- Analysis of Consciousness
- Dr. Peter Della Santina
Because of its importance and scope, I will
dedicate three chapters to
the analysis of consciousness within Abhidharma philosophy. In
this chapter I look at some
of the systems for classifying consciousness and also at the
sense-sphere consciousness in
particular. To understand why we begin our Abhidharmic analysis of
experience with
consciousness, it is important to remember the therapeutic concern
of Buddhist philosophy
in general and the Abhidharma in particular. The starting point of
Buddhist thought is the
truth of suffering. Suffering is a problem of consciousness; only
that which is conscious
can suffer. Consciousness is subject to suffering because of
ignorance, or fundamental
not-knowing, which divides consciousness into subject and object,
into a self and an
other-than-self (i.e., the objects and people around the self).
In Buddhism, ignorance is defined as the notion
of a permanent,
independent self and its object. Once we have this division of
consciousness into a self
and an other-than-self, we have suffering, because tension is
created between the two. We
also have craving and aversion, because we want those things that
support the self and are
averse to those things that are not conducive to the self.
This division or discrimination between the
self (or subject) and the
other-than-the-self (or object) is the fundamental cause of
suffering. Such a division is
possible because of ignorance--the belief in a real self existing
independently and in
opposition to the other-than-self. Thus it is not surprising that
the Abhidharma should
turn first to an analysis of subjectivity and objectivity. Indeed,
when we examine the
teaching of the five aggregates, we see that form (rupa) is the
objective component, while
name (nama), consciousness, and the mental aggregates of volition,
perception, and feeling
are the subjective component.
Before looking at how this division affects the
Abhidharmic analysis of
consciousness, we must be clear about what it means. In Buddhism,
this division does not
mean that we have an essential, irreducible duality of mind and
matter. Buddhism is not
concerned with mind and matter as ultimate metaphysical facts but
with mind and matter as
they are experienced. Mind and matter are forms of experience, not
essences. This is why
Buddhism is a phenomenological, not an ontological, philosophy,
and why the division of
mind and matter in Buddhism is a phenomenological division.
There are two systems for classifying
consciousness in the Abhidharma:
objective and subjective. Objective classification refers to the
objects of consciousness,
while subjective classification refers to the nature of
consciousness. Objective
classification primarily takes into account the direction in which
consciousness is
oriented. Within this objective scheme, there is a division into
four classes of
consciousness: (1) the sense-sphere consciousness, or
consciousness directed toward the
world of sense desire (kamavachara); (2) the consciousness
directed toward the sphere of
form (rupavachara); (3) the consciousness directed toward the
formless sphere
(arupavachara); and (4) the consciousness directed toward nirvana
(lokuttara).
The first three classes of consciousness are
worldly (lokiya) and are
concerned with the world of conditioned things. The fourth class,
also known as
supramundane consciousness (alokiya chitta), refers to the
transcendental direction of
consciousness (lokuttara) and is the consciousness of the four
types of noble ones--the
stream-winner, once-returner, non-returner, and liberated one (see
Chapter 35).
The object of the kamavachara is material and
limited; the object of
the rupavachara is not material but is still limited; and the
object of the arupavachara
is not material and is unlimited. If we look at these three in
order, we find (a) a
material and limited object, (b) an immaterial but still limited
object, and (c) an
immaterial and unlimited object of consciousness. All three types
of consciousness are
directed toward mundane objects. There is a progressive
unification and homogenization in
the object of each consciousness. The object of the consciousness
of the sphere of sense
desire is the most proliferated and differentiated, those of the
form and formless types
of consciousness are increasingly less proliferated. The fourth
type of consciousness is
directed toward a transcendental type of object.
Let us now look at the subjective
classification of consciousness. This
consciousness has to do with the nature of the subjective
consciousness itself and is also
divided into four classes: the wholesome consciousness (kusala),
the unwholesome
consciousness (akusala), the resultant consciousness (vipaka), and
the ineffective or
functional consciousness (kiriya). The wholesome and unwholesome
classes are karmically
active classes of consciousness; in other words, they have karmic
potential. The resultant
and functional types of consciousness are not karmically active
and do not have karmic
potential. The resultant class cannot bring about results because
it is itself the result,
while the functional class cannot do so because its potentiality
is exhausted in the
action itself.
We can thus place the wholesome and unwholesome
categories in the more
general category of karmically active consciousnesses, and the
resultant and functional
types into the category of passive consciousnesses that do not
have karmic potential. It
might be useful to look for a moment at the meaning of the terms
'wholesome' (kusala) and
'unwholesome' (akusala), and then at the definition of the
wholesome and unwholesome
categories of subjective consciousness. Wholesome means 'what
tends toward cure' or 'what
tends toward desirable results.' Here we are again reminded of the
therapeutic concern of
Buddhist philosophy. Unwholesome means 'what tends toward
undesirable results' or 'what
tends toward perpetuation of suffering.' The terms 'wholesome' and
'unwholesome' are also
related to skillful and unskillful, or intelligent and
unintelligent, moments of
consciousness.
However, for convenience, people still
sometimes refer to wholesome and
unwholesome consciousness as good and bad, moral and immoral.
'Wholesome' and
'unwholesome' can also be defined with reference to the three
wholesome and unwholesome
root causes (non-greed, non ill-will, and non-delusion, and greed,
ill-will, and delusion,
respectively). Greed, ill-will, and delusion are the derivative
forms of fundamental
ignorance, which is the mistaken notion of a self as opposed to
what is other-than-self.
Ignorance in its fundamental sense might be likened to the root of
a tree, and greed,
ill-will, and delusion to its branches.
The karmic potential of a moment of
consciousness conditioned by any of
the three unwholesome causes is unwholesome, while the potential
of a moment conditioned
by any of the three wholesome causes is wholesome. These wholesome
and unwholesome classes
of consciousness are karmically active, and they are followed by a
resultant class--in
other words, by the ripened results of those wholesome and
unwholesome actions. The
inactive or functional class refers to actions that are not
productive of further karma,
and that also do not result from wholesome and unwholesome karma,
such as the actions of
enlightened ones--the Buddhas and Arhats--and deeds of indifferent
or neutral karmic
content.
In addition to these two general systems for
classifying
consciousness--the objective, which classifies consciousness
according to its object and
direction, and the subjective, which classifies consciousness
according to its nature--we
have a third system in which consciousness is distinguished
according to feeling,
knowledge, and volition.
In the classification according to feeling,
every conscious factor
partakes of an emotional quality: agreeable, disagreeable, or
indifferent. These three can
be expanded into five by dividing the agreeable category into
mentally agreeable and
physically agreeable, and the disagreeable category into mentally
disagreeable and
physically disagreeable. There is no category of physically
indifferent consciousness
because indifference is primarily a mental quality.
In the classification in terms of knowledge,
again we have a threefold
division: conscious factors accompanied by knowledge of the nature
of the object,
conscious factors unaccompanied by knowledge of the nature of the
object, and conscious
factors accompanied by definite wrong views about the nature of
the object. These can also
be called the presence of correct knowledge, the absence of
correct knowledge, and the
presence of erroneous knowledge.
Finally, in the classification according to
volition, there is a
twofold division into automatic and volitional consciousness--in
other words, moments of
consciousness that are automatic in nature, and moments that have
an intentional element.
Let us now look at the sense-sphere
consciousness (kamavachara). There
are fifty-four types of consciousness in this category, which
divide into three groups:
The first group consists of twelve factors that are karmically
active and that have
unwholesome karmic potential. The twelve can be subdivided into
factors conditioned by one
of the three unwholesome conditions of greed, ill-will, and
delusion.
The second group consists of eighteen reactive
or passive factors of
consciousness, which can be further broken down into those that
are resultant and those
that are functional. Fifteen of the eighteen are resultant, and
refer in general terms to
experiences that are agreeable or disagreeable, the result of
wholesome or unwholesome
factors experienced through the five physical senses and the sixth
mental sense. The
remaining three are functional, having no karmic potential and not
being the consequence
of karmically active wholesome or unwholesome factors.
The third category consists of twenty-four
wholesome factors of
consciousness that are karmically active and thus have karmic
potential conditioned by
non-greed, non-ill-will, and non-delusion.Within the class of
sense-sphere consciousness,
therefore, we have fifty-four types of consciousness that can be
analyzed in terms of
active and passive, wholesome and unwholesome, resultant and
functional, and even in terms
of feeling, knowledge, and volition.
I want to conclude by spending a few moments on
the multivalent nature
of terms in the Abhidharma in particular and in Buddhism in
general. The factors of
consciousness listed in the Abhidharma, and the terms used to
describe them, have
different values and meanings according to the functions they
perform. Failure to
understand this leads to confusion about Abhidharmic
classifications.
Even in the early years of the Abhidharma,
there were critics who
failed to understand that the factors in it are classified
functionally, not
ontologically. What this means is that if you survey the factors
of consciousness listed
in the Abhidharma literature, you find the same factor occurring
in different categories.
Your initial conclusion may be that there is a great deal of
repetition in Abhidharmic
material, but this is not the point. The presence of the same
factor in different
categories is due to its functioning differently in each one.
The commentary to the Dhammasangani
(Classification of Factors) records
the objection of repetition raised by an opponent. It replies with
the analogy that when a
king collects taxes from people, he does so not on the basis of
their existence as
identifiable individuals, but of their functions as earning
entities. (This is also the
case today, when one pays taxes on the basis of being a property
owner, a salaried worker,
on the earnings of one's stocks and bonds, and so forth.) In the
same way, the factors
enumerated in the Abhidharma occur in different categories because
in each case it is the
factor's function that counts, not its essence.
This is also the case with terms. We need to
understand terms in
context--by the way they are used--rather than imposing rigid,
essentialistic, and
naturalistic definitions. Take, for instance, 'suffering' (dukkha)
and 'happiness'
(sukha). In the analysis of the factors of consciousness, these
terms mean physical
suffering and physical happiness. Yet when we talk about dukkha in
the context of the
first noble truth, it includes not only four physical sufferings
but also four mental
sufferings. Similarly, sankhara means simply 'volition' in one
context but 'all compounded
things' in another.
Thus when we study the Abhidharma, we need to
understand the words in
context. If we keep this in mind, we will be adopting the
phenomenological spirit of
Buddhist philosophy and will find it easier to approach the
significance of what is being
said. Otherwise, we will find ourselves trapped into rigid,
unworkable definitions of
terms and rigid, unhelpful ideas about factors of experience.
-oOo-
[Taken from Peter Della Santina., The
Tree of Enlightenment. (Taiwan:
The Corporate Body of the Buddha Educational Foundation, 1997),
pp. 2911972].