學的性質。但在本論文中，我只想談談佛教倫理學本身，以及它在未來的可能改變。
佛教以其倫理理想來適應新文化情境，似乎不是因
為推論出道德神學的精細處，而是訴諸超倫理的價值：
(1)肯定它的超越性（在認識論上以二諦的模式來表達，在倫
理學上以入世出世的模式來表達）。
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(2)訴諸它的比較廣泛的救世原則（也就是把倫理學當成目的
論）。[5]
這些策略足以讓佛教成為一種宗教意識型態，也足
以讓僧院成為一種自我存續的機構。基督教的西方，也有類似的意識型態。
這些對於倫理有效性的詮釋方式，一方面使倫理獲
得似非而是的定位──以各地的道德習俗，來界定非出家眾的倫理。另一方面，它們也衍生僧團的解構倫理理想，借用萊斯．大衛的話，倫理只有在對俗眾宣說時才
是倫理，在對僧眾宣說時它只不過是跳板而已。
不管怎樣，今天我們面臨了佛教倫理的危機。傳統
佛教戒律並不能對這種危機做適當的回應。這種危機並不新，赫胥黎早就一針見血地指出了。這種道德危機，不能單純地解釋為人們實踐道德的決心越來越薄弱。傳
統的倫理基礎，不論是社會的，形而上的或宗教的，已經受到嚴厲的質疑。如果想對佛教倫理做新的詮釋，擴大來說，就是對戒律做有意義的重估，就必須修改佛教
倫理理想的內涵與基礎。我們也必須重新思考形成佛教的廣泛原則，並且從這些廣泛原則的角度來看特殊規矩。下面這些說法都是無濟於事的：佛教就是答案，而
「真正的」答案則存在於另外一界──解脫界……只有從解脫者的角度來看，才能判定倫理有意義或無意義。
更有甚者，否認佛教的缺點也無補於實際，尤其是
否認佛教徒的缺點，否認佛教史上某些時期的缺點，或佛教的傳統教條內容。
只站在吾人想當然耳的理想的基礎上來討論，或只
站在原始佛教的立場來討論，或只站在佛陀應該已說過的戒律的立場來討論……或甚至只站在佛陀實際上已說過的戒律的立場來討論，都是不夠的。
說佛教是解決方案，這是不夠的。即使說佛教是解
決方案之一，也是不夠的。我
5.
第一種策略已經被 Dharmasisi 在他1989年的近著《佛教倫理的基本要素》（Fundamentals of Buddhist
Ethics）中所採用。第二種策略隱含在我從卡洛琳．萊斯．大衛斯的《早期佛教徒的讚美詩》（Carolyn
Rhys-Davids Psalms' of the Earlies
Buddhists）所引用的段落中。問題當然遠比這個要複雜得多。雖然基督教辯證家明瞭獨立倫理立論和獨立哲學人類理論的價值（無疑的，這個技巧得自希
臘人和羅馬人，再加上與世俗哲學家爭吵而磨鍊出來的），但任何以宗教語詞來界定自已的信條或倫理理論體系，都有貶抑倫理本身的危險。而且，儘管本文對於佛
教目的論已經有所保留，但我仍然不相信在目的論的立論中，有什麼先天上的瑕疵，對於宗教倫理思想而言，這些立論在歷史上都是最重要的。不過，如果目的論的
立論會導致社會和人類現實的貶抑，以便產生倫理的需要性或宗教倫理的兩個基本面向：針對別人和針對自己，那麼我還是要袒護反本體論者。
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們必須說明佛教如何和為何能提供解決方案，並且承認佛教傳統在某
種程度上也無法提供解決方案……或只能提供一些不能被稱為「解決方案」的東西。我們必須指出：有關現代佛教徒所應遵循的普遍倫理，佛教至少能符合其內容和
形式的基本需求。
我們生活在一個大覺醒的時代，如果不是犬儒主義
的時代的話。我們見到學者和修行人的覺醒。他們所覺醒的，不是人類變得比從前殘酷粗野，而是我們正在迅速喪失我們的基礎感（包括社會對於自我和價值的肯
定），以致於現在我們可以藉口為了對自己忠誠，而毫不知恥地表達和培養我們的自私心。因此，在這個時代裏，自私心的理想缺少社會的涵義，大眾的意見和行
為，既不支持精神上的理想，也不支持佛教在過去之所以被承認為生活行為規範的行為模式。
誠如阿賴斯戴．麥辛泰爾在《美德之後》所說的，
佛教並不能免於大眾價值的腐蝕。這本書寫於十年前，作者幻想不出「新的世界秩序」，他只把我們的時代比喻為羅馬帝國的末年。羅馬帝國的道德共識消失了，
「美德」變成少數新信徒和修道人的專區。麥辛泰看到今天我們也需要過著少數人所宣揚的道德生活。因此，他看到我們有必要：
建設新的社會形式，在這種社會中，人們能夠過著道德的生活，以便在即將來臨的野蠻和黑暗時代裏，道德和禮貌，還不致於完全絕跡。但此時野蠻人並不是在邊疆
之外等待，他們已經統治我們有一段時間了。我們所等待的，並不是可多特，而是另一個（無疑是大不相同的）聖貝尼迪克。
我們確實需要另一個聖貝尼迪克（或者我願意說，
許多聖貝尼迪克），但這些修行團體的新創立人，將與聖貝尼迪克「無疑是大不相同的」；我急著要補充說：將與喬摩、宗喀巴、道元「無疑是大不相同的」。
嘗試著當預言家是很危險的（當然這要決定於他活
多久，很有可能會令他尷尬萬分），但我仍然要冒險地說：即使在未來的五十年（可能是未來的二十年），看到（我相信我們將看到）僧團重新變成工業化世界的核
心的道德和精神機構，它必然是迥異於過去的僧團，迥異於過去的戒律。
我們之所以聚集在這裏，說明：我們或我們所回應
的某個不特定團體，正在探求僧團的新定義及其指導原則。不管如何，對於戒律從事任何嚴肅的反省，其目的就在這裏。
在這種探求中，我們必須質疑許多過去的假設。面
對著現代倫理和世俗道德的挑戰，我們不僅要了解大家所熟知的僧團戒條和風俗的細節，還應該提出更多的問題。我們必須自問：「為什麼我們要守『佛教倫理』而
非一般性的倫理？為什麼我們要從佛
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教傳統中尋找或希望尋找某些東西，以便能夠替我們的時代……並替
我們那些非常分歧卻又統合的文化宇宙，建構、引出或維持一個倫理理想呢？僧團的理想能夠提供什麼給非僧團人士呢？」
這些都是複雜而爭議多端的問題。今天，我只想把
自已限制在邀請各位跟我一起來偵察這個領域，思考新倫理和新戒律的某些一般性和正式需求。對我們這個時代具有意義的佛教倫理，到底需要那些條件呢？我能想
到幾個互相重疊的條件。
(1)第一而且似非而是的，對於佛教行為理想的
任何重新思考，都必須根源於過去和傳統佛教討論。任何有效的倫理，都必須與過去有所連繫。我們的困難，不僅是哲學倫理的困難，也是實踐倫理和宗教倫理的困
難，我認為：與祖先做象徵性和歷史性的連繫，既是倫理行為（特別是宗教倫理）的基礎，也是它們的意義。連績感和同體感，可能比哲學上的說服力要來得重要。
不過，同時我們也必須與過去斷裂。今天我們的問
題是：如何與過去連繫，不管這個過去是準歷史的過去或綜合性的理想過去，我們都不能脫離過去；但在另一面，我們卻又必須尋找建構倫理意義的新途徑。但如何
建構和維持這個「倫理意義」呢？當我們能夠從文化的知識化、民眾互動的行為困境和內在身分感的個人困境等層面，來了解和釐清倫理符號的系統（理想、神話、
教條和儀式）時，才能產生和保存倫理的意義。在從事釐清
的工作時，我們所需要的是諧和，而非同意。事實上，如果宗教討論想當俗眾討論的刺激物或評論者，不同意是很重要的。
請注意：意義並不源自「真理」，或佛教的「真實
和原始」價值的發現或恢復，或「不背負世世代代文化包裹」的價值。離開文化就不可能有倫理──過去世代的文化包裹，其實就是宗教傳統的內容，雖然我們可能
不願意背負整個文化包裹。
目前，還不只這個問題而已。我們可以在這個地方
信心滿滿地說：今天我們的困境是一方面要保存神話式的過去，另一方面則要產生新的意義和運用方式。我們既不能聲稱已經從我們身上「淨化」了神話，也不能聲
稱目前的事實並不存在。
對於佛教倫理的傳統知識性討論，一方面我們必須
以相同的記號來找出其替代品，另一方面卻還要保存我們與它的連繫。譬如，讓我們來研究經常被古典和現代辯證者當作基本教理的兩個教理：佛教徒到底是以佛教
的「終極目標」來當作倫理行為的基礎呢？還是以慈悲的原則來當作倫理行為的基礎？我們可能有好幾個方式可以引用這些原則來啟發進一步的反省，同時又不致於
單純地重彈老調。
這兩個原則的第一個，似乎不被用作基本的倫理原
則，而是被用作倫理原則的非倫理基礎。但，如何從它引伸出倫理呢？則一點也不清楚。傳統的佛教倫理討論，都集中在輪迴宇宙論的分層上，而非所謂的「終極目
標」。[6]
我認為：從目標上來立論，是最微弱的事；在古典
亞洲和西方現代佛教徒中，都
6.
傳統上，這些結構的倫理支柱，自然都是功德的理論和善的理論。（「善」的梵文字
Kusala，是一個非常重要的語詞，但我還沒有找到合適的英文字。）在現代有關佛教倫理的討論中，我相信「功德」還是佔有一席之地，但令我感到遺憾的
是，在現代人想描述佛教倫理的努力中，卻有忽視「功德」論的趨勢。
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對這種立論方式產生相當可疑的猜測。把涅槃當作佛教修持的基礎，
曾經被大乘批評過，但大乘並未做太多的更動。在西方，我們有自己的目的論，倫理哲學家已經找到道德基礎的不同概念，一方面是受到亞里斯多德的啟示，他最先
主張「道德……是做而非製造的形式……做的目的，與動作本身並無分別，做得好，本身就是目的了。」大乘哲學家不再拘泥於嚴格的目的論，但在大乘的倫理和神話省思中，曾經呈現現世倫理的種種因素，這時候卻被救
世目標的迫切性所遮掩了。
不過，問題的癥結，並不在於道德的目的論定義或
立論基礎是否正式（或優先）無效，而是在於我們從涅槃的特殊概念所獲得的道德具有什麼性質。[7]
毫無疑問的，在道德和宗教思想中的那些「引
伸」，常常是溫和的，而且常常植基於推測性的公理原則之外的價值、考慮和立論。不過，把涅槃當作「至善」，卻可以有兩種矛盾的概念，[8]其中一個模式說，涅槃的超越，從字面上可以理解為「與我們目前的生存狀態完全無關的情況」。世親對於涅槃的檢討，
就是這種概念的一個例子。第二種模式，把超越理解為一種譬喻，指的是一種心境：解脫者在存在中的位置，與別人的位置並無不同，但他對於事情的認知卻大為不
同。我們可以在某些中觀著作中發現這種模式。不過，第二種模式是否完全不把解脫當作他方世界，則我們一點也不清楚。毫無疑問的，某些矛盾的觀念仍然存在，
而且在大乘的倫理著作中，在美德的層次中，在「筏喻」和「無相之戒」的討論中，特別明顯。
受到大乘影響而產生的涅槃定義的改變，事實上是
一種立論的改變：從超越性的倫理，改變到現世性的倫理。無論如何，大乘還是保有早期苦修主義和厭世的味道，它還是一個以僧團為主的宗教。[9]但至少在意識型態上，已經發生了重大的轉變。這
7.
請參閱 Bhasya ad Akoś（IV： &IV： 66）中有關世親對於「善」的觀點，頗具啟發性。
8.
我用「涅槃」一詞泛指佛教的解脫境界的概念。在這種用法中，「涅槃」是指各式各樣的「涅槃」。這些概念所共通的是它們的角色：它們都是指最高或終極的價
值，它們也是修「道」所期望的最後結果。不用說，這些抽象觀念也可以當作具體或符號的階層宇宙論中的組織原則。
9.
在基督教的歷史中，至少一直到後改革時代為止，對於道個世界既愛又恨的矛盾情結也是一個常見的問題。本論文有一個論點是：促使基督教改變的社會環境，目前
已經受到佛教機構的正視（如果說還未超越的話）。
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種轉變與佛教倫理的第二個傳統原則（慈悲原則）的發展密切相關。
「慈悲」並不是支持倫理行為的一種立論，而是一
個廣泛和非常模糊的語詞，代表著一組美德──善良的情感，可能還包括善良的行為。不過，在佛教的討論裏，「同體大悲」本身被當作基本的倫理規則。傳統上，
對於慈悲的討論，似乎都把同體大悲當成公理，它的終極意義可能是如此。但它與其他基本規則的關係，則從未被充分發展過。[10]即使是那些把慈悲當作主要或基本角色的人（如蓮華戒），也是把它看成是一種前行，顯然與靜心的修行有關，而與
倫理規則的細節無關。[11]將古代的說法賦予新義，其必要性只是新戒律第二個條件的正面而已：
(2)現代倫理，也就是僧俗二眾的現代信條，必
須考慮到目前的時空。社會的目前時空，當然也包括個人的目前時空。
這裏的困難是：找出一個具有足夠彈性的方式，以
適應社會環境和文化常模的改變，而不喪失一切的連續感和穩定感，也不傷害到宗教扮演社會評論者的功能。佛教在這方面所面臨的重要挑戰是：改變中的在家眾角
色，尤其是當我們以迅速進化的人類世俗觀念來界定它時，更是如此。在這個其實並不怎麼新穎的觀念中，人類被界定為生物實體，當他們的人類實體被建構時，並
沒有脫離活的有機體的盲目驅力，限制性和脆弱性。更有甚者，在討論人類的本體和思想時，並沒有忽略頭腦的生理特性，而人類至少部分繼承了這種生理特性。然
而，個體的人類人格更進一步被看成在遺傳上具有價值，除了政治或精神的階層以外。如果這只是一種理想，二種知識化作用和一個精密的神話，它仍然是一個強大
而主要的神話，這種神話需要我們把倫理看成是一種限制和達成完美境界的潛力，這與古典的（和現代的）佛教倫理討論迥異。
不管如何，佛教道德思想的（神話、救世或哲學）
基礎，可能還要加上（俗僧二眾）組織的基礎，都必須符合這些激烈的歷史轉變。由於社會正義的發明，我們已經知道把精神上的高階層和高僧懷疑為精神意識型態
的提倡者，並以之為控制和剝削的
10.
印度形而上學的精細，與它以不太批判的態度來處理倫理問題，可以說是大異其趣。印度對於認知的研究，發展出細膩的認識論，但對於情緒和美德的概念，卻只是
就表面事實而談。對於倫理的處理方式為什麼會這麼偏頗呢？自然有它的社會和哲學原因。那些社會環境已經改變了。事實上，它們是一直在改變之中。不過，佛教
對於那些改變的反應很緩慢，有助於倫理的討論方式，我們很難翻譯成我們自己的模式、輪迴的神話、功德的教理、菩薩的神話。不過，也有著名的例外，印度的寂
天及其註疏者般若喀喇瑪蒂、戒賢，東亞的智顗等人，都偶爾會有其知卓見的倫理立論。
11.
這個問題的歷史根源，可能是早期對於「慈悲」賦以神話和儀式的氛圍。它似乎與社會倫理或美德倫理無關，但與一個人命終時諸佛的超人力量以及培養彼岸的心境
有關。
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工具。由於（醫學界）發現了（過去所說的）心原來就是頭腦、潛意
識和情緒生物學等新學科，我們已經知道把美德懷疑為一種簾幕，而不再是那麼具有精神上的動機。這兩種重要的轉變，威脅著傳統佛教道德的兩大支柱：價值層次
和道德高階層的觀念、把美德當成「限制」的道德。
由於對個體的看法有了新觀念，就產生了我相信已
經影響到佛教機構（甚至在亞洲也是如此）的改變。對於戒律的反省和對於佛教倫理的反省，一般來說，都必須忠實而具有批判性地面對種種問題：對於婦女的傳統
立場和公開歧視、對於下述倫理問題的模糊立場──戰爭與和平、同性戀、社會正義（而不只是主張以仁慈來對待奴隸和僕人）。
新戒律必須建立在衍生自過去的倫理原則上。支配
社會的道德原則，必須建立在社會所有成員共同遵守的美德目標或定義上。這種過程的完成，不能依靠世俗生活的僧團化（或僧團生活的世俗化，如果我的預測（僧
團將持續下去）成真的話）。但它需要對「限制」建立新概念，考慮到現代人接受人類生物性（或為什麼不可以率直地說動物性）的意願。這就是赫胥黎所看到來自
當時新生物學的挑戰，也是今日我們所面臨的挑戰。
這些改變，似乎會威脅到傳統佛教倫理思想家最為
堅持的某些概念。在僧團高階層方面，這些改變將對他們適用高階戒或無相戒的特權，甚至他們的倫理持守能力構成挑戰。它們也將對俗眾道德的次等地位構成挑
戰。在道德心理學方面，這些改變將對「不執著就是出離」的觀念構成挑戰，事實上，它們將對出離的可能性構成挑戰，不用說，將對完全掃除性驅力的可能性構成
挑戰。
因此，佛教道德必須建立在「真正的人類」之上，
不是把他們的精神性從他們的動物性分離，而是要面對精神性和動物性並存（如果不是同一的話）的事實。赫胥黎認為十九世紀科學革命所帶來的許多挑戰中，有一
項是：我們的知識和精神實體，不可能被化約為生物實體，而是生物實體中不可分離的一部分。因此，雖然我們的（社會）機構、大眾科學、尤其是自我實現的心理
治療法日益普遍，一直在鼓吹價值的世俗化和自私心的高尚化，但我並不如此認為。
宗教討論可以遮蓋和保存，也可以揭發、發現和挑
戰。這兩種功能都是必須的，兩者必須維持不確定的平衡。我擔心太多的精力被花在不計任何代價地遮蓋和保存上。在這麼做的時候，佛教對於倫理的討論，無法實
現它的一個目的：幫助我們有效地適應這個世界，並在世界上運作。這個功能，我把它包括在第三個「條件」內：
(3)彿教對於倫理的討論，必須有效、有影響力
和有效率。換句話說，它必須針對目的而談，必須充分達成目的，並且儘量減少神秘色彩和浮誇虛飾。這就包括承認某些信條之所以必須制訂的環境。某種信條之所
以必須制訂，必然有其人類現實的考
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慮，如果光是哀怨或排斥，是無補於事的。
產生信條的現實，就是人際的環境和人類的熱情。
提倡或強迫布施和知足的倫理規則，可能是建立在理想的模式上，但促成它們的最大因素卻是下述現實：我們不能想要什麼就有什麼，我的薪水不能像同事那麼高，
而最重要的就是我堅持貪求別人所擁有的。換句話說，規矩和美德的形成都是因為先有邪惡。但如果被當成理想的規矩和美德想要發揮功效，就必須符合熱情的現實
──極力想符合理想的人類的現實。
因此，這種倫理討論（甲）必須採取說服的方式，
而非強迫的方式。（但這句話並不表示必須掩飾恐懼、危機和恐怖，或忽視暴力，不管它們是明顯的或潛在的。）它也必須（乙）承認凡是人就有錯誤和缺陷，不管
這個人是凡夫或聖人、卑微的信徒或坐禪功夫高深的老參。換句話說，新倫理的建構，必須以人類為考量依據。這就是「條件」四：
(4)信條必須考慮到個體及其社會現實。它必須
是給每一個人和任何人遵守的信條。
這第四點是警惕我們不要落入倫理討論的兩種常見
謬論──在規矩和人類環境之間，必然不能配合得很完美，由此產生混亂狀態，從而造成這兩種常見的謬論。第一種謬論是把問題化約成「認知的人的不完美性」，
第二種謬論是把問題化約成「臆測的規矩的不完美性」。道德的語言，必須能夠平衡這兩種缺憾。道德的陳述，必須承認（確實要接受）個體的環境和感覺、個體的
認知、個體的熱情。不過，如果要以它們為指導原則，必須超越個人的奇想和偏好。因此，我們必須從判斷的規矩分辨出指導原則的規矩，從內心感覺的規矩分辨出
社會行為的規矩。換句話說，我們必須面對「人陷於兩個極端之間的」事實：一端是普遍適用性的權威，另一端則是慾望的奇想；一端是把普遍情況當成僵化的絕
對，另一端則是把個人情況當成不可預測的不穩定。
我們也許可以舉出一個比較具體的例子：很少人對
自我檢討和自我發露做反省功夫。雖然迴向功德和懺悔的儀式在佛教儀式中很重要，但我們從未針對它們在修行之道上的地位做過現代倫理的反省；至於懺悔、自我
發露和倫理理想之間如何交涉，更少有反省。除了把這些儀式解釋成「前行」的陳腔爛調以外，現代作者並不想詮釋它們的重要性。
條件(3)和(4)說明了：我理想中的倫理討
論，其型式還是根源於傳統的佛教理論。這最後兩點讓我們想到佛教倫理立論最常引用的兩個原則：慈悲和方便。我之所以反對佛教辯證經常引用這兩個語詞，並非
認為：慈悲和方便這兩個概念的內在價值，僅能嚴謹地用在了解和行動的原則上。相反的，我發現困擾的關鍵在於把這兩個語詞當作自家行內話來使用（或濫用），
從來不想認真地加以發展、修正和（最重要的）批
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判。值得重視的是：一直到今天，只有兩篇重要論文探討這些主題，
但都沒有談到哲學問題。
不幸，這兩個語詞只有在它們模糊和混沌時，才能
發揮它們最佳的辯證力，它們經不起嚴厲的檢驗。對這兩個概念做嚴厲的檢驗，將證明可以提供肥沃的園地，作佛教符號的發展和改進之用。但方便不僅是「只准談
不准批判」的執照而已，慈悲也不僅是「搪塞我們必然做不到」的咒語而已。
大慈悲的神話，需要翻譯成社會行動的語言；另一
方面，把慈悲當作一種感人的美德來培養（尤其是在它與觀想自我同時運用時），在我們反省道德價值和本體之間的關係時，能夠提供有用的符號。
「方便」的概念，在「意義的協談」這個現代概念
裏獲得迴響。因此，發展後的「方便」的概念，對於佛教的意義倫理學和倫理學的意義理論，可以說是適時的理論進路。
除了它多層面而頗引起爭議的辯證用途之外，「方
便」這個概念也是「道」的理論，在道德上，它是不執著「道」的教理，也是空性或空的對治；在認識論上，它是意義動力學的教理。在最後一種意義裏，「方便」
隱含「意義就是做」的理論，也隱含「真理就是做和意識的協談」的理論。[12]這些概念對我們最有用了，因為我們想要尋找用什麼方式把目前正在發生，而且將在佛教機構和理想中繼續發生的變
遷予以概念化。把「方便」當作是文化調適的教理性或理論性立論基礎，這種現代認知並沒有受到誤導，雖然它的應用一點也不精密。
「方便」的教理，以及和它密切相關的空，是雙刃
劍，它們可以用來佐證任何以佛教自居的陳述，但也可以把它們看成佛教本身的剋星。不過，充其量，它們是批判性的工具，建立在對於人類現實的建構性質的直覺
上。它們不見得可以協助我們構造經驗（同樣情形，涅槃也無法給我們什麼倫理），但在我們構造現實的過程中，它們卻給予我們一種批判的角度。充其量，它們是
因緣論的延伸──延伸到佛教教理本身。我們建構佛教的方式有很多（出於「意圖」、個人動機），也用一套語言來建構痛苦的世界。對於這種種的認識，便延伸出
「方便」和空。它們並沒有把批判性的思想繳械，也沒有把一切「真理」解釋為同等無意義（或有意義）。它們也沒有把道德的思想繳械。但它們卻意謂著：
「真」、「善」或「對」並不能在原始的、最初的和純粹的現貨中發現，而獨立於吾人情緒的社會的和語言的生活現實之外。「對」是經
12.
我特意用「隱含」這兩個字，因為我不相信傳統的論述，已經對這些觀念做過清晰的說明。我們自然不能期望在古典經論中發現這種說法。但我們可以站在它們的貢
獻上，嘗試發現對我們可能會更具意義的概念。
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由個人成長的過程而發現的，我們稱之為「道」，稱之為意義的協
談。但在成長的過程中，我們領受了一個世界，在領受這一個世界的過程中，我們又改變了它。被領受的世界，是情感、記憶、教理和儀式的宇宙，既無定型又是無
意識的。被變形（應當說是變形中）的世界，是被生活的「道」，既不是已經證得的目標，也不是可以證得的目標。佛教徒一直在宣揚空和虛無的哲學，卻很害怕這
種倫理的真理和一般的真理，實在是太諷刺了。
傑羅姆．布魯諾在挑戰傳統的西方根本主義時，精
彩地描述了隱含在上文的「真理」概念：
我們建構了許多事實，而且是以不同的意圖來建構的。但我們不是從「羅斯巴克的污點」中建構的，而是以我們構成經驗的許多方式來建構的，不管它們是不是感官
的經驗……是不是我們透過與吾人社會世界互動而獲得的極高度符號經驗我們從閱讀中所獲得的替代性經驗……心（或文學意義）的建構主義哲學，並不能在本體論
上或倫理上讓一個人繳械。不管是書本或世界經撿的詮釋，都可以就它們的正當性來加以判斷。但是，我們不能夠因為它們與「彼岸」的原始「真實」世界相應，就
承認它們的正當性。這是因為此一「真實世界」不但在認識
論上是模糊不清的，而且就信仰的行為而言也是空的。反之，意義（或「現實」，因為兩者終究是不可分辨的）是反映人類意圖的事業，不能脫離人類意圖而判斷它
的正當性。然而，「世界製造」……始於我們認為是被給予的先驗世界……如果在世界上（或在我們所開始的書本上）有意義的「化身」，我們就會在領受它們的行動中，把它們樊形為我們這個已經被變形的世界，而那個
變形的世界接著又變成別人所開始的世界……。
因此，當我們在反省佛教戒律時，如何重新建構佛
教倫理時來重新建構我們自己，以便能夠重新發現和了解它的意義，便成為我們的挑戰──屬於「發現」性質的挑戰。雖然這個過程包含研究、修正和產生一般的倫
理原則、陳述、命題和禁令，但終究與規矩無關，而是關係到行為和行為的意義。規矩是界址，不但引導道德的選擇和行為，還引導它們所攜帶的意義。
然而，因為意義是一種語言和社會的事實，不只是
心理動機的創造而已，所以討論倫理或討論戒律就是討論文化（和歷史）的現實，而不是討論已經被解體的理性原則。因此，我們是在尋找一個共同的語言、一個產
生意義的共同方式、一個共同的故事。「意義的產生」這個概念，麥克．羅薩爾多曾經做過貼切的描述：
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意義是一種大眾生活的事實……文化模式（社會事實）提供了一
切人類行動、成長和了解的繩墨。在這種解析下，文化與其說是……命題、規矩、計劃或信仰的東西，倒不如說是聯想的鎖鍊和印象，它所指涉的東西能夠被人理性
地聯想到。集體的故事，可以說明動作者世界的連貫性、可能性和意思的性質，我們便是透過這些故事來明瞭文化的。因此，文和總是比人種學者的描述所記錄的特
徵來得豐富，因為它的真實情況並不存在於日常生活儀式的明顯形式上，而是存在於人們的日常作為上，人們在行動中，自然會透露出自己的身分和同胞的動機。
如果我們把「文化總是比人種學者的描述所記錄的特徵來得豐富」這句話，改成「倫理的經驗和實踐，總是比僧規和哲學家的臆測所制訂的規矩來得豐富」，那麼唐
羅薩爾多對於文化的陳述，就能夠摘述我在這裏所要表達的立場之精華：規矩和觀念都是互動結構的一部分，這個結構比較不那麼理性、合乎邏輯或與本體論相關，
它是人際和語言的產物。一個宗教的儀式和故事，最能表達、保存和轉變這個結構。[13]但，這並不是說儀式和人類互動的書本不需要加以詮釋，不需要在知識性和理性了解的層次上加以「表顯」。今天我
們出席這項會議，不需要更多的證據就可以說明：在我們所生存的這種社會裏，理性探討是產生意義的人際過程的主要部分，學者和學派是機構的一種，是意義協商
的一種「討論會」。
今天我們聚集在這兒，就是為了要重新協商，或最
好說是為了繼續重新協商的過程。但如果我們把不確定的溝通基礎、意義的分歧和緊張，以及文化的流動性看成一種威脅，那麼就像任何其他協商一樣，這種類型的
協商是不可能進行的。我們千萬不要把吾人世界的不確定性看成是災難；反之，在重新協商能夠回應當今時代的廣泛倫理需求的佛教倫理時，我們必須把吾人世界的
不確定性看成是隱藏於其中的危險。
我們有必要對古代某些神秘東西做批判性的檢驗，
我們有必要更新那些支持佛教倫理生活的神話和符號，但這不表宗教敬畏的結束。古代的了解系統的崩潰，並不會帶來美和敬畏的消失。誠如丹尼爾．滇涅特在《被
解釋的意識》一書中所極力主張的：
讓我們提醒自己在早期解除迷信之後，到底發生了什麼事情？我們發現過沒有
13.
布魯納（Bruner l986：
122）「社會和社會生活的「現實』本身，經常是語言使用方式的產物，譬如一些演講中的動作、保證、發誓、辯解、命名等。一旦我們承認文化本身包含經常需
要文化成員加以詮釋的模糊文字時，語言在創造社會現實的結構性角色，就可以變成實際關心的課題了。」
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減少驚奇；反之，我們發現浩瀚宇宙如此的美，如此的瑰麗眩目，遠
過神秘的護衛者所曾構想到的。早期視野中的「神奇」，最大功能是在掩藏想像的澈底失敗，是無可奈何地閃避「人造神」的概念。駕著金車駛過天空的憤怒神祇，
是心術單純的漫畫書故事，有如現代天文學的迷人新發現，DNA複製機器的極端錯綜複雜，使得「原始生命力」像超人的恐怖秘密武器那麼有趣……（當）不有神
祕時，（事情將）變得不一樣，但還是會有美，也比從前更有敬畏的空間。
"Talking
about
Precepts and Practicing Precepts"
By Luis O.
Gomez
Department of Asian Languages and Cultures
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
Chung-Hwa
Buddhist
Journal
No. 6 (July 1993)
pp. 351-389
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Chung-Hwa
Buddhist
Journal, Vol. 6 (July 1993)
|
Summary
Buddhism has been very
attached
to codes and rules. Morality or ethics are preliminaries to the higher
goals
of Buddhism and the essential basis of the higher life. Buddhism
adapted its
ethical ideals to new cultural situations not so much by reasoning the
subtleties
of a moral theology but by an appeal to extra-ethical values: (l) by
affirming
its transcendence, and (2) by appealing to its more general
soteriological principles.
Traditional Buddhist
rhetoric is
not responding adequately to the crisis in Buddhist ethics today. A
meaningful reexamination of the Vinayas will require a revision of
both the
content and the foundations of Buddhist ethical ideals. It will not do
to deny
the shortcomings of Buddhism.
A meaningful Buddhist
ethics for
our times should have four overlapping requirements: ① To be rooted in
the past
and in traditional Buddhist discourse. ② To take the social and the
individual
present into account. ③ To serve its purpose well with a minimum of
mystification
and pomp in Buddhist ethical discourse. ④ To take into account the
individual
as well as his or her social reality. It must be a code for each and
every one.
We need to examine
critically some
of the ancient mystifications and to renew the myths and symbols that
sustain
Buddhist ethical life. However, it does not mean the end of religious
awe.
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Chung-Hwa
Buddhist
Journal, Vol. 6 (July 1993)
|
A common interest in
"Vinaya"
in the broad sense has brought us together in this conference. Many
among us
are fascinated by the history and the minutiae of Buddhist monastic
codes, by
their ritual and sociological contexts, but we share above all a
respect for
Buddhist ideals of human conduct generally. In other words, interest
in Vinaya,
I assume, implies interest in the broad issues of ethics, virtue,
concern for
others, and self-cultivation. The high esteem in which we hold
Buddhist ethical
ideals, I am sure also leads to a concern for their future, for their
survival,
and for the preservation and clarification of their meanings. I would
therefore
like to invite the participants in this conference to reflect on the
ideals
embodied in the Vinaya literature, as well as on the historical
specifics of
that literature.
In some way or another
Buddhist
monastic codes have provided models for human virtue and human
perfection for
over two thousand years. The "virtue" of Buddhist monks has been
proverbial
in the West for centuries. Already more than half a millennium ago,
Marco Polo
spoke of the exemplary life of the followers of Buddha, although he
saw their
belief system as a "superstition." [1]
As Western understanding of, and respect for, Buddhism grew, the
perception
of Buddhism and Buddhists as highly ethical did not diminish. It is
not uncommon,
even today, to hear of Buddhist "virtue" or "morality" as
being somehow special, more subtle than any of the Western systems of
morality.
In 1913, Carolyn
Rhys-Davids wrote
with inimitable fondness of the Pali term sila, as she seemed to
apologize for
translating the word as "morals.":
I was tempted to retain the
pretty
word śīla for our more cumbrous "morality," etc. "Virtue"
is more elegant, but a little vague. Sīla is moral habit, habitual
good, or
moral conduct -- the conduct of one who does not hurt or rob living
things,
is sexually straight, truthful, and gentle of speech, and sober as
to drink.
(C. A. F. Rhys-Davids, 1913: 269, n. 2)
1.
Things have not changed much in the six hundred years since. Perhaps
the same
mixture of admiration and fear of the exotic moved Carl Jung in our
century
to see "Oriental" wisdom as the repository of profound psychological
truths, but not a place for Westerners to dwell in.
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As if this took care of the
matter,
she added "That is all."
And in a certain manner of
speaking,
that has been all. Modern writers on "Buddhist ethics" often have
been content with expanding on definitions and assumptions similar to
those
implied by this brief reflection of Rhys-Davids. [2]
It is also customary to claim a central role for śīla in the Buddhist
paradigms
for human behavior and fulfillment, while at the same time (and
perhaps this
is what has attracted contemporary Westerners the most) asserting that
morality
or ethics are only preliminaries to the higher goals of Buddhism. In
the same
note just quoted, Rhys-Davids states categorically, "Such conduct is
only
the essential basis of the higher life." [3]
And then, revealingly, adds, "The sermon is addressed to hired
assassins,
not to bhikkhus"!!
Śīla, however, is seen not
only
as a foundation for the path, but also as derivative from the content
of Buddhist
doctrine. Almost a hundred years ago Thomas H. Huxley wrote
admiringly, and
with typical Victorian flair, of the "metaphysical tour de force"
that lead "Gautama" to conclude that in "the whole universe there
is nothing permanent, no eternal substance either of mind or of
matter,"
that "personality is a metaphysical fancy; and in very truth, not only
we, but all things, in the worlds without end of the cosmic
phantasmagoria,
are such stuff as dreams are made of." (Huxley, 1893/1989: 124-125).
2.
B. C. Law (1936/1966) uses Rhys-Davids' footnote as the guide for his
summary
of Buddhist sila in Concepts of Buddhism.
3.
Emphasis
mine. This quotation is rife with implications. The length and
circumstances
of this address do not allow me to go into full detail into these
implications,
but one should remember the long debate, in Asia and in the West,
about the
Parable of the Raft, the arhant's status "beyond good and evil," the
"formless precepts," etc. All of these, important, and highly
problematic
issues can only be touched in passing in an article of this length.
Whether
the verses translated by Rhys-Davids (Thg 608 ff.) were addressed
at assassins or not is impossible to tell, the frame story being from
the much
later commentary. But the verses clearly refer to a provisional, or
non-religious,
conception of morality, based on expediency, since the fruits of
morality are
listed as fame, gain, and heaven (Thg 609).
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Huxley argued that
Gautama, like
his predecessors, could derive "only one rule of conduct" (122) from
his metaphysics -- the rule of renunciation. But, Huxley reasoned,
Gautama,
unlike his predecessors, "doubtless had a better guarantee for the
abolition
of transmigration, when no wrack of substance, either of Atman or of
Brahma,
was left behind, when, in short, a man had but to dream that he willed
not to
dream, to put an end to all dreaming." (125-126)
This appraisal of Buddhist
philosophy
and theory of liberation was followed by Huxley's enthusiastic
endorsement of
what he perceived to be the ethics and social practice of Buddhism
(126-127):
The appetites and the
passions are
not to be abolished by mere mortification of the body; they must, in
addition,
be attacked on their own ground and conquered be steady cultivation
of the
mental habits which oppose them; by universal benevolence; by the
return of
good for evil; ... in short by total renunciation of that
self-assertion which
is the essence of the cosmic process.
Doubtless, it is to these ethical
qualities
that Buddhism owes its marvelous success. A system ... which denies a
soul
to man; which counts the belief in immortality a blunder and the
hope of it
a sin; which refuses any efficacy to prayer and sacrifice; which
bids men
look to nothing but their own efforts for salvation; which in its
original
purity knew nothing of vows of obedience, abhorred intolerance, and
never
sought the aid of the secular arm; yet spread over a considerable
moiety of
the Old World with marvellous rapidity, and is still, with whatever
base admixture
of foreign superstitions, the dominant creed of a large fraction of
mankind.
To us, Huxley's panegyric
suggests
inadequate knowledge of Buddhist texts and history. It also reveals
the scholar's
uncritical faith in the power of disembodied ideas. Seen from the
vantage point
of the hundred years that have since given shape to various
disciplines for
the scholarly study of Religions, and a hundred years of Buddhist
Studies, seen
likewise on the looking glass of our own expectations, Huxley's
appraisal appears
idealistic, if not outright naive. Yet, thought the modern scholar may
have
little use for concepts such as the "admixture of
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foreign superstitions," one
must
recognize that Huxley was struggling with issues similar to those that
concern
us today. In Evolution and ethics Huxley also confronted the question
of what
happens to moral responsibility when there is no self, no eternal
life, and
no God. This is not the facile, and crusty, academic debate of how can
a Buddhist
believe in karma if there is no self, or the philosophical question of
the metaphysical
foundation for ethics, rather it is the question of the meaning,
function and
nature of ethics in a world without transcendence. Huxley, like we
today, and
perhaps like the Buddha Śākyamuni himself, was confronted by the loss
of self
of his own age long before he knew of a "doctrine of no-self." But
loss of self can have many meanings and many outcomes -- it can lead
to more
than one restructuring of a person's horizons of meaning and purpose
(Taylor,
1989).
In the West -- as perhaps
in ancient
India -- social loss of self has been accompanied by an ontological
loss of
self. In the West, however, this loss generally is seen as leaving
behind a
joyless void. The main-streams of Western thought in the past have
tended to
derive only despair and hopelessness from negation, to infer nihilism
and nothingness
from groundlessness. [4]
The Buddhist tradition,
on the other hand, conceived of this loss as both a mark of the
possibility
of escape, and a reason for escaping from the world, not a reason for
despair
and lamentation. For the Buddhist, a desolate, homeless Earth, calls
for renunciation,
but renunciation leads to the highest bliss.
Huxley perceived this
important
difference: the collapse of cosmological and metaphysical security
lead in the
West to despair, yet, in Buddhism it seemed to lead to joyful
detachment. But,
ironically, for all his unveiled admiration for Buddhism, Huxley was
at the
same time critical of Buddhist detachment. Huxley saw the Buddhist
insight into
non-substantiality as one of several classical approximations to the
evolutionary
perspective, but the believed the ethical principles that had been
derived from
these approximative insights were faulty. The Greeks had given us an
overconfident
faith in human perfectibility -- while hinting at both renunciation
and despair
in the teachings of the Stoics. In Gautama, India had given us a more
perfect
form of withdrawal. But withdrawal is only half the
4.
This is no longer the case. See Taylor, 1989.
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answer: between the two
extremes of
total despair and total withdrawal, Huxley saw a future ethics that
would both
accept human limitation and strive to correct it. One must "throw
aside,"
he wrote, both "youthful overconfidence and the no less youthful
discouragement
of nonage." (144)
Huxley was no naive
Romantic. His
essay is at times sobering, and his genius surfaces repeatedly as he
anticipates
many of the insecurities of self and value that have shaped our
century. But
there is no question that his perception of Buddhism reflects what the
Victorians
expected from Buddhism and from "the East."
As Western intellectuals
lost their
faith in their own institutions, they sought exotic models of ideals
without
institutions. It is not surprising, therefore, to read Huxley's
description
of Buddhism as a "philosophy" that no only shares in the insights
of evolutionary biology, but also "counts the belief in immortality a
blunder
and the hope of it a sin; which refuses any efficacy to prayer and
sacrifice;
which bids men look to nothing but their own efforts for salvation;
which in
its original purity knew nothing of vows of obedience, abhorred
intolerance,
and never sought the aid of the secular arm." One has to wonder how
much
of this portrait is only a reflection of a Western intellectual's
hopes.
Buddhism has been, if
anything,
very attached to codes and rules, and even if we grant that the term
"obedience"
may not be the most accurate, one would be hard pressed to find
historical evidence
for the disembodied Buddhism described by Huxley, It is obvious that
Buddhism
has had political positions, and has had to manipulate political and
social
realities. In doing so, Buddhism has also had to forge its own ethical
ideals
-- often in directions far from the simple assertion of no-self.
Regrettably, Huxley's
profound insights
into the psychology of renunciation and the sociobiology of perfection
are not
well known among writers on Buddhist ethics, but the Victorian image
of Buddhism
on which he relied is still with us.
Today we would like to
believe that
we have outgrown the agendas of the Victorian era. Our scholarship has
made
at least some faint progress and we can safely assert that Huxley's
perception
of Buddhism is at best an idealized abstraction. Yet, it is still
common to
assume, like Huxley did, that there is a clear, and logically
necessary connection
between Buddhist ontology on the one hand, and its ethical ideals and
its ethos,
on the other. There is also a tendency to assume
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the forms it takes as an ethos
are or
should be reflections of an ethical theory. It is also still common to
express,
either as historical fact or as apologetic that Buddhism has been free
of ritualism,
legalism, and political interests. All of these claims fly in the face
of the
evidence of history, but they appear to have had a certain apologetic
success.
This not wholly a modern
proselytizing
strategy , however. "Disembodied religion" is a common strategy of
apologetics -- "my religion" is always the true, it is defined by
its ideals, whereas the religions of others are always the flawed
human realities
of lived religion. This is sometimes an effective apologetic strategy,
and may
have been very successful in certain circles during this past century.
I believe
this success is bound to be short-lived, and, what is worse, it is
bound to
thwart whatever salutary effects Buddhism may have as a force for
positive change
-- especially as a force in our common search for social consensus
through humane
ideals, rather than through coercion. The presentation of Buddhism as
an ideal
disembodied entity, without reference to the concrete codes of action
and ritual
traditions that have shaped its institutional history renders a
disservice both
to truth (or shall we say honesty?) and to Buddhism as a
treasure-house of human
insight.
Why this tendency to see
Buddhism
as a disembodied theory of ultimate insight and liberation, rather
than as a
body of modes of conduct? Radical differences between the social
histories of
Europe, India, and China no doubt are one of the most important
contributing
causes. A closer study of the interaction between, say, Brahmanism and
Buddhism
could tell us much about the nature of Buddhist ethical discourse. But
in this
essay I rather look at the discourse itself, and how it may change in
the future.
It appears that Buddhism
adapted
its ethical ideals to new cultural situations not so much by reasoning
the subtleties
of a moral theology but by an appeal to extra-ethical values: (1) by
affirming
its transcendence (epistemologically in the mode of a two-truth
doctrine, ethically
as world-renunciation), and (2) by appealing to its more general
soteriological
principles (that is, ethics as a teleology). [5]
These strategies serve well the function of Buddhism as a religious
ideology,
and monasticism as a self-perpetuating institution. The Christian West
knows
of similar ideologies.
5.
The first of these strategies has been followed by Dharmasiri in his
recent
(1989) Fundamentals of Buddhist Ethics. The second strategy is
implicit in the
passage I quoted earlier from Carolyn Rhys-Davids' Psalms of the
Earlier Buddhists.
The problem is of course more complicated than this. Whereas Christian
apologists
learned the value of independent ethical arguments and independent
theories
of philosophical anthropology (a skill they no doubt inherited from
the Greeks
and the Romans, and honed by sparring with secular philosophers), any
code or
theoretical system of ethics that defines itself in religious terms
runs the
risk of devaluing ethics itself. Moreover, in spite of the
reservations I will
express presently regarding Buddhist teleology, I do not believe there
is anything
inherently flawed in teleological arguments, and they are historically
of the
greatest important for religious ethical thought. I side with the
deontologists,
however, when teleological arguments lead, to a devaluation of the
social and
human realities that give rise to the need for an ethics, or to a
hierarchy
of the two fundamental dimensions of religious ethics: relating to
others and
relating to oneself.
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These approaches to
ethical justification
lead on the one hand to a paradoxical localization of ethics -- the
ethics of
non-monastic Buddhists defined by the moral customs of the locality.
They also
lead, on the other hand, to the disembodied ethical ideals of the
monastics;
paraphrasing Rhys-Davids, ethics is literally ethics only when
preached to brigands,
and only a springboard when preached to monks.
Be that as it may, today
we face
a crisis in Buddhist ethics. A crisis to which traditional Buddhist
rhetoric
is not responding adequately. The crisis is not so new, and was
pointedly described
by Huxley. This moral crisis cannot be interpreted merely as a
weakening of
moral resolve. The traditional foundations of ethics -- the social,
the metaphysical,
and the religious -- have been seriously questioned. A new Buddhist
ethical
discourse, and, by extension, a meaningful reexamination of the
Vinayas, will
require a revision of both the content and the foundations of Buddhist
ethical
ideals. We have again to rethink the broad principles that form
Buddhism and
we have to look at the specific rules from the perspective of those
broad principles.
It will not do to argue that Buddhism is the
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answer and that the "real"
the answer is somewhere in another realm, the realm of liberation --
that ethics
will make sense, or not make sense, only from the perspective of one
who is
liberated.
Furthermore, it will not
do to deny
the shortcomings of Buddhism -- in particular human beings, in
particular moments
in history, but also in its traditional dogmatic formulations.
It is not enough to argue
on the
basis of a presumed ideal, or original, Buddhism, on the basis of the
Vinaya
of what the Buddha ought to have said ... or even of what the Buddha
actually
said.
It is not enough to say
that Buddhism
is the solution. It is not enough to say even that Buddhism is a
solution. One
must say how and why Buddhism can offer solutions, and accept the
extent to
which Buddhist traditions may not have a solution to offer ... or may
be able
to offer something else, something that cannot be termed "solution."
And one must show that Buddhism can meet at the very least the basic
requirements
of content and form for a universal ethics for modern Buddhists.
We live in an age of great
disillusions
-- if not an age of cynicism. We witness the disillusion of the
scholar and
the practitioner. It is not so much that humanity has become more
cruel and
callous, but that we are rapidly losing our sense of grounding,
including the
social confirmation of self and value, so that we can now unabashedly
express
and cultivate our selfishness in the name of being honest with
ourselves. Thus,
this is an age in which the ideals of selflessness lack a social
context, in
which public pronouncements and behaviors support neither the
spiritual ideals
nor the models of conduct upon which Buddhism relied in the past to
maintain
its viability as a set of living behaviors.
Buddhism is not immune to
the effects
of the erosion of public values so well described by Alasdair
MacIntyre in After
virtue. Writing ten years ago, MacIntyre could not fantasize with "a
new
world order," rather he compared our age to the last days of the Roman
Empire (MacIntyre, 1981: 244). As the moral consensus of the Empire
disappeared, "virtue" became the ward of small communities of new
believers and
renunciants. MacIntyre sees a need today too for a moral life based on
the support
of small communities. Thus, he sees a need for
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the construction of new
forms of community
within which the moral life could be sustained so that both morality
and civility
might survive the coming ages of barbarism and darkness... (244)
[But] this time the barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers;
they
have already been governing us for quite some time. And it is our
lack of
consciousness of this that constitutes part of our predicament. We
are waiting
not for a Godot, but for another -- doubtless very different -- St.
Benedict."
(245)
There is indeed a need for
another St.
Benedict (or, better, I would say, for many Benedicts), but this new
founders
of spiritual communities will "doubtless be different" from St.
Benedict,
and, I hasten to add, from Gautama, from Tsong-kha-pa, from Dogen.
It is always dangerous
(and, depending
on how many years one lives, potentially embarrassing) to try to play
the prophet,
but I will venture to say nevertheless that even if the next fifty,
perhaps
the next twenty, years see (and I believe we will) a revival of
monasticism
as the core moral and spiritual institution in the industrialized
world, it
will be a very different monasticism. It will have to be a very
different Vinaya.
Even the fact that we are
gathered
here suggests that we, or an indeterminate group to which we are
responding,
are groping for a new definition of the spiritual community, and its
guiding
principles. This is, after all, what is meant by any serious
reflection on Vinaya.
In this quest we will have
to question
many of our past assumptions. Faced by the challenge of modern ethics,
and the
challenge of secular morality, we will have to ask something more than
questions
of detail about quaint monastic rules and customs. We will have to ask
ourselves, "What does it mean to have 'a Buddhist ethics,' rather than
ethics in general?
What is it that we want to find or expect to find in the Buddhist
tradition
that will make any difference in constructing, deriving, or
maintaining an ethical
ideal for our age -- and for our very diverse, yet converging cultural
universes?
What could a monastic ideal offer to those who are not monastics?"
These are all complex and
controversial
issues. Today I will limit myself to
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inviting you to reconnoitre
the field
with me by considering some of the general and formal requirements of
the new
ethics, and of the new Vinaya. I can think of several, overlapping
requirements
for a meaningful Buddhist ethics for our times.
(1) First, and
paradoxically, any
rethinking of Buddhist ideals of behavior has to be rooted in the
past, and
in traditional Buddhist discourse. A connection with the past is a
requirement
for any effective ethics. Our problem is not only one of philosophical
ethics,
but of practical ethics, and of religious ethics. I would argue that
the symbolic
and historical connection with ancestors is part of both the
foundation and
the meaning of ethical behavior generally, and of religious ethics in
particular.
A sense of continuity and identity is perhaps more crucial than a
philosophical
cogency.
At the same time, however,
we have
to break with the past. The problem for us today is how to connect
with a past,
be it a quasi-historical past or a composite picture of an ideal past,
while
at the same we seek new ways of constructing ethical meaning. But, how
is this "ethical meaning" constructed and maintained? Meaning in ethics
is
generated and preserved when the system of ethical symbols -- ideals,
myths,
codes, and rituals -- can be understood and articulated in terms of
the intellectualizations
of our cultures, the behavioral dilemmas of our public interactions,
and the
private dilemmas of our inner sense of identity. Concord in
articulation, not
agreement, is all that is needed. Disagreement is in fact essential if
religious
discourse is going to act as a goad or critic of secular discourse.
Notice that meaning does
not arise
from "truth," or from the discovery or restoration of "the true,
and original" values of Buddhism, or from values "free from the
cultural
baggage of generations." There can be no ethics apart from culture --
the
cultural baggage of past generations is what a religious tradition is
all about,
though we may choose not to carry all of it.
More about this presently
-- suffice
it to say here that the dilemma for us today is that we must generate
new meanings
and applications while we preserve a mythical past -- we can neither
pretend
to "purify" ourselves of myth, nor pretend that present actualities
do not exist.
By the same token, we have
to find
alternatives to the traditional intellectual discourse of Buddhist
ethics, yet
preserve our connections with it. Consider, for instance, two of the
doctrines
often used by classical as well as by modern apolog-
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ists as foundational
doctrines: Buddhist
have appealed to "the ultimate goal" of the path or to the principle
of compassion as purported foundations for ethical action. Perhaps
there are
ways to use these principles as inspirations for further reflection
without
falling into the simple repetition of variations on the same themes.
It appears that the first
of these
two principles is not meant to be a fundamental ethical principle but a
non-ethical
foundation for ethical principles. Yet, it is not at all clear how one
is to
derive an ethics from it. Traditional Buddhist ethical discourse
focused on
the stratification of the cosmology of rebirth, not on the so-called
"ultimate
goal." [6]
The argument from the goal
is, in
my mind, the weakest of all, and has led to much questionable
speculation, both
in classical Asia and among modern Buddhists in the West. Nirvana as a
foundation
for the path was criticized, but not quite superseded, by the
Mahayana. In the
West, where we have had our share of teleologies, ethical philosophers
have
sought a different conception of the foundation of morality --
inspired in part
by Aristotle who first argued that "morality" ... is a form of doing
(Praxis) and not of making (Poiesis), ... the end of doing is not
something
distinct from the action itself -- doing well is in itself the end."
(Frankena,
1980:31) Mahayana philosophers moved away from a strict teleology, but
the primacy
of the soteriological goal obscured those elements of an ethics of
immanence
present in Mahayana ethical and mythological reflection. [7]
The problem, however, is
not so
much in whether a teleological definition or justification of morality
is formally,
or a priori, unjustifiable, rather the issue is the nature of the
morality that
one could derive from particular conceptions of Nirvana.
Naturally, derivations" in
moral and religious thought are always soft, and
6.
Naturally, the properly ethical underpinnings of these constructs have
been
traditionally the doctrines of merit, and of kusala (we have as yet to
find
an English equivalent for this all-important term). I believe there is
a place
for the rhetoric of merit in a modern discourse on Buddhist ethics,
and I regret
the tendency to ignore this doctrine in modern attempts to describe
Buddhist
ethics.
7.
Cf. also
the extremely suggestive reflections of Vasubandhu on śubha and
kuśala, in the
Bhāśya ad Akoś IV:8 & IV:66.
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often depend on values,
considerations,
and arguments external to the putative axiomatic principles.
Nevertheless, one
can speak of two competing concepts of Nirvana as summum bonum. [8]
According to one model, the transcendence of Nirvana is understood
literally
as a condition wholly other than the present state of our existence.
Vasubandhu's
reflections on Nirvana are an example of this conception. The second
model,
understands transcendence metaphorically as denoting a state of mind:
the liberated
person's place in existence is no different from that of others, but
his perception
of things is radically different. One may see this model in some of
the writings
of the Madhyamaka. It is not at all clear, however, that the second
model is
totally free from the tendency to see liberation as wholly other. Some
ambivalence
remains no doubt, and is especially obvious in Mahayana ethical
writings, in
the hierarchy of the virtues, and in treatments of the Parable of the
Raft and
the "formless precepts."
The change in the
definition of
Nirvana effected by the Mahayana was in fact a change in argument from
one of
ethics derived from transcendence to an ethics of immanence. The smell
of earlier
asceticism and contemptus mundi remains, Mahayana continued to be,
after all,
a monastic religion. [9]
But at least in ideology
a major shift began to occur. This shift was closely connected to the
development
of the second traditional principle of Buddhist ethics, the principle
of compassion.
"Compassion" is not an
argument for ethical behavior, but a general, and very vague, term for
a cluster
of virtues -- virtuous emotions, and, perhaps, behaviors. In Buddhist
discourse,
however, "Universal Compassion" is itself used
8.
I use the word Nirvana loosely to denote Buddhist conceptions of the
state of
liberation in general. In this usage, "Nirvana" refers to a variety
of "nirvanas." What these conceptions have in common is their role
as intellectualizations of the highest or ultimate value, and the
desired final
outcome of the Path. Needless to say, these abstractions can also
serve as principles
of organization in concrete or symbolic hierarchical cosmologies.
9.
Ambivalence
towards the world is also a common issue in the history of
Christianity, at
least until the Post-Reformation. On of the contentions of this paper
is that
the social circumstances that brought about a change in Christianity
have now
caught up with (if not passed by) Buddhist institutions.
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as an fundamental ethical rule
(a "Gen,"
as the more general statements of moral rule are called by Frankena,
1980).
Traditional discourse on compassion appears to regard universal
compassion as
axiomatic -- which it may ultimately be. But its connection with other
Gens
was never fully developed. [10] Even those who
argued for a primary or foundational role for compassion (e.g.,
Kamalaśīla)
saw it as a preliminary, explicitly connected with the practices of
calming
the mind, not with the specifics of ethical rules. [11]
The need to renew ancient
rhetoric
is only the obverse of the second requirement of the new Vinayas: (2) A
modern
ethics, and consequently, a modern code for lay and monastics, must
take into
account the present: the social present, of course, but the individual
present
as well.
The difficulty here is
finding a
way to be flexible enough to adapt to changes in social circumstances
and cultural
mores without losing all sense of continuity and stability, and
without relinquishing
the function of religion as a critic of society. An important
challenge facing
Buddhism in this sphere is the changing role of the laity, especially
as it
is defined by a rapidly evolving secular conception
10.
The sophistication of Indian metaphysical discourse contrasts sharply
with the
less critical treatment of ethical issues. A subtle epistemology of
cognition
contrasts with an actuarial conception of the emotions and the
virtues. There
were social, as well as philosophical reasons, for this lopsided
treatment of
ethics. Those social circumstances have changed. In fact, they have
always been
changing. Buddhist reaction to those changes, however, was slow, and
ethical
discourse took forms that we find difficult to translate into our own
rhetorical
modes: the mythology of re birth, the doctrine of merit, the mythology
of the
bodhisattvas. Notable exceptions to this description do exist --
witness the
occasional, but insightful, ethical arguments of Śāntideva and his
commentator
Prajñākaramati, and of Kamalaśīla, in India, and Chih-I and Jiun in
East Asia,
among others.
11. The
historical roots of this problem may be in the early mythical and
ritual contexts
of compassion. It appears to have been associated not with social
ethics or
an ethics of virtue, but with the extraordinary powers of buddhas at
one end
of the spectrum (cf. Abhidharmadīpa 508, Abhidharmakośa 7.34) and the
cultivation
of states of mind at the other end (cf. Aronson, Gomez).
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of the human being. In this
conception
-- which is really not so new -- the human being is defined as a
biological
entity, and its human identity is no longer constructed apart from the
blind
drives, the limitations, and the fragility of a living organism. What
is more,
human identity and thought can no longer be separated from the
physical realities
of the brain in which they at least partly inhere. And yet, the
individual human
personality is furthermore conceived as inherently valuable -- apart
from political
or spiritual hierarchies. Granted this is only an ideal, an
intellectualization,
and a sophisticated myth, but it is a powerful and dominant myth, a
myth that
requires of our ethical reflections a conception of restraint and
perfectibility
that is very different from that expressed in classical (and
contemporary) Buddhist
ethical discourse.
At the very least the
foundations
(mythical, soteriological, or philosophical) of Buddhist moral
thought, and
possibly the institutions (lay and monastic), will have to conform to
these
radical historical shifts. With the invention of social justice we
have learned
to suspect spiritual hierarchies and hierarchs as promoters of
spiritual ideologies
that serve as tools of control and exploitation. With the invention of
the mind
as brain, of the so-called unconscious, and of the biology of
emotions, we have
learned to suspect virtue as a screen for less spiritual motivations.
These
two major shifts threaten two pillars of traditional Buddhist
morality: the
notion of levels of value and hierarchies of morality, and the
morality of virtue
as restraint.
With the new conception of
the individual
come changes that I believe are already affecting Buddhist
institutions even
in Asia. Reflections on the Vinaya and reflections on Buddhist ethics
generally
must face squarely and critically the traditional position and open
disparagement
of women, and more ambiguous positions in a range of ethical issues --
such
as war and peace, homosexuality, social justice (in contrast to merely
recommending
kindness in the treatment of slaves and servants).
The new Vinaya will have
to be based
on ethical principles that spread out on a continuum. The moral
principles governing
the community will have to be grounded on the same goals or
definitions of virtue
for all members of the community. This process cannot be accomplished
by monachizing
the lay life (or, for that matter, by secularizing monastic life -- if
my prediction
that monasticism
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will endure turns true). But
it will
require a new concept of restraint, a concept that will take into
account the
modern willingness to accept the biological (or, why not call it with a
less
euphemistic term, the animal) nature of the human being. Such was the
challenge
Huxley saw in the new biology of his days, and such is still the
challenge today.
These changes will seem as
threats
to some of the concepts held most dear by traditional Buddhist ethical
thinkers.
On the side of hierarchy, these changes would challenge the privileged
access
to the higher, or formless, precepts, or even their ethical viability.
It would
also challenge the second class status of lay morality. On the side of
the psychology
of morality, these changes would challenge the notion of detachment as
renunciation
-- in fact, it would challenge the possibility of renunciation, and,
needless
to say, the possibility of totally eradicating sexual drives.
This would then be a
Buddhist morality
that seeks to account for real human beings, not by separating their
spirituality
from their animality, but by confronting the coexistence, if not
identity, of
those dimensions of experience that have been isolated by these two
constructs.
Huxley saw this as one of the challenges of the scientific revolutions
of the
nineteenth century: to understand the sense in which our intellectual
and spiritual
is not reducible to our biological reality, but is nevertheless an
integral
part of it. I am not arguing, therefore, for the secularization of
values and
the glorification of selfishness promoted by our institutions, and by
popular
science, and, especially, by the popularization of the psychotherapies
of self-fulfillment.
Religious discourse can
serve to
cover and preserve, or it can serve to uncover, discover, and
challenge. Both
functions are necessary, and must remain in precarious balance. I am
afraid
too much energy has gone into covering and preserving, at all costs.
In doing
so, Buddhist discourse on ethics has failed to fulfill one of its
purposes:
to assist us in effectively adapting to and acting on the world. This
function
include under a third "requirement": (3) Buddhist ethical discourse
should be efficacious, effective, and efficient. In other words it
must serve
its purpose, and must serve it well, with a minimum of mystification
and pomp.
This includes a recognition of the circumstances that make the code
necessary.
Nothing is served by lamenting or disparaging the human realities that
make
the
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code necessary.
The realities giving rise
to the
code are interpersonal circumstances and human passions. Ethical rules
advising
or compelling generosity and contentment with what we have may be
based on ideal
models, but they are mostly prompted by the reality that we cannot all
have
what there is to have, that I cannot have my colleagues salary, and,
above all,
that I insist, nevertheless, in coveting what others have. In other
words, the
rule and the virtue are modeled on the vice. But, if the rule, and the
virtue
as ideal are to be effective, they must conform to the reality of the
passion,
the reality of the human being who struggles to conform to the ideal.
As corollaries, this
ethical discourse
(a) must persuade without coercion (which does not mean it should
gloss over
fear, peril, and terror, or ignore violence, manifest or latent). It
must also
(b) allow for human error and imperfection, in both the unholy and
holy, in
the humble believer and in the virtuoso of meditation.
In other words, the new
ethic must
be constructed to the measure of the human being. And this is
"requirement"
four: (4) the code must take into account the individual, as well as
his or
her social reality. It must be a code for each and every one.
This fourth point is a
warning against
two common fallacies of ethical discourse that are both based on a
natural confusion
brought about by the necessarily imperfect match between rule (signed)
and human
circumstances (signified). In one case one reduces the problem to a
perceived
imperfection in the human person, in the other one reduces the problem
to a
putative imperfection in the rule. The language of morals has to be of
such
a nature that it balances both insufficiencies. Ethical statements of
Gens must
acknowledge, indeed make allowances, for individual circumstances and
feelings,
for individual perceptions, for individual passions. Yet they must
serve as
guidelines from beyond individual whim and preference. It is necessary
then
to separate the rule as a guideline, from the rule as a judgement, the
rule
of social behavior from the rule of inner feeling. In other words, one
must
face the fact that one is trapped between two forms of arbitrariness:
the authority
of universal applicability, and the whim of desire; the universal as
rigid absolute
and the individual as unpredictably capri-
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cious.
As a more concrete example
of the
problem, one may mention the dearth of reflections on self-examination
and self-disclosure.
In spite of the importance of dedications of merit and repentance
formulas in
Buddhist ritual, we do not have as yet a modern ethical reflection on
their
position in the Path, much less a reflection on how repentance,
self-disclosure
and ethical ideals are supposed to interface. Except for the hackneyed
explanation
of these rituals as "preliminaries," modern writers do not attempt
to interpret their significance.
Requirements (3) and (4)
illustrate
well how the type of ethical discourse I envision is still rooted in
traditional
Buddhist rhetoric. These last two points bring to mind two principles
often
appealed to in Buddhist ethical argument: compassion and skillful
means. My
objections to the frequent use of these terms in Buddhist apologetics
stem not
from any serious reservations as to the inherent value of the concepts
of compassion
and skillful means as principles of understanding and action. Rather,
what I
find disturbing is the use (or abuse) of these terms as shibboleths,
without
any serious attempt to develop, refine, and above all, criticize the
terms.
It is significant that there are to this date only two major
monographs on these
topics (Nakamura, and Pye), neither of which addresses the
philosophical issues.
Unfortunately, the two
words are
at their apologetic best when they are vague and mushy, and not open
to critical
examination. A critical examination of these two conceptions may prove
fertile
ground for the development and refinement of Buddhist symbols. But
upāya will
have to be more than a license to speak uncritically, and compassion
something
more than a mantra to guard off the consequences of our inability to
act.
The mythology of the Great
Compassion
needs to be translated into a language of social action, while the
cultivation
of compassion as an affective virtue, especially in its association
with the
practice of meditation on the self, could provide useful symbols in
our reflections
on the connection between moral values and identity. This is
especially timely
today, when traditional Western notions of the self are under attack
(Taylor,
Dennett).
The concept of "skillful
means"
finds an echo in modern concepts of the negotiation of meaning (about
which
more in short). Thus developed concept of
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upāya could be a timely
theoretical
approach to a Buddhist ethics of meaning and the theory of meaning in
ethics.
Apart from its multiple,
and problematic,
apologetic uses, "skillful means" is also a concept of Path theory
-- morally as a doctrine of detachment from the Path and a counterpart
to the
emptiness or emptiness, and epistemologically as a doctrine of the
dynamics
of meaning. In the last sense, "skillful means" suggests a theory
of meaning as doing, and of truth as the negotiation of doing and
meaning. [12]
These conceptions would be most useful for us, as we seek ways of
conceptualizing
the changes that are occurring and will continue to occur in Buddhist
institutions
and ideals. The modern perception of "skillful means" as a doctrinal
or theoretical justification for cultural adaptation is not misguided,
although
its application has been far from sophisticated.
The doctrine of "skillful
means"
and its close relative, emptiness, are double edged swords: they can
be used
to justify any statement trying to pass for Buddhism, or they can be
seen as
undermining Buddhism itself. At their best, however, they are critical
tools
based on an intuition of the constructed nature of human realities.
They do
not necessarily assist us in structuring experience (any more than
Nirvana can
really give us an ethics), but they give us a critical perspective on
the process
of structuring reality. At their best, they are extensions of the
doctrine of
causal interdependence -- extension into the Buddhist doctrine itself.
As such
they derive from a recognition of the myriad ways in which we
construct Buddhism,
out of "intentions," personal motives, and the very same linguistic
reality that constructed the world of suffering to begin with. They do
not disarm
critical thought, nor do they render all "truths" equally meaningless
(or meaningful). They do not disarm moral thought either. But they
suggest that
the "true," the "good" or the "right" are not
to be found in a primal, original, and pure reality independent from
the reality
of our own emotional, social and linguistic life. The "right" is
discovered
through a process of personal growth, call it Path, call it
12.
I use the word "suggests" advisedly, since I do not believe these
ideas are explicitly stated in traditional treatments of the subject.
Naturally,
one should not expect such formulations in classical texts. But one
can stand
on their contribution to try to see beyond to conceptions that may be
more meaningful
to us.
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negotiations of meaning, but a
process
of growth in which we receive a world and transform it in the process
of receiving
it. The received world is an amorphous, and for the most part
unconscious, universe
of emotions, memories, doctrines, and rituals. The transformed (or,
rather,
transforming) world is a lived Path, not an attained goal, not an
attainable
goal. It is indeed ironic that such a view of ethical truth, and truth
in general,
is so much feared by Buddhists, who after all claim to advocate a
philosophy
of non-substantiality and groundlessness.
The conception of "truth"
implicit in the above remarks has been formulated eloquently by Jerome
Bruner
in a challenge to traditional Western foundationalism:
We construct many realities,
and do
so from differing intentions. But we do not construct them out of
Rorschach
blots, but out of the myriad forms in which we structure experience
-- whether
the experience of the senses..., the deeply symbolically encoded
experience
we gain through interacting with our social world, or the vicarious
experience
we achieve in the act of reading... It is not the case that a
constructivist
philosophy of mind (or of literary meaning) disarms one either
ontologically
or ethically. Interpretations, whether of text or of world
experience, can
be judged for their rightness. Their rightness, however is not to be
reckoned
by correspondence with an aboriginal "real" world "out there."
For such a "real world" is not only indeterminate epistemologically,
but even empty as an act of faith. Rather, meaning (or "reality"
for in the end the two are indistinguishable) is an enterprise that
reflects
human intentionality and cannot be judged for its rightness
independently
of it. But "World making," ... starting as it does from a prior
world that we take as given, is constrained by the nature of the
world version
with which we begin the remaking... If there are meanings
"incarnate"
in the world (or in the text with which we start) we transform them
in the
act of accepting them into our transformed world, and that
transformed world
then becomes the world with which others start... (158)
As we reflect on the
Buddhist Vinayas
our challenge is therefore one of discovering, rediscover and
understand meaning
by reconstructing ourselves in the
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process of reconstructing a
Buddhist
ethics. Although the process involves the study, revision, and
generating of
Gens, of general ethical principles, statements, propositions and
injunctions,
it is ultimately not about rules, but about behaviors and their
meanings. The
rules are benchmarks that guide not only moral choice and behavior,
but the
meanings that those choices and behaviors carry.
But, since meaning is a
fact of
language and society, and not simply a creation of psychological
motivations,
ethical discourse, talk about the Vinayas is talk about cultural (and
historical)
realities, not about disembodied principles of reason. We are
therefore in a
quest to find a common language, a common way of generating meaning, a
common
story. This conception of the generation of meaning has been so aptly
expressed
by Michelle Rosaldo (1984: 140):
[M]eaning is a fact of
public life,
... [C]ultural patterns -- social facts -- provide the template for
all human
action, growth and understanding. Culture so construed is,
furthermore, a
matter less of ... propositions, rules, schematic programs, or
beliefs, than
of associative chains and images that tell what can be reasonably
linked up
with what; we come to know it through collective stories that
suggest the
nature of coherence, probability and sense within the actor's world.
Culture
is, then, always richer than the traits recorded in the
ethnographer's accounts,
because its truth resides not in explicit formulations of the
rituals of daily
life but in the daily practices of persons who in acting take for
granted
an account of who they are and how to understand their fellows'
moves.
If we change the phrase
"culture
is always richer than the traits recorded in the ethnographer's
accounts"
to read "the experience and practice of ethics is always richer that
the
rules promulgated by the monastic codes and the philosopher's
speculations,"
Rosaldo's statements about culture summarize the gist of the position I
have
tried to formulate here: that rules and ideas are part of the
interactional
fabric, and that this fabric is not so much rational, logical, or
ontological,
as interpersonal and linguistic. This fabric is best expressed,
preserved, and
transformed in the rituals and the stories of a religion. [13]
But, this is not to say that the text of ritual and human interaction
is not
in need of interpretation, in need of being
13.
Bruner (1986: 122): "the 'realities' of the society and of social life
are themselves most often products of linguistic use as represented in
such
speech act as promising, abjuring, legitimizing, christening, and so
on. Once
one takes the view that a culture itself comprises an ambiguous text
that is
constantly in need of interpretation by those who participate in it,
then the
constitutive role of language in creating social reality becomes a
topic of
practical concern."
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made "explicit" at the level
of intellectual and rational understanding. We need no more proof that
our presence
here today to show that in the type of society in which we live,
rational exploration
is an integral part of the interpersonal process of generating meaning
-- scholars
and schools are one of the institutions, one of the "forums" for the
negotiation of meaning (Bruner).
This is what we are here
for today
to renegotiate or rather to continue the process of renegotiation. But
negotiations
of this type, like any other negotiation, are not possible when one
sees the
uncertain ground of communication, the diversity and tensions of
meanings, and
the fluidity of culture as a threat. We must see the precariousness of
our worlds
not as hazards, but as risks inherent in opportunity for renegotiating
a Buddhist
ethics that responds to the broad ethical needs of our age.
The need to examine
critically some
of the ancient mystifications, the need to renew the myths and symbols
that
sustain Buddhist ethical life, does not mean the end of religious awe.
The collapse
of ancient systems of understanding does not entail the disappearance
of beauty
and awe. As Daniel Dennett eloquently argues in Consciousness
explained (Dennett,
1991: 25):
[L]et us remind ourselves of
what
has happened in the wake of earlier demystifications. We find no
diminution
of wonder; on the contrary, we find deeper beauties and more
dazzling visions
of the complexity of the universe than the protectors of mystery
ever conceived.
The "magic" of earlier visions, was, for the most part, a cover-up
for frank failures of imagination, a boring dodge enshrined in the
concept
of a deus ex machina. Fiery gods driving golden chariots across the
skies
are simpleminded comicbook
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fare compared to the
ravishing strangeness
of contemporary cosmology, and the recursive intricacies of the
reproductive
machinery of DNA make élan vital about as interesting as Superman's
dread
kryptonite... [When] there is no more mystery, [things will] be
different,
but there will still be beauty, and more room than ever for awe.
Key words: 1. Buddhist
ethics
2. Buddhist morality 3. Vinaya 4. Practicing Precepts